

# Tonkin Bay: Was There a Conspiracy?

Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair—Illusion and Reality by Joseph C. Goulden.

A James B. Adler Inc. Book, published in association with Rand McNally, 283 pp., \$6.95

Peter Dale Scott

Seaman Patrick N. Park, on the night of August 4, 1964, was directing the gun-control radar of the *USS Maddox*. For three hours he had heard torpedo reports from the ship's sonarman, and he had seen, two or three times, the flash of guns from a nearby destroyer, the *Turner Joy*, in the rainy darkness. But his radar could find no targets, "only the occasional roll of a wave as it breaks into a whitecap." At last, just before midnight, a target: "a damned big one, right on us... about 1,500 yards off the side, a nice fat blip." He was ordered to open fire; luckily, however, not all seamen blindly follow orders.

Just before I pushed the trigger I suddenly realized, That's the *Turner Joy*.... There was a lot of yelling of "Goddamn" back and forth, with the bridge telling me to "fire before we lose contact," and me yelling right back at them.... I finally told them, "I'm not opening fire until I know where the *Turner Joy* is." The bridge got on the phone and said, "Turn on your lights, *Turner Joy*." Sure enough, there she was, right in the cross hairs... 1,500 yards away. If I had fired, it would have blown it clean out of the water. In fact, I could have been shot for not squeezing the trigger. Then people started asking, "What are we shooting at...?" We all began calming down. The whole thing seemed to end then.

Goulden's fascinating book, which has gathered much new information about the Tonkin Gulf incidents, sees the experience of Patrick Park as, with one exception, a microcosm of the entire Tonkin affair—

illustrating the confusion between illusion and reality and the inclination of man to act upon facts as he anticipates they should be, rather than what rational examination shows them to be. The exception is that Park refused to squeeze the firing knob while Washington acted on the basis of assumption, not fact—hastily, precipitously, perhaps even unneces-

sarily—firing at an unseen enemy lurking behind the blackness of misinformation.

Not all will accept the analogy between Washington and a confused young seaman, but this hardly lessens the importance of Goulden's patient researches. The author of a book on AT&T and a former reporter for the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Goulden has made good use of his years of experience in Washington. He has not really written a "thesis" book; his method is to stick closely to official documents (above all the neglected Fulbright Committee Hearing of 1968)<sup>1</sup> and first-hand interviews with witnesses the Committee failed to call, including Seaman Park. At times he can be faulted for believing so much what was told him in the Pentagon. Even so, the

result is devastating. It is now even more clear that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (in his words) "contains the fatal taint of deception." The Administration had withheld much vital information in formulating the simple story of "unprovoked attack" by which that resolution was pushed through Congress.


The *Maddox*, according to McNamara in 1964, was on a "routine patrol in international waters." In fact it was on an electronics intelligence (ELINT) or spy mission for the National Security Agency and CIA. One of its many intelligence requirements orders was "to stimulate Chicom-North Vietnamese electronic reaction," i.e., to provoke the North Vietnamese into turning on their defensive radars so that the frequencies could be measured. To this end, between August 1 and 4, the *Maddox* repeatedly simulated attacks by moving toward the shore with its gun control radar mechanism turned on, as if it were preparing to shoot at targets. In so doing, it violated the twelve-mile limit which Pentagon officials thought North Vietnam claimed for her territorial waters.<sup>2</sup> Far from being "routine," this was only the third such patrol in the Tonkin Gulf in thirty-two months; and the North Vietnamese had to assess it in the context of a recent US build-up and South Vietnamese threats to carry the war north. On July 31, just before the patrol, the South Vietnamese had for the first

heard North Vietnamese orders to position a defensive ring of PT boats around Hon Me after the first South Vietnamese attack on the North Vietnamese islands, as well as speculations about the possible link between the *Maddox* and the raids.

Near Hon Me on the morning of August 2 the NSA technicians intercepted orders for PT boats to attack the *Maddox*. Captain Herrick, aboard the *Maddox* cabled to his superiors in Honolulu that "continuance of patrol presents an unacceptable risk," but was ordered to resume his itinerary. The *Maddox* returned to a point eleven miles from Hon Me island, and then heard a North Vietnamese order for its attack. This was the prelude for the first incident of August 2—it is clear both that a North Vietnamese attack was ordered and

According to *The New York Times* (Aug. 11, 1964, p. 15) the *Ticonderoga's* Task Force Commander Rear Admiral Robert B. Moore "indicated that the destroyer might have been two or three miles inside the 12-mile limit set by Hanoi for international waters."

McNamara told the Committee that the *Maddox* could simulate an attack on the coast by turning on special transmitters, but the Pentagon later said the ship carried passive equipment and could only listen.



BY STEWART ALSOP

## WOLF, WOLF

WASHINGTON—Gerard C. Smith, the chief American negotiator at the SALT talks in Helsinki, is in a rather feeble bargaining position, for reasons that are hardly understood at all in this country. He is in the position of saying to his Russian interlocutors: "If you fellows will please stop what you're doing already, we'll promise not to do what we're not going to do anyway."

The history of negotiating with the Russians hardly suggests that they will warmly welcome this sort of deal. But it is really the only sort of deal Smith is in a position to offer.

On the offensive side, there are three major categories of strategic weapons. The most important, of course, is the ICBM. This country turned out its last Minuteman ICBM back in 1967. The Soviets are still churning out their various versions of the ICBM like sausages, at a rate of more than 300 a year. They now have some 1,350 operational ICBM's, about 300 more than we have. Their biggest ICBM is the SS-9, which has a warhead about twenty times as powerful as Minuteman's.

### TARGET: MINUTEMAN

The Minuteman warhead, split into three independently targeted vehicles (MIRV's) could be used to wreck three cities. But the Minuteman MIRV's would not be powerful enough to dig an SS-9 or other Soviet ICBM out of its underground silo. The SS-9 warhead, similarly MIRVed, would have the kind of power (about 5 megatons) needed to knock a Minuteman out of its silo, given the accuracy attributed to the SS-9 by the intelligence specialists. The specialists have concluded that knocking out the Minuteman complex must be the purpose of the SS-9s. Since the smaller Soviet SS-11s have all the power needed to wreck any American city, what else can the SS-9s be for?

The Soviets have about 280 SS-9s operational now, and they are now believed to be building the weapons at a rate of more than 50 a year. John Foster, chief Pentagon scientist, has said that it would require about 420 MIRVed SS-9s to destroy 95 per cent of the U.S. Minuteman force.

The story is similar in the other chief categories of offensive strategic weapons—submarine-based missiles, and bombers. The United States produced its last nuclear sub in 1966, while the Soviets are turning out

subs at the rate of about one a month. We have produced no strategic bombers in seven years, and the B-52s are getting very elderly. The Russians are testing a new, swing-wing bomber. It has a shorter range than the B-52, but with air refueling it could reach targets in this country.

On the defensive side, there is evidence—including huge new radar installations the size of several football fields—that the Soviets are greatly improving their existing, 67-missile anti-missile system. Our ABM system, which passed the Senate by a single vote, is of course strictly on paper—it will not be operational before 1974.

### POSITION: FEEBLE

So what is Mr. Smith to say to the Russians? "Please stop making SS-9s, and nuclear subs, and bombers, and we won't make any either, which we have no plans for doing anyway"? Or: "Please tear down your existing ABM system, and we'll tear up our paper plans for our system"?

Gerard Smith's bargaining position is certainly not hopeless—we are still unquestionably technically superior in some areas, notably the submarine-launched missiles. But it is much feebler than most people realize. One reason its feebleness is so little understood is what might be called the "wolf-wolf syndrome."

The famous "missile gap" of the 1950s turned out not to be a gap at all, but an inflated intelligence estimate of Soviet missile production. The politicians—Sen. Stuart Symington, for example—who had taken the estimates at face value and made impassioned speeches warning of the danger to American security, were left looking a bit foolish, like the people who responded to the boy's cries of "Wolf, wolf!" in the fable. So now, in response to such facts as those given above, there has not been a peep out of Senator Symington, and hardly a peep out of anybody else.

The trouble is that this wolf is real. The intelligence is based, not on estimates, but on very detailed spy-satellite pictures. "When they build a new missile complex," said one expert at lunch at a restaurant, "we see it just as clearly as you and I can see that couple over there."

In fact, the intelligence people are beginning to worry that they may not be seeing everything quite that clearly. The Russians, who used to be surpris-

ingly naïve in certain ways—notably, internal communication—are getting pretty sneaky and sophisticated.

For example, they recently fired a new missile at low altitude wholly within the U.S.S.R., from Plesetsk to the Kamchatka Peninsula, a distance of 3,500 miles. They took certain technical measures that were designed to persuade the U.S. intelligence that the missile was really a space vehicle. But intelligence specialists are now unanimous that the missile is a new prototype ICBM, a follow-on to the SS-9.

The SS-9 and the other Soviet ICBM's were test-fired over the Pacific, which made it easy to record the flight pattern, and get a very accurate "profile" of the weapon, including accuracy and warhead megatonnage. Because the new weapon was test-fired at low altitude within the U.S.S.R., its profile is fuzzy. "We had to stand on tiptoe to see it at all," says one intelligence man, "and we didn't see it very well."

### MISSION: PRESERVATION

The fact that it was necessary to "stand on tiptoe" to see the new weapon is not a very good augury for the SALT talks, because any agreement will have to be based on "national means of detection"—meaning, mostly, spy satellites. But even without standing on tiptoe, the intelligence has confirmed beyond dispute that the Russians have been making really impressive strides in strategic weaponry, and nobody seems to care.

A subsidiary reason why nobody seems to care may be that the intelligence bureaucracy lacks the clout it had in the days when Allen Dulles or John McCone was an immensely powerful figure in the Washington power structure. Richard Helms, the current CIA chief, is an able intelligence officer, but he keeps strictly out of policy questions, and as the CIA has become increasingly bureaucratic, its chief mission, as with all bureaucracies, has become its own self-preservation.

But the main reason nobody seems to care is, of course, our national disease, Vietnam. Vietnam has produced such a revulsion against all things military that absolutely hard intelligence is dismissed as mere propaganda from the military-industrial complex. So the wolf growls and scratches at the door, and nobody notices. Perhaps the SALT talks will tame the wolf, but it would be unwise to count on it.

4 DEC 1969

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

*Inside Washington*CIA's Helms Wins  
Senate Doves' OKBy ROBERT S. ALLEN and  
JOHN A. GOLDSMITH

WASHINGTON—It is hard to believe, but Richard Helms, director of the much-criticized Central Intelligence Agency, has become a darling of the Senate dovescote.

A career intelligence officer, with CIA since its founding in 1947, Helms was named director by President Johnson in 1966. President Nixon renewed the appointment early this year.

In subordinate posts Helms had seen CIA blamed abroad and at home, for goofs of all proportions. He served under two colorful and much-publicized directors of central intelligence, gentleman-spy Allen W. Dulles and hard-driving industrialist John A. McCone.

Now it is being said — and by the most critical of the Senate doves — that career-man Helms has brought a new respectability to the quiet campus-like CIA headquarters in Langley.

Exhibit A in this regard is Sen. Mike Mansfield, Mont., the Senate Democratic leader. Mansfield has been a frequent critic of Vietnam policies and of other aspects of national security planning by two administrations.

For years Mansfield has, in addition, been a leader of a so-far unsuccessful drive to apply a tighter congressional oversight to CIA activities. Yet Mansfield says Helms "has brought a respectability and integrity to the CIA...and given it the kind of standing which it lacked prior to the time he took over.

"I must say, like all those who have come in contact with him, I have been tremendously impressed. I think he is by far the best director the CIA has ever had. Because of Mr. Helms that agency's integrity and standing have increased considerably, at least in the congressional community," says Mansfield.

ALSO FULBRIGHT — Mansfield made those comments in the Senate's secret debate on the ABM Safeguard system weeks ago. The transcript of that debate, censored and reviewed, was made public only last week. CIA data was quoted by both sides in the secret discussion, but Safeguard opponents stressed the agency's finding, made without further evaluation or comparison, that Russia had suspended work on its anti-missile system.

**"APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS"**

— Helms has always enjoyed the confidence of the rather hawkish senior members of the House and Senate who ride herd on CIA operations through special intelligence subcommittees. There is therefore, a real significance in his present high standing among the agency's long-time critics.

He has, in the first place, made it clear that, as the nation's top intelligence officer, he will provide the best possible reading, without bias and without trying to evaluate events abroad against developments (weapon or otherwise) in the United States. In short, Helms will provide the best available basis for U.S. policies without trying to make them.

CIA critics were never sure that Dulles and McCone were willing to stop at that.

With respect to CIA's operational responsibilities, those shadowy clandestine activities which have provoked most of CIA's criticism over the years, Helms has carefully lived up to a pledge made during his Senate confirmation hearings in 1966:

"Sir," said Helms on that occasion, "the Central Intelligence Agency takes no actions without approval from the appropriate officials of the U.S. Government, and they are not in the CIA."

After more than three years, CIA's critics are beginning to believe him.

## INTELLIGENCE:

## Our Man at State

Over the years, U.S. intelligence operations have often given the impression that the cloak did not know what the dagger was doing. Within the vast, interlocking network of agencies that make up what is known as the "intelligence community," intramural bickering and poor



J.H. Darchinger IFJ

## Cline: 'Betwixt and between'

coordination have played a key role in every major intelligence blunder—from Francis Gary Power's wayward U-2 flight to the Bay of Pigs. Now, however, the Nixon Administration is moving quietly to sort out the lines of communication.

Senior Administration officials reject words like "overhaul" and "shake-up" to describe the changes in the intelligence community. But the effect has been the same. Operating with a minimum of fuss, the White House has given a new look to the top echelon of intelligence personnel, installing new chiefs at the supersecret National Security Agency (which concentrates on monitoring radio transmissions and breaking codes) and at the Defense Intelligence Agency (which evaluates information gathered by the armed forces). Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird now has a "Special Assistant for Intelligence," Assistant Secretary Robert F. Froehke, who among other things controls all the budget strings of the Pentagon's manifold intelligence activities. On top of all this, Mr. Nixon had Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms—a man of exceptionally high standing in the Administration—set up a top-level interagency committee to supervise the over-all allocation of resources within the intelligence community.

But the innovation that raised most eyebrows in Washington was the appointment of Ray S. Cline, 51, a veteran CIA officer, to head the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State. The appointment, which reportedly originated in the White House but had the approval of Secretary of State William Rogers, places a CIA hand in the sensitive State Department intelligence post for the first time. The Administration knew that hostile propagandists would cite the appointment as living proof that the State Department is really run by the CIA. But when Rogers set out to replace the present head of the intelligence section, Thomas L. Hughes (who has been posted to London as minister-counselor), he was looking for professionalism that was available only within the intelligence community itself. "Rogers wasn't trying to turn the State Department into another spook house," said one official. "But the intelligence bureau was too much of a library and clipping service, and he felt that State needed sharper and more imaginative work."

**Invention:** With Cline at the helm, State is likely to get what it is looking for. He holds an impressive set of credentials. Born in Anderson, Ill., and educated at Harvard and Oxford universities, he first came to Washington as a cryptanalyst in 1942 and has subsequently served as chief of the national-estimates staff (the key CIA group that produces the famous "country estimates" on which much of U.S. foreign policy is based), chief of the CIA's Sino-Soviet section, station chief of the huge China-watching complex in Taiwan and, most recently, the CIA's man in Bonn. In the shake-up that followed the Bay of Pigs in 1961, Cline became deputy director for intelligence—one of the four top deputy slots in the CIA. When John McCone left the agency, Cline came within a hair of becoming CIA director. Just before the CIA dispatched Cline to Bonn, he bluntly told McGeorge Bundy and other top Johnson aides that McCone's successor, Vice Adm. William Raborn, was ineffectual at his new job. A few months later, Raborn was replaced by the current CIA chief, Richard Helms. To every assignment, Cline brought an intellectual bent seldom found in intelligence operations. "The real invention of modern intelligence organization," he said recently, "is the awareness that it takes scholarship—that more is required than chasing fire trucks. I'm not a cloak-and-dagger twirler. I want to explore relevance in social science terms."

Even for a man of Cline's expertise and experience, the new post—which carries with it a seat on the U.S. Intelligence Board and the hush-hush 303 Committee that rules on complex operations—will have its pitfalls. "State wants me because they figure I'll monitor the CIA better," says Cline, "and the agency's delighted to have me because they think I'll represent their interests in State. It's a sort of betwixt and between."



PORTLAND, ORE.  
OREGONIAN

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

W - 245,132  
S - 407,136  
OCT 15 1969

# Lack Of Adequate Public Transportation Isolates Many Watts Residents

Fourth of Series

By PETER BERNSTEIN  
Washington Bureau, The Oregonian

LOS ANGELES — In Watts automobiles are relatively scarce and traveling even a short distance is a costly effort for many people, particularly those with jobs outside the ghetto.

A California state survey estimates that 42 per cent of Watts households do not have cars. Many families with cars say they do not operate with any degree of predictability.

Yet, for nearly a half-million persons living in predominantly Negro southcentral Los Angeles, there is no dependable mass transportation system.

The city has neither subways nor commuter trains. It is the only major city in the country which refuses to subsidize its private buslines. Consequently, bus service is bad. Taxicabs, which are found elsewhere in the city, steer clear of Watts and other poor Negro neighborhoods.

## New Light Seen

Since the 1965 riots, which focused attention on the ghetto's plight, the outlook has brightened somewhat.

Federal and state authorities joined forces three years ago to inject new life into the public transportation system as part of an effort to improve job opportunities for poor people.

As a result, several thousand ghetto residents today are getting to work on a new government-subsidized bus route from Watts to Los Angeles International Airport. The 15-mile trip takes about a half hour. It costs 30 cents. But before the new route opened under a \$2.7-million federal grant to California, the trip required three bus transfers and cost three times as much.

More significant is the fact that last spring the Southern California Rapid Transit District agreed to continue the bus route without financial assistance. Today up to 17,000 persons ride on it each week. There is at least the possibility that the bus will establish new routes on its own.

Minibuses Initiated

The federal-state partnership has led to creation of a minibus service, which has neither fixed routes nor a fixed schedule. It picks people up at their homes and drops them off where they work. The minibuses have been used largely by the non-profit Watts Labor Community Action Committee to shuttle men and women to the Santa Monica and Long Beach plants of Douglas Aircraft Co., one of the major employers in the Los Angeles area.

The twin improvements are the outgrowth of recommendations the McCone Commission made to former Gov. Pat Brown in its detailed investigation of the 1965 Watts area riot.

The blue-ribbon commission, headed by John A. McCone, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, devoted an entire chapter to the transportation problem.

"Our investigation," the commission said, "has brought into clear focus the fact that the inadequate and costly public transportation currently existing throughout the Los Angeles area seriously restricts the residents of the disadvantaged areas as south central Los Angeles."

"This lack of adequate transportation handicaps them in seeking and holding jobs, attending schools, shopping, and in fulfilling other needs. It has had a major influence in creating a sense of isolation, with its resultant frustrations, among the residents of south central Los Angeles, particularly the Watts area."

Four years later, however, many of the same problems persist.

Bus travel still is slow, unpredictable and expensive. It is a continuing source of irritation.

Details of the problem were made public a few weeks ago in a report by a group of transportation consultants under contract to the state.

"Transit service leaves something to be desired," the report says. Because of a bad bus system, it says, the west of Los Angeles is "essentially inaccessible" to Watts residents.

The consultants lay the blame for much unemployment directly on the inadequate bus system. They assert

that a bus rider traveling an hour has access to only a third of the job opportunities available to someone driving a car.

For example, a bus passenger riding from Watts to downtown Los Angeles, a distance of 10 miles, must transfer from one private bus line to another and pay two full fares. The trip costs 53 cents one way, and possibly even more if the rider needs to transfer to a third bus to travel elsewhere in the downtown area.

Likewise, it takes almost a two-hour ride on three buses to travel 16 miles from Watts to the employment hub in Santa Monica. Even worse, a bus trip to Beverly Hills, where many Negro women work as domestics, requires four bus transfers.

"One of the problems in the Los Angeles area is that it's so spread out," says William F. Hibbard, director of the federal-state transportation project. "If you don't have an automobile you're just grounded."

However, Hibbard believes the transportation problem is not all that bad. He is a civil engineer, not a sociologist, and this view reflects his long years as a staff member of the state utilities commission.

That some residents spend up to a quarter of their weekly income on bus fare is un-

fortunate, he says. But he adds, "You can't haul people for nothing — it costs money. In this city, two transfers aren't unreasonable. Some people even have to make three and four transfers, but that's the way the system operates."

Even so, the government is taking steps to expand the fledgling minibus service.

Last May, the government announced tentative plans to expand the unorthodox minibus service throughout south-

central Los Angeles. Details of the plan were jointly made public by Housing Secretary George Romney and Transportation Secretary John A. Volpe.

As a starter, the government gave \$70,000 to the Watts Labor Community Action Committee to operate an additional 10 minibuses for six months. Today the 11-passenger minis are being used for group outings as well as to take people from their homes to work.

Further expansion of the system will depend on how much money Congress appropriates in coming months for such mass transit demonstration programs.

In any event, federal and state transportation officials seem agreed that the minibus service operating without fixed schedules or routes is a major innovation.

As the service expands, so, too, will the mobility of Watts residents. The system already is being tested in a slum area of Kansas City, and several top transportation experts foresee the day when minibuses or other compact vehicles will be used for public transit in most cities and suburbs.

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

S 12258

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

October 9, 1969

of County officers. These dedicated officials presented irrefutable evidence of the impact the House tax reform bill has already had on their functions.

Their capital improvement programs cannot be initiated. Their bond issues have been authorized but the bonds cannot be sold. Bonds they have already issued are rapidly depreciating in value, causing considerable losses to their holders.

These witnesses reminded the Committee that the House tax reform bill would raise only \$80 million annually in revenues for the Federal Treasury through the tax on their bond interest. Then they carefully demonstrated that State and local taxes would have to go up by \$200 million a year to pay for it.

State and local tax structures generally are regressive—they fall more heavily on the poor than on the rich. Sales taxes, property taxes, gasoline taxes—these are the levies that would need to be hiked at State and local levels to pay the higher yields demanded by purchasers in anticipation of a Federal tax on their bond interest. These are the taxes that hit hardest at the poor.

Based on the testimony we received, the Committee on Finance concluded this morning that the provisions of the House bill taxing State and local bond interest constituted a very inefficient tax reform and should not be enacted. The Committee is hopeful that the action it has taken on this subject will restore confidence to the tax-exempt bond market and enable State and local governments to get on with the important work of improving services and facilities for their own citizens.

## ARBITRAGE BONDS

The Committee agreed to retain that provision in the House Tax Reform bill which would tax the interest earned on so-called "arbitrage bonds." However, the provision was modified to make it somewhat more objective.

Arbitrage bonds are bonds issued by a State or local government, the proceeds of which are reinvested in higher yield Federal or corporate securities.

The Committee felt that State and local governments should not use their tax exempt privilege for the purpose of gaining a higher return on other investments in this day of record-breaking interest rates.

The Committee action consists primarily of the addition to the bill of a definition of the type of bond to which the House bill referred but did not identify. It is made clear in this definition that bonds issued by a State and local government to provide funds for the financing of residential housing, sports facilities, airports, docks, wharves, mass commuting facilities and park facilities, air and water pollution control facilities, sewage or solid waste disposal facilities, or for facilities of the local furnishing of electric energy, gas or water would not be treated as arbitrage bonds, and the interest on bonds issued for these purposes would remain tax-exempt. These are the purposes for which an exception was provided when Congress acted last year to tax the interest earned on industrial development bonds.

## REPORTING OF TAX-EXEMPT INTEREST

The Committee also agreed to a provision which in the future would require that individuals and corporations receiving tax-exempt State and local bond interest must report their bond interest on their tax returns for statistical purposes only.

This will provide information as to where, in the income classes, interest on these bonds is received. This will indicate whether there are individuals with large amounts of this income who are avoiding the payment of any Federal taxes.

Today this interest is not reported on tax returns for any purpose. No one knows who receives this interest at the present time and this gap in our knowledge has led to consid-

erable speculation that these bonds are purchased primarily for their tax exemption.

The statistical knowledge gained by requiring that tax-exempt interest be identified on the tax return will permit a more national discussion of the question of whether these bonds are used primarily as a tax-avoidance device.

It is certainly true—although tax-purists are unwilling to concede it—that the purchaser of State and local bonds have already borne a tax, a tax in the form of a lower return on their money.

## ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, a carefully orchestrated tide of voices is now rising throughout the country demanding what amounts to immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. I notice that these self-appointed spokesmen no longer even mention the need for reciprocal moves from Hanoi. They want the United States to withdraw now—whatever the consequences. They cast aspersions upon the Thieu government, and they demand some kind of coalition that will admit to power the very subversive elements that the United States, South Vietnam, and our allies have been struggling against for many years.

Even though some eminent persons have lent their names to this protest movement, it is very disturbing to examine the makeup of the groups that are actually doing the work. Coordination of the activities is being done by the New Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam. The Washington weekly, Human Events, has revealed that the steering committee of "New Mobe" includes such people as Arnold Johnson, the public relations director of the U.S. Communist Party; Irving Sarnoff, an identified Communist who took the 5th amendment before the House Committee on Un-American Activities rather than say whether or not he was a Red; Sylvia Kushner, a radical activist in her own right and for many years the wife of Sam Kushner, who has served on the Communist Party's National Committee and as Los Angeles editor of the People's World, the west coast Communist Party newspaper; and Otto Nathan, charged by the State Department in 1955 with having been a German Communist who has a "consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line on a variety of issues."

The steering committee also includes Dave Dellinger and Rennie Davis, two of the people now on trial in Chicago on grounds of violating the U.S. antiriot law during the 1968 Democratic convention. Fred Halstead, an avowed Trotskyite, is also included, along with Robert Greenblatt. Human Events says that Greenblatt's bias was revealed last year when he went to Paris bearing a letter of introduction from Tom Hayden to a North Vietnamese, a Colonel Lao. The letter from Hayden introduced Greenblatt as a trusted worker in the cause and ended with this thought for Colonel Lao: "Good fortune. Victory."

Mr. President, this New Mobilization Committee is working hand and glove with the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, and does not attempt to conceal its relationship. I am sorry to say that cer-

tain Members of this body are vigorously supporting the Vietnam Moratorium Committee. Perhaps they have not examined its relationship with the New Mobilization Committee. I hope they will do so and withdraw from this effort.

The New Mobilization Committee does not hesitate to propagandize openly for the Vietcong. It is viciously anti-American. Theodore White has quoted Sam Brown as saying the following:

We've recognized the true nature of the United States. We saw the United States attack Cuba, it attacked the Dominican Republic, it attacked South Vietnam. The Communists are now a fragmented force; the United States is now the great imperialist-aggressor nation in the world.

This is not a peace movement. These people do not direct any antiwar protests against North Vietnam. They attack only the leaders of the American people.

The mood of the country is outraged now at the conduct of the war, but I warn that the country will be even more outraged if we surrender. The consequences will be so terrible for the people of South Vietnam, and the blow to American credibility will be so great that the balance of peace among the great powers may be irreparably dislodged.

Mr. President, we must not misjudge the temper of the Vietnam dissent. As reported recently in the Washington Post, a thorough study has been conducted of the supporters of the senior Senator from Minnesota (Mr. McCarthy) in his bid last year for the Democratic nomination in New Hampshire. The opinions of the Senator on Vietnam are well known. It was a great surprise, then, when this study showed that his supporters backed a harder line against Hanoi by a 3 to 2 margin. In other words, for every two "doves" in his camp, there were three "hawks" who were disgusted that the policy of the Johnson administration declined to seek victory in Vietnam. Although the news media played up the young supporters who were eager to project a liberal and radical image, the bulk of the Senator's support came from those who were deeply disturbed over the artificial and unreasonable restrictions placed upon the military conduct of the war.

This study was conducted by the survey research center of the University of Michigan, one of the most prominent such institutes in the field. It must also be noted that it was a study of past and present attitude, rather than an attempt to predict how voters might react in a future election.

We are now in the midst of another campaign. There is no doubt that the proponents of this campaign against the Vietnam war are seeking to manipulate public opinion, and to influence the course of events with regard to the war. It would be disastrous if Hanoi—or our own leaders—misread the nature of the discontent of the American people. Just as the news media misread the nature of this discontent last year, there is today a calculated attempt to misread and misinterpret the situation.

Let there be no mistake. The American people will not accept surrender. They will not agree to discard the sacrifice of

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

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
# BULLETIN


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NEWS OF THE WEEK

# Chevron

**STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA**

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SMILING skipper of the new supertanker is Commodore Renato Lepri.


The first of Standard of California's mammoth new supertankers takes to the sea; the S.S. John A. McCone can lift more than a million-and-a-half barrels of crude oil for delivery to refineries around the world

The first of Standard of California's 1970-size supertankers successfully completed her maiden voyage recently. The 212,000 dead-weight-ton S. S. John A. McCone delivered 1,500,000 barrels of Arabian crude oil to the Pernis refinery at Rotterdam. Lifting her cargo at Ras Tanura on the Persian Gulf, the huge vessel moved on a course that took her around the southernmost tip of Africa, up through the South and North Atlantic and into the English Channel to Holland.

The 11,200-mile voyage was made in 30 days, with the McCone making an average speed approaching 16 knots. Completion of the trip came approximately five months after christening ceremonies at the Kockums shipyard in Malmo, Sweden. The vessel is named for the nationally known industrialist and former government official who is chairman of the board of the Joshua Hendy Corporation and a director of Standard of California.

The McCone is a beautiful big ship: 1,037 feet stem to stern, 160-foot beam, with a draft of 62 feet fully loaded (24 feet greater than the Suez Canal). Sleek she is not, nor is she intended to be. Her beauty lies in the functional lines of her modern marine architecture.

THE COAST of Sweden falls behind as the S.S. John A. McCone moves into North Sea waters for sea trials. At right, the big tanker completes her maiden voyage at Rotterdam, bringing in 1,500,000 barrels of crude from the Persian Gulf.





# Who Makes U.S. Foreign Policy and How?

Roger Hillsman. To Move a Nation. The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967, XXII+602 pp.

In his book, Roger Hillsman, Professor at the Columbia University School of International Affairs analyses several aspects of the late U.S. President Kennedy's foreign policy, in the elaboration of which the author took part as Director of the State Departments' Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and later as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

The preface points out that the book is based on documents, interviews, talks and reminiscences, but that the author prefers not to disclose the sources because they were confidential. The book, however, is of great interest, as it sheds additional light on a short but unique period in modern U.S. history.

In the first chapters of the book, the author shows how foreign policy decisions are worked out and adopted. In the United States many departments and agencies deal with foreign policy questions, including the State Department, the Defence Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Disarmament and Arms Control Agency. As many as 16 government agencies directly deal with foreign policy matters, and another twenty are more or less involved.

The author writes that such a situation often leads to "abusive rivalries... between the government agencies engaged in making policy, and even within a single agency different factions battle, each seeking allies in other agencies, among the members of Congress, from interest associations, and among the press" (p. 8).

Accordingly, the author maintains that although, under the Constitution, the U.S. President is given great powers and is the sole foreign policy authority, in reality he can rarely issue an independent order even in a field which is supposed to be solely within his competence.

The author deals at length with the influence of the C.I.A. on the elaboration and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. He shows how intelligence is becoming intertwined with the diplomatic service, which is

used as a cover by the C.I.A. and military intelligence agents working abroad. The author writes that the C.I.A. is concentrating "the resources and instruments of foreign policy—the means to gather information in its agents abroad; the means to analyse information and develop policies and proposals in its research and analysis sections in Washington, and the means to implement policy with a whole range of instrumentalities, including C.I.A. station chiefs with their capacity for high-level representation" (p. 77).

At the same time the author is unable to conceal the fact that U.S. foreign policy is ultimately determined by monopoly capital, whose spokesmen hold key government posts connected with elaborating and implementing foreign policy. He writes that President Kennedy too selected his cabinet members with due regard to their connections with influential monopoly-capital groupings. The President, for example, appointed John McCone, a multi-millionaire and member of the Republican Party, to be director of the C.I.A. because he wanted "to make the conservatives in business, in industry, the military, and Congress feel that they and their foreign and defence policy interests would be represented" (p. 571).

The monopolists do not act through their government spokesmen alone, but also through a wide network of businessmen's organisations, including the National Association of Manufacturers, a union of the largest firms and corporations whose share of the country's industrial output totals as much as 66 per cent; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which is closely connected with the N.A.M.; the Economic Development Committee, and various funds and institutions. They all regularly submit to the government their foreign policy recommendations, mainly on economic matters.

The author also deals with U.S. foreign policy planning and its shortcomings. He writes that the "planning" is usually done by several governmental bodies. The U.S. policy in Vietnam, for example, was worked out by the State Department's Bureau of

Intelligence and Research, the White House and the headquarters of the Special Forces in Fort Bragg on the one hand, and by the Pentagon and the U.S. military headquarters in Saigon on the other.

On the whole, the author regards U.S. foreign policy as "a mixture of conflict and accommodation similar to that in domestic politics". That view makes the author come to the conclusion that "the business between nations, like the business of reaching decisions within a single nation, requires techniques for persuasions, negotiation, and bargaining as well as for manipulating power" (p. 552).

The Kennedy Administration continued to pursue U.S. imperialism's global policy, which it had inherited from the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. In that context, President Kennedy gave much attention to the establishment and consolidation of the U.S. 'Special Forces for suppressing the national liberation movements. To coordinate that work, President Kennedy set up an inter-departmental "counter-insurgency" committee under General Maxwell Taylor, and a "counter-insurgency" course was organised in the State Department; all those who were being sent to the "unstable" areas of the globe had to take this course, no matter how high they ranked.

The author then goes on to analyse U.S. policy towards Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, the Congo, the Chinese People's Republic and Indonesia. He believes that President Kennedy's decision to invade Cuba in 1961 was a mistake, and puts the blame partly on State Secretary Dean Rusk. "If the State Department and the Secretary stood up strong and clear against the plan," the author writes, "then he, the President, would have a choice" (p. 32).

In one section of the book, the author analyses the events which took place in the Caribbean in late 1962. He describes the distribution of forces in the U.S. Administration and its means of solving the crisis. He admits that the crisis was settled peacefully owing, to some extent, to President Kennedy's stand, and that it taught him a lot. It was only after the crisis that the President gave more consideration to the ways of "a lessening of tensions in the world and a détente with the Soviet Union" (p. 224).

The author deals at great length with the Vietnam problem, which was one of the most difficult world problems which President Kennedy had to



WASHINGTON STAFF  
6 JUL 1969

# Inside The White House In The Kennedy Years

## Clash Between Jackie and Her Social Secretary Tish Baldrige Comes to Light

By VERA GLASER and  
MALVINA STEPHENSON  
Knight Newspaper Syndicate

The private papers of former First Lady Jackie Kennedy disclose a somewhat different person than the vain, self-centered, extravagant and at times ill-tempered woman portrayed in the tattle-tale book by her former secretary, Mary Gallagher.

Revealed here for the first time are direct excerpts from the First Lady's verbatim inside-the-White House correspondence. Her memos were written to express herself with no thought of forming a public image.

She worried about drunken behavior by White House guests, about possible damage to the Red Room rug, and about demeaning the presidential seal by possible use on cigarette packs.

### Revealing Memos

The memos of Jackie Kennedy, now Mrs. Aristotle Onassis, reveal human foibles and perhaps some unattractive qualities.

But on the whole Jackie comes across—in her own words and in her most unguarded moments—as witty and sophisticated, with a sense of history and regard for the White House.

When Jackie directed her staff to refill half-empty cocktail glasses and pass them again, she meant it, but when she added: "Even if a few people do get hepatitis," it was her way of tossing off a quip.

Tagging newswomen "harpies," Jackie gaily suggested stationing "a couple of aides with bayonets near them all through the next dinner."

"They have a heck of a nerve," she said of a cigarette company, "plastering the presidential seal, which should be treated like the flag, all over their cigarettes. Please put a stop to it at once."

The memos reveal a female toughness when Jackie felt called upon to protect her children, Caroline and John, or the trappings of the presidency.

She professed not to "give a damn" about Vaughn Meader's best selling record spoofing the Kennedy family, but called him "a rat as far as the children are concerned."

### Clash With Tish

The memos also expose the long-suspected and bitter clash between Jackie and her social secretary, Letitia "Tish" Baldrige.

When Tish destroyed all of Jackie's detailed directions for the glittering Kennedy entertainments, the First Lady's sense of history was assaulted. Jackie found the action "mystifying and infuriating" and accused Tish of "calculated destruction."

Although Jackie tried to control what reached the public, she wrote, "I have never sent out one memo that I would have minded the world seeing ... the worst thing I have ever said is about the Archbishop of Canterbury's wife."

What that was the memos do not disclose.

The memos do confirm Jackie's extravagance, revealing that she spent \$15,000 on clothes in a three-month period.

Rather than trim her wardrobe, the First Lady cut back on food and liquor, according to the Gallagher account.

The economy also happened to jibe with Jackie's idea of White House decorum.

"Liquor often flows too freely here," she wrote the housekeeper, "and I find it as abhorrent to hear a reception turning into drunken laughter as I do to hear loud jazz crashing through the East Room. No one should ever get drunk in the White House; so will you see that at stag affairs and official receptions—especially the Judiciary—liquor flows much more slowly."

"People should get one drink immediately, have to do a little waiting or beckoning for a second one and really make it almost impossible for them to have a third." I think that is fair. They can have a good time and not get drunk.

"... Only exception for this would be that cultural fund raising party where the more they have to drink the more tables they sign up for."

"At the staff party I want them all to have as much as they want — as good a thing as possible — because I really think they liked it last year. For this party please remove all good ash trays."

### Callous About Hepatitis

"For our private parties and for any other occasions where guests may leave glasses, wander off, and order another drink, I suggest this: Tell butlers to take glasses which look relatively unfinished and don't have great lipstick marks on the edge, just fill them slightly, pass again — even if a few people do get hepatitis."

"Also make drinks weaker at our parties. As get plenty to drink; so don't rush to pass them drinks."

Jackie admitted in a note to housekeeper Anne

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MAY 25 1969

# Book Hits 'Legend' Of Cuban Crisis

Conley News Service

WASHINGTON — A prominent free Cuban lawyer-author is waging a determined attack on what he calls the legend that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was President John F. Kennedy's "finest hour."

Dr. Mario Lazo, who wrote the well-read "Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures In Cuba," has dedicated himself to help in the liberation of Cuba and to put the missile crisis into what he believes is the proper historical perspective.

Despite his 70 years he is engaged in a vigorous writing and lecture program.

"This is vital," Lazo said in an interview, "because in 1972 there might be another Kennedy (Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) running against President Nixon, and he will be doing so on the John F. Kennedy image. It has to be debunked."

## VERSION CHALLENGED.

Lazo, American-born, was once a prisoner of Fidel Castro and was under a death sentence following the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco.

He challenges the official version of the Cuban missile crisis as depicted by the late Sen. Robert Kennedy in the book, "Fourteen Days."

It isn't true, Lazo says, that the missiles on Cuban soil were first found out on Oct. 14, 1962 and that President Kennedy only heard of it on Oct. 16.

"I have a letter from the CIA Director John McCone stating that on Aug. 22 he had seen President Kennedy and had advised him that there was evidence the Russians were bringing missiles into Cuba," Lazo said.

He claims Kennedy refused to believe the report because of Russian assurances that while they had such powerful long-range rockets, they did not need to place any on foreign soil.

"President Kennedy believed only what he wanted to believe," Lazo said, "until it was too late."

## ESCAPE MADE

Lazo practiced law in Havana for 35 years. He was a legal representative of many government and private organizations.

He researched his book for seven years after he escaped from Cuba. When it emerged it reached conclusions diametrically opposed to "official" versions of the missile crisis.

Far from being a great victory claimed by the Kennedy administration, it was a "calamitous defeat," Lazo argues, because it left a protected sanctuary for communism, 90 miles from the American mainland, "without time limit and without the consent of other nations involved."

In exchange for the withdrawal of the missiles, he charges, President Kennedy agreed to withdraw American missiles from Turkey, Italy, and Britain.

## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

## New Peace Corps Chief Had CIA Ties

By Dreio Pearson  
and Jack Anderson

The late President Kennedy's orders to keep the Peace Corps free of any CIA taint have been quietly abandoned. The new Peace Corps head, dynamic, 34-year-old Joe Blatchford, came to the Nixon Administration from Accion, a volunteer organization that has accepted money from at least two CIA fronts.

President Kennedy was so determined to disassociate the Peace Corps from the Central Intelligence Agency that he gave strict instructions to his CIA chief, John McCone, and Peace Corps director, Sargent Shriver, to permit no liaison between the two agencies.

Carrying out these instructions, Shriver issued specific orders in 1962 to all his country directors in Latin America not to associate with anyone from Accion, because it was operating with the guidance of the CIA.

Now Accion's former executive director has been put in charge of the Peace Corps.

Blatchford was recommended by Pepsi Cola president Don Kendall, who is president of Accion. It was largely Kendall who persuaded one of Wall Street's most distinguished law firms in 1963 to accept Richard Nixon as senior partner. Thereafter, Nixon traveled around the world representing Pepsi Cola.

Accion has done some out-

standing volunteer work in Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina. However, it has received indirect CIA financing through the Donner Foundation and the Free Labor Committee.

Kendall also got a contribution for Accion from the Nixon law firm and appointed Nixon's law partner, Milton Rose, to Accion's board of directors.

Terry Holcombe, who replaced Blatchford as Accion's executive director, admitted to this column that Accion has received \$50,000 from the Donner Foundation.

"We would accept another donation," he added. "No one has said or done anything to convince me that the Donner Foundation did not act with Accion's best interests in mind. I believe the correct theory behind Shriver's orders for Peace Corps volunteers not to meet with members of Accion was to insure that Accion did not become a threat to the Peace Corps. I think Shriver was looking out for his own skin."

The president of the Donner Foundation, incidentally, is Franklin Johnson, a former CIA official.

Note: Despite the CIA taint, Blatchford is highly regarded as an able, aggressive administrator.

## Canceled Contract

Less than two weeks after this column exposed irregular-

ities in the Cheyenne helicopter program, the Army canceled its contract with Lockheed for the production of the combat helicopters. Lockheed stands to lose \$500 million in production profits.

We reported that Rep. Mendel Rivers, the czar of the House Armed Services Committee, blocked an investigation into the Cheyenne program last year. Earlier, Lockheed had helped erect a monument to Rivers in North Charleston, S.C.

New York's Rep. Otis Pike asked Rivers to investigate the skyrocketing Cheyenne costs a year ago. He cited the fact that an Army document, related to the Cheyenne contract, was signed by former Assistant Army Secretary Willis Hawkins, who came to the Pentagon from Lockheed and later returned to his same desk at Lockheed.

But Rivers, who has favored Lockheed in other backstage negotiations at the Pentagon, refused to listen to Pike.

"I was elected to run this Committee; I will handle it," Rivers snapped. "So I did handle it, and I called in my chief counsel, I called in Mr. Bates (Massachusetts Congressman William Bates, senior Republican on the Committee) . . . We handled it, and there wasn't any investigation."

"Right," said Pike wearily.

"So that is the situation," declared Rivers with finality. "Now, at least we got the Cheyenne."

When Pike raised his objections to the Cheyenne on the House floor, Rivers had Speaker John McCormack step down from the rostrum to settle the matter.

"Where the national interest of our country is concerned," intoned the Speaker, "if I am going to err in judgment, I would rather err on the side of strength . . . I am willing to follow the leadership of the gentleman from South Carolina (Rivers)."

On previous occasions, McCormack has joked that he and Rivers have their own private political party with a membership of two.

It now looks as if Rivers and McCormack were really protecting the interests of Lockheed, not of the country.

Note: The snow-manned Rivers and his chief counsel, Russ Blandford, run the Armed Services Committee in an arbitrary and arrogant manner. They make the multi-billion-dollar weapons decisions after mere token consultation with the membership. At hearings, other members are given only five minutes to question witnesses. Rivers keeps an alarm clock on the rostrum to let him know when the five minutes are up.

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PUBLIC TELEVISION

# THE PRODUCERS ORG

**CHARLES HORMAN**

*Mr. Horman is a free-lance writer based in New York.*

In the middle of April, there was an almost complete collapse of morale in the world of public television. Some of the events which precipitated the crisis were barely related; but, falling as they did within a short period of time, they combined to persuade the working producers that their interests were not being represented in public TV's corridors of power. For a couple of weeks, real life in educational broadcasting skipped along like a particularly hectic script from *Mission Impossible*—the plot included such elements as lifted documents, midnight meetings and impassioned phone calls.

Out of this turmoil has come a happy result—the formation of the first producers' organization that is more interested in political than in bread-and-butter issues. After only two weeks of organizing, the Association of Public Television Producers includes more than 90 per cent of the men and women who produce programming for national public television and a smattering of the producers from affiliate stations in San Francisco and Boston.

For years these men and women had been flying to Appalachia, Mississippi and the universities to record the discords associated with social change. In mid-April, those forces came home to them. The men who filmed organizers have become organizers themselves. The ideas they have dealt with professionally—community control, participatory democracy, collective action—suddenly describe their own desires and situation.

Where they go from here is uncertain. Although they have been influenced by the community organizers they have filmed, they certainly could not be characterized as a Movement group; they are not that young or that radical. But they feel the same tremors which are shaking other professional groups around the country—tremors which were also evident at recent meetings of the American Physical Society and at the March 4 "work stoppage" at M.I.T. It is not just the young, the poor and the dispossessed who want power to shape their lives; it is everybody.

The association was organized fast, and it is obvious to its members that it could splinter just as quickly from a variety of internal disputes over program or tactics. So far, therefore, they have been cautious about describing their plans. Recently, however, they issued a statement on three issues—all of them important.

(1) *Annual funding.* Although many people have talked about the need for "insulating public television's funds," the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is applying to Congress, once again, for financing on an annual basis. There is a good political reason for this; no one in the corporation thinks that, given the mood of the Congress, it can squeeze out more than one year's funds. Bill Duke, director of national affairs for the corporation, says it hopes to submit a plan for long-range funding to the Congress later this year (although the chances of success are slim) but the Producers Association says that the time is now.

Jack White, president of N.E.T., recently told a meeting of the affiliate stations that annual funding would turn public television into a "domestic USIA." The members of the Producers Association agree and will lobby, before the public and Senator Pastore's Communications subcommittee, for immediate long-range financing.

(2) *Board membership.* "The people appointed to control public television under the Corporation for Public Broadcasting," says the producers' statement, "do not now fully represent the pluralistic society they are charged to serve; the board should include men and women diverse enough in background to faithfully reflect our pluralistic society."

One N.E.T. producer—not a spokesman for the group—put it more vividly: "The corporation's board was rigged by the Establishment. It represents the narrowest kind of political and economic interests. It's a little military-industrial-financial complex all its own. There is certainly no one black, poor, or young on it. We could make the most incisive films on earth, and it wouldn't matter. I don't think they'd ever get on the air."

(3) *Direct censorship.* The producers fear the vetoes of a new panel, about to be established. This is the Public Broadcast System, an offshoot of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Its role is to assign time slots on the interconnected network lines. If the panel assigns you a time slot, you are seen by everybody (who watches public television). If the panel—for whatever reasons—does not assign you a time slot, the program is not seen on national public television. Thus, the members of the Public Broadcast System have virtual power of censorship over programming, if they choose to exercise it. "We are concerned," says the Producers Association, "that this board will be no more representative than the board of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and no better insulated from governmental and special interests."

Those are the association issues; but its significance goes far beyond them. An organization which has so quickly gained the allegiance of the vast majority of working producers is a powerful force, and its greatest power could be deployed inside the networks and local stations. It might—though so far it has not—throw its weight toward opening up new areas for documentary or news investigation. (For example, big business which, with the exceptions of two PBL forays, remains virgin territory for both public television and the commercial networks.)

There are other possibilities. The association might take in lower-level employees in public television or move into the commercial networks. It is conceivable that, had such a group existed several years ago at C.B.S., Fred Friendly might have won his battle with Frank Stanton, and the public might have seen George Kennan's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee instead of a sixth rerun of *I Love Lucy*.

Only a month ago, the Producers Association would not have been possible. Even now, it is difficult to believe that virtually all the producers from the Public Broadcast Laboratory and N.E.T. could have come together in one room and agreed on anything. That they agreed on something important is almost miraculous.

# An Exchange on the Missile Crisis

To the Editors:

As one who on occasion has been an admirer of Ronald Steel's writings, I was dismayed and saddened to read his review of Robert F. Kennedy's *Thirteen Days*. It is ill-informed; there are gross inaccuracies; and several quotations are so wrenched out of context that the result is simply the opposite of truth. And his overall judgments and conclusions are sometimes not only questionable as scholarship, but naive and simple-minded.

On the questions of quotations out of context, consider the following. Steel writes: "What happened was nothing less than a failure of intelligence, 'a failure,' in Hilsman's words, 'not of rationalization, but of imagination—a failure to probe and speculate, to ask perceptive questions of the data, rather than of explaining away the obvious.'"

But turn to my book, to the conclusions of my chapter, "The Intelligence Post-Mortem: Who Erred?", where one would expect to see my final judgment, and what do you find? "Given the inherent difficulties of espionage and the special circumstances... it is probably something to be proud of that the missiles were discovered as early as they were. In sum, Cuba in 1962, it seems to me, must be marked down as a victory for American intelligence—and a victory of a very high order."

Now that is just exactly the opposite of what Steel says my views are. Where did he find the quote he cites? He found it in an earlier part of the chapter, in a discussion not of American intelligence in the Cuban crisis, but of a small sub-unit of CIA involved in shipping intelligence, and the "failure" I speak of was the failure of this tiny sub-unit to report to higher authority that two of the ships bringing arms to Cuba had exceptionally large hatches and were riding high in the water, indicating space-consuming cargo. The sub-unit had not reported these facts—which were suggestive, but not decisive—because these ships, one of which had been built in Japan, were designed for the lumbering trade; and since the Soviets were short on ships, the shipping specialists thought it only natural that they should be using these, and so saw no significance in the reports. The part of the quote Steel left out was the crucial part: "The fact that the shipping specialists did not call these facts to the special attention of their intelligence superiors was clearly a failure. But it was a failure not of rationalization... and so on."

Again, Steel quotes my description of a memo, written the next day, about Gromyko's meeting with the President, which argued that the Soviets would assume from what was said in that meeting and in earlier meetings with Dobrynin, that Kennedy knew about the missiles. Steel

not plotting a surprise attack." The truth is that the conclusion was a major point of the memo, and the President's plans and actions were based on the judgment that the Soviets were *not* planning a surprise attack. To quote again from my book (page 201), "The Soviets did not put missiles in Cuba with the intent of using them in a military sense any more than the United States put Minutemen ICBM's in Montana with the intent of using them."

And there are many more, either misquotations or straight inaccuracies. It was not "shortly after assuming office" that Kennedy learned there was no missile gap, but in late summer, 1961, following an intelligence breakthrough. And it was not from U-2 flights and Penkovsky that we learned, as Steel asserts. U-2 flights were never made over the Soviet Union after May 1, 1960. And a moment of reflection on what Penkovsky's job was would reveal how unlikely it is that he would have known. Since Kennedy did not know there was no missile gap until late summer—although he may have begun to suspect it—he could not have decided after the Vienna meeting, as Steel would have it, to let the Soviets know by way of Roswell Gilpatrick's speech. Gilpatrick gave his speech in October, and the facts are that the decision to make the speech was made in the days immediately preceding it.

Another quotation from Steel: "Meanwhile reports kept flowing in from agents inside Cuba that missiles much longer than SAM's were being delivered..." There were in fact only two such reports, as is fully described in my book, which hardly justifies the suggestive phrase, "flowing."

Still another quotation from Steel: "There were available [for diplomacy] not only the Soviet ambassador and the famous 'hot line' direct to the Kremlin, recently installed with such fanfare..." Yet the truth is that the "hot line" was installed *after* the crisis, and partly as a result of it.

There are many more pieces of misinformation or inaccuracies, but one more will suffice. Steel says McCone "immediately ordered the entire island photographed." In fact, however, McCone had no such power. The decision could be made only by the President on the recommendation of a high level committee. McCone attended a meeting of such a committee at which there was discussion of the fact that a rhomboid-shaped area in Western Cuba had not been photographed for a month. The SAM's were most nearly operational in this part of Cuba, and the discussion centered on the risk to the U-2 of making a surveillance flight, and the possible consequences if it were shot down. Nevertheless, the full group decided to recommend to the President that a U-2 be flown, providing great care be taken in planning

In addition to distorting the meaning of quotations, Steel also uses the technique of the grave question, implying that the

they are readily available. "But why were photographs not made earlier?" Steel asks. I have a long analysis of that question in my book and reach some conclusions that Steel should have found interesting. For example (page 186): "It could reasonably be argued that the U-2 flight of October 14 found the missiles at just about the earliest possible date..." I do believe that it could be reasonably so argued, but my own conclusion is that they could have been discovered at least two weeks earlier, but probably not much more. "Given the vagaries of the weather, (page 190) it would have been a fantastic stroke of luck if convincing photographs could have been obtained before September 21..." The decision to fly the U-2 was made on October 4, and the subsequent delay was at the operational level. Time was consumed in planning because of the SAM's; there was postponement because of weather; and there was a disgraceful squabble between the Air Force and CIA as to who should fly the plane—all of which is fully documented in my book. The point is simply that Steel's misuse of quotes, his inaccuracies, and his rhetorical questions leave the reader with an impression of mystery and possible conspiracy—yet the facts and the answers to Steel's questions are all laid out in a book he has read—or at least quotes from.

It is against this background of misquotation, inaccuracy, and suggestive rhetoric that Steel's major conclusions must be judged.

One of these conclusions is that the Kennedy administration was caught "flat-footed" in the Cuban missile crisis, and that the reason was that the administration "could never figure out why the Russians might find it advantageous to put missiles in Cuba." Yet the evidence on both counts is in the exactly opposite direction. As described above, a study of the data indicates that if the decision to fly the U-2 that discovered the missiles had been made two weeks earlier, it might have discovered nothing at all. This is not being caught "flat-footed." And there is other evidence. In my book, for example, in discussing the failure of the shipping intelligence unit to report the fact that two of the ships had large hatches (mentioned above), I wrote (page 189): "All that these reports could do, no matter how seriously they were taken, would be to increase sensitivity in Washington to the possibility that the Soviets would put missiles in Cuba. But the people in Washington, as even the public statements of the time show, were already sensitive to the point of nervousness. President Kennedy made several public statements warning the Soviets. He instituted special security precautions concerning intelligence on offensive weapons. Questions were asked on the subject in every Congressional hearing that had even the remotest connection with Cuba. And

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

## American Militarism

General David M. Shoup, former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, has set forth his views on "The New American Militarism" in the April issue of the *Atlantic*. His statement, somewhat reminiscent of the warning sounded by President Eisenhower against the power of the Military-Industry Combine and coming as it does at the peak of the ABM debates, has stirred up considerable comment. Shoup's message is that "the cult of the gun" is ready to lead us into war whenever and wherever the cultists "suspect Communist aggression." The obvious index of the military's ballooning influence is, of course, the Defense budget itself - \$45.5 billion in 1960, when General Shoup became Marine Corps Commandant; over \$82 billion ten years later. But the momentous meaning of Shoup's essay lies elsewhere, in what he does not say, in what he did not know how to say, in what he seems not to have observed.

General Shoup, who retired in December 1963 as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, never made the New Team that has been riding high this decade. With his Congressional Medal of Honor and his quiet dignity he was one of the old school. Like the other Chiefs of Staff of his time - Lemnitzer, White, Burke and Decker - he was battle-trained, competent, old-line. His and their era came to an end with the change of Administration in 1961, and specifically with the abortive invasion of Cuba. Shoup was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the Bay of Pigs, as was General Lemnitzer, but they never participated in its planning. The invasion cast the peacetime military forces in a role for which they were unprepared. When it misfired, some believed, or hoped, that CIA-directed paramilitary operations would be shelved, that a lesson had been learned and firm restraints placed on the gung-ho enthusiasts for counter-insurgency. They were wrong. In the wake of the disaster, President Kennedy appointed a review board (Allen Dulles, Admiral Burke, Robert Kennedy, and Maxwell Taylor). General Taylor, who had left the Army to vent his displeasure with things as they were and to write *The Uncertain Trumpet*, here found an outlet for his energies. When the Bay of Pigs hearings were concluded, President Kennedy made Taylor his Special Assistant and Adviser for Military matters. Both the young President and the ambitious general denied that this assignment would infringe upon the authority of the Chair-

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the insiders knew better, knew General Taylor, knew he was more a CIA-type operator than an old-school military man. At Fort Bragg's Special Forces Center and in the new Air Cavalry Mobile Divisions at Fort Benning, the new forces began to be formed.

From his position close to the throne, General Taylor rapidly cemented relations between the CIA and elements of the Army. General Marshall S. Carter (Army) replaced General Charles B. Cabell (Air Force) as deputy director, Central Intelligence. John McCone replaced the old master, Allen Dulles, as director. The Army was drastically reoriented; "Green Berets" and Air Cavalry units ascended to prominence over conventional forces.

Forces officers were on special assignment with the CIA, or had had assignments with that agency. Many

CIA officials were serving in the Defense Department in both military and civilian roles. General Taylor took over as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lemnitzer having completed his tour. The man who had stepped down from the Army in a huff was back, bigger than life and in the number one job. The Army-CIA example spread like wildfire. The Air Force rushed to create its own Special Air Warfare units from assorted remnants of the Bay of Pigs resource. The Navy created its own version of Special Warfare units in its SEAL teams and others. With General Taylor it was "Get on the Team" or get left behind. The new President and his brother had embraced the concept of counterinsurgency; the New Team was ready to meet the challenge.

General Shoup and the Marines were not on the team. Although the regular military forces had the highest regard for the Marines as experts in Special Warfare, the Army-CIA enthusiasts passed them by. The emerging team prided itself on its readiness to perform anywhere in the world, "wherever and whenever we suspect Communist aggression," as General Shoup says. To repeat, the vital force in the new militarism was not the traditional military. It was not the man who spearheaded the "massive and swift invasion" of the Dominican Republic in 1965, to which Shoup refers in his *Atlantic* article. It was the CIA-Special Forces elements which opened the door, and were followed by the regular military, after basic decisions had been made. Even the Marine colonel who opened early contacts with Dominican officials in Washington and later in the Dominican Republic, was working with and through the CIA representatives, not the military.

CIA, as used in this connection, is the operational organization, not the intelligence structure, and the operational organization was and is well-placed throughout the government. Farsighted Army officers years ago saw the value of travelling the CIA road for contacts, special techniques, and the mystique went with working in the backrooms of military activities. Lt. Gen. William E. De Puy, assistant chief of staff, first served with CIA as a deputy division chief in 1950 and 1951; Lt. Gen. W. Raymond Peers was chief of CIA clandestine training in 1951 and the head of Western Enterprises, a CIA cover operation in Taiwan from 1951 through 1953. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy started out in CIA on the intelligence side, wandered over to Defense, then to the State, where his specialized training was put to use. Robert Komer went from CIA to the White House as an Ambassador in charge of "policy coordination." The decision makers on the New Team to

continued



E - 628,146

MAR 24 1969

# The Peace Corps' New Chief and the CIA

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By WARREN HOGE

New York Post Correspondent

WASHINGTON — The South American slum project founded by President Nixon's appointee to head the Peace Corps, Joseph H. Blatchford, was blackballed by the Peace Corps two years ago on the assumption—apparently mistaken—that it was financed by CIA money.

Peace Corps volunteers in Venezuela were instructed by the Washington office in March,

1967, that they were to have no further dealings with representatives of Blatchford's project, ACCION (American for Community Cooperation in Other Nations).

At the time, the Peace Corps and ACCION were cooperating in training volunteers for community development in Caracas. Then word came to the corps director in Venezuela, Henry Wheatley, that all contact was to end.

From that point on, even phoned messages from ACCION representatives to the Peace Corps went unheeded.

Reached at his home in Caracas, Wheatley denied the report. "I know of no breakdown of any kind," he said.

Other sources, from both sides of the issue, corroborated the account.

The move came at a time of high controversy over exposures of CIA involvement in domestic institutions. The Peace Corps, highly sensitive from its inception to attempt at subversion of its purpose by the American intelligence community, had an acute reaction to the development.

Though it is not clearly established why the Corps singled ACCION in its campaign to keep its own program sanitized, several features of Blatchford's might have drawn their suspicion.

First, ACCION was funded in large part by American businesses based in Venezuela. Among the foundations supporting it were several which regularly backed highly conservative and often right wing fringe efforts.

Another foundation backing Accion, the Ottinger Foundation, had marginally implicated in the exposure of CIA conduits while a third, the American Institute for Free Labor development, the AFL-CIO's labor training program in Latin America, had often been accused of collaboration with the CIA.

## CIA Conduit

Perhaps the most suspicious appearing organization giving grants to ACCION was the William H. Donner Foundation. In truth, however, the foundation was only one arm of a larger foundation of the same name, and it was unconnected with the CIA.

The parents group's other arm, the independence foundation, was a well-known conduit between the CIA and the National Student Association. Peace Corps investigators may

have missed this distinction and taken action against ACCION as a consequent.

Peace Corps anxiety over possible CIA contamination arose at the outset of former director Sargent Shriver's tenure. Conscious that Communist propaganda would cast the Peace Corps as a spy operation to discredit it, he secured from President Kennedy a verbal agreement that agents would be barred from mixing with the volunteers or involving themselves with the corps in any way.

Kennedy followed this up by ordering CIA head Allen Dulles and later, his successor, John McCone, to make sure the agreement was kept by the agency.

Even with this assurance, Shriver set up his own intelligence unit to guard against the incursion of agents into his ranks.

According to the executive director of ACCION, Terry Holcombe, his group was usually vigilant. He said that as a privately funded group, ACCION was particularly suspect and that it therefore overcompensated for its lack of CIA contamination.

ACCION staff and peace corps volunteers work together now in community development work in Venezuela. The intrigue of March, 1967, is apparently over.

Blatchford, 34, started the program in Venezuela in September, 1961, with 30 volunteers.

He is a Republican and ran unsuccessfully for Congress last fall in California. He is expected to gain easy confirmation and succeed Jack Hood Vaughan, becoming third director of the Peace Corps.

## NEWS BRIEFS

### SOCAL'S NEW 210,000 DWT SUPERTANKER TAKES SHAPE IN SWEDEN; DUE IN SERVICE THIS SUMMER

Hull 520 is currently represented by 15,000 tons of steel fabricated in 80- to 100-ton sections in many areas of Kockums Shipyard in Malmo, Sweden. In a matter of weeks this will grow to about 30,000 tons, precisely shaped, fitted and fabricated into a mammoth vessel capable of lifting more than a million and a half barrels of crude.

Hull 520, due out of drydock by the end of March, will be christened the S.S. *John A. McCone*, and will be running through her sea trials just one month later. Her crude-carrying service on the Company's far-ranging, worldwide routes starts this summer.

The 1,037-foot long, 160-foot wide vessel is the first of six such giants

recently contracted for by the Company. A seventh ship will be operated under charter. All seven will be in service by 1971.

The great size of these vessels is the key to their efficiency and economy. They can carry crude on the Middle East-Rotterdam route, for example, for about 30% less than yesterday's "supertankers."

Standard of California's new tankers range from 210,000 to 214,000 deadweight tons.

Today's supertankers are designed more or less for a certain range of routes. For the Company's current long-range supply patterns, tankers in the 200,000 dwt class have the most efficient and profitable capabilities.

13 March 1969  
 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

# Endgame

Thirteen Days

by Robert F. Kennedy,  
 with Introductions by Harold  
 Macmillan and Robert S. McNamara  
 Norton, 224 pp., \$5.95

Ronald Steel

It was a time, in Khrushchev's memorable phrase, "when the smell of burning hung in the air." Robert Kennedy's account of those thirteen days in 1962 from October 16, when he and his brother were presented with proof that the Russians were secretly building long-range missile bases in Cuba, until October 28, when the Kremlin agreed to dismantle them, shows the view from the inside by one of the key participants. Written with economy and directness, *Thirteen Days* is a valuable historical document with all the elements of a thriller.

This short, terse memoir—battered by the publisher with superfluous introductions, photographs, and documents—does not, of course, tell the whole story of the missile crisis. There is a good deal about the events leading up to the crisis that is gone over too lightly or deliberately clouded over. The clash of personalities and ambivalent motives is muted and the tone rather detached. But behind the measured prose we see the spectacle of rational minds swayed by passions and the euphoria of power, governmental machinery breaking down into the struggle of individual wills, and decisions affecting the future of humanity made by a handful of men—the best of whom were not always sure they were right. A disturbing description of decision-making in the nuclear age, this posthumous work also offers a revealing glimpse of an enigmatic man who might have bridged the gap between the old politics and the new.

We have come to take the balance of terror so much for granted that it is hard to imagine any situation in which the two super-powers would actually use their terrible weapons. Yet more than once during those thirteen days it seemed as though the unthinkable might actually occur. SAC bombers were dispersed to airfields throughout the country and roamed the skies with their nuclear cargoes. At one point President Kennedy, fearful that some trigger-happy colonel might set off the spark, ordered all atomic missiles defused so that the order to fire would have to come directly from the White House.

The first showdown came on the morning of October 24, as Soviet ships

approached the 500-mile quarantine line drawn around Cuba. "I felt," Robert Kennedy wrote of those terrible moments, "we were on the edge of a precipice with no way off...." President Kennedy had initiated the course of events, but he no longer had control over them. Faced with this blockade, the Russian ships turned back, and the first crisis was surmounted. No more missiles could get into Cuba. But what of the ones already there that Russian technicians were installing with feverish haste? President Kennedy was determined that they had to be removed immediately, and on Saturday, October 27, he sent his brother to tell Soviet ambassador Dobrynin "that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them." The Pentagon prepared for an air strike against the bases and an invasion of Cuba. "The expectation," Robert Kennedy wrote of that fateful Saturday, "was a military confrontation by Tuesday."

We know, of course, how it turned out. On Sunday morning the message came through that Khrushchev would withdraw the missiles in return for a US pledge not to invade Cuba. Kennedy had pulled off the greatest coup of his career—the first, and one hopes the last, military victory of the nuclear era. Not a shot was fired, although we came a good deal closer to war than most people realized at the time, or have cared to think about since.

It was a victory not only over the Soviets, but over many of Kennedy's own advisers who favored a more militant course from the start. The drama was played out among a hastily assembled group, which later took on the formal title of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, that met several times a day in the White House. The sessions were frequently stormy, although the lines were loosely drawn at first. Several of the participants, according to Robert Kennedy, shifted their opinion "from one extreme to the other—supporting an air attack at the beginning of the meeting and, by the time we left the White House, supporting no action at all." A few, such as Dean Acheson and Douglas Dillon, were hawks from the start, and argued for what they euphemistically called a "surgical strike" against the air bases. They were eventually joined by John McCone, General Maxwell Taylor, Paul Nitze, and George Bundy. Favoring a more moderate course, which settled around a naval blockade to be "escalated" to an

necessary, were the doves; led by Robert Kennedy and Robert McNamara, and including George Ball, Roswell Gilpatric, Llewellyn Thompson, and Robert Lovett.

Dean Rusk, for the most part, avoided taking a stand, or even attending the sessions. The Secretary of State, in Robert Kennedy's caustic words, "had other duties during this period and frequently could not attend our meetings." It would be interesting to know what these duties were. Robert Kennedy does not elaborate, although he does offer the further intriguing aside that "Secretary Rusk missed President Kennedy's extremely important meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan in Nassau because of a diplomatic dinner he felt he should attend." That was the meeting, one will remember, where President Kennedy agreed to help out Harold Macmillan (author of one of the two introductions to this volume) on the eve of the British elections by turning over Polaris missiles to Britain after the Skybolt fiasco that had embarrassed the Tories. De Gaulle, predictably, was furious, declared that Britain still valued her trans-Atlantic ties above her European ones, and vetoed her entry into the Common Market. The Nassau accord was a colossal error of judgment that an astute Secretary of State should have been able to prevent—had he not been too busy attending diplomatic dinners.

Some of the hawks were, of course, predictable. It is not surprising that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were eager to use their expensive hardware. "They seemed always ready to assume," Robert Kennedy wrote, "that a war was in our national interest. One of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once said to me he believed in a preventive attack against the Soviet Union." Nor is it surprising that Dean Acheson, among the most recalcitrant of the cold warriors, should have come down on the side of the military. "I felt we were too eager to liquidate this thing," Elie Abel reports him as saying in *The Missile Crisis*. "So long as we had the thumb-screw on Khrushchev, we should have given it another turn every day. We were too eager to make an agreement with the Russians. They had no business there in the first place." Ever since his crucifixion by Congress during the Alger Hiss affair, Acheson has become increasingly reactionary and eager to prove his toughness toward the Communists. His bomb-first-and-found receptive cars in such pillars of the Eastern

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

Continued

NEWPORT, R.I.  
NEWS

E - 14,242

FEB 25 1969

## Nation's Super-Spy Made Scene Here

By LEONARD J. PANAGGIO

Allen W. Dulles, one-time head of the Central Intelligence Agency, who died a few weeks ago, and his brother, John Foster Dulles, secretary of state under President Eisenhower, made headlines all over the world during their active careers.

At least one headline was made in Newport when Allen Dulles resigned his post as the top man of the CIA.

The Dulles family left its mark in Rhode Island in another way a long time ago. Back in the middle of the last century, when this little state boasted of having more ritzy resorts in a small area than could be found in any other part of the world, it was the great-grandfather of the two famous brothers who helped make Narragansett Pier internationally known.

In 1843 Joseph Heatly Dulles, a cotton broker, visited the little village of Peace Dale in South Kingstown. He was there on business dealings which brought him face-to-face with Rowland Hazard. Hazard was one of the largest operators of textile mills in that part of the state.

It was during this brief visit that Dulles, a Philadelphian, was shown the magnificent vistas of beaches and rocky shoreline of the Narragansett area. So taken was he with the beauty and the climate that he made arrangements to bring his family to Rhode Island for their summer vacation the next year.

At that time Narragansett

was only scratching its eventual potential as a resort. There were a few boarding houses and some cottages set aside for the use of visitors. One was the Hardwin Cottage, and Dulles, according to one account, reserved all the cottages' accommodations for 1849. The family continued to return to Narragansett for at least a dozen seasons. In the meantime, the Dulles family publicized Narragansett to such a degree that within a few years several wealthy and influential Philadelphia families began to visit Narragansett Pier and established one of this country's most famous watering places.

Allen Dulles made several visits to Rhode Island during his career. In 1947 he was the recipient of an honorary degree when he was made a doctor of laws at Brown University.

He was in Newport June 6, 1960, when he addressed 500 civilians, senior reserve officers and the staff and students of the Naval War College. His topic was "Factors Producing the Current World Situation." The talk was given on the opening day of the week-long 12th annual Global Strategy Conference. He was the lunch guest of Vice Adm. Stuart H. Ingersoll, then the college president.

On Sept. 26, 1961, President John F. Kennedy and his family arrived at Quonset Naval Air Station to begin his first vacation sojourn in Newport. The Presidential yacht, Honey Fitz, was waiting at Quonset to transport the President to "Hammersmith Farm," residence of Mr. and Mrs. Hugh D.

Auchincloss, the stepfather, and mother of Mrs. Kennedy.

The next morning presidential press secretary Pierre Salinger called a special press meeting at the Naval War College. On the platform with President Kennedy were John A. McCone, a wealthy West Coast industrialist and former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Allen Dulles. The President announced that Dulles had come to Newport to tender his resignation as head of the CIA. Kennedy then named McCone as his successor. He

said the change would become effective Nov. 1.

With this important piece of business accomplished, President Kennedy saw both officials take-off in a Marine Corps helicopter for Quonset Point. As soon as the copter was well on its way, the President went to the Naval Base pier where the Honey Fitz was waiting for him. He joined his family and a few friends for a lunch and cruise of Narragansett Bay, and hopefully, to begin an uninterrupted week away from the wearying work of Washington.

Hobart Rowen

# Packard Is Wrong Choice For No. 2 Defense Post

DAVID PACKARD is a brilliant engineer-industrialist, who started a fortune the hard way, through his own initiative and genius.

He is also a broadly-based and dynamic executive with interests in education and people that go far beyond the narrow concepts of the business world.

Yet, he probably is not the right man for the No. 2 job in the Defense Department, the slot to which he has been named by the Nixon Administration.

As the head of his own business, the Hewlett-Packard electronics company, Packard has an income of about \$1 million annually, much of it from the \$300 million worth of Hewlett-Packard stock he owns.

IN THE YEAR ending Oct. 31, Hewlett-Packard did \$34 million in business with the Pentagon, and \$60 million more with other prime Government contractors. Thus more than one-third of a total volume of about \$300 million annually is defense-related, and presumably will continue to be around that level.

The reason that Mr. Packard should not become Deputy Secretary of Defense involves an old matter of principle: there would be a clear conflict of interest between his duties and his relationship to his company, inasmuch as he proposes to retain ownership of the \$300 million worth of stock.

And his appointment raises again, in a very specific way, the question of the military-industrial "complex" and its powerful role in shaping policy as the world turns increasingly to nuclear weapons.

PACKARD HAS SAID that he could overcome any conflict-of-interest by placing his stock in trust, with the income and gains in the capital to be turned over to charitable and educational institutions.

To dispose of his 3,610,000 shares, he agreed, would vastly disrupt the market

for the stock. I think that is so—and probably is among the compelling reasons for his not taking the job.

To allow Packard to become Deputy Defense Secretary while putting his vast Hewlett-Packard holdings in trust would be a serious compromise of a basic principle, although some Congress-

## Economic Impact

men are all too ready to consider this an acceptable device.

Packard would be less than human if he had no interest in seeing that the Hewlett-Packard company remained in sound and whole condition for his eventual return.

The conflict-of-interest problem is a complicated one. It is difficult for individuals concerned, who want neither their honesty, ethics, nor good instincts questioned. It is difficult for the nation, which wants to avail itself of the services of talented individuals.

BUT IN THE PAST, businessmen and others with small to large equity holdings have been asked to dispose of them before taking Government office. It is a sound rule. Arthur Goldberg, it may be recalled, on becoming Secretary of Labor even divested himself of rights to a future pension earned when he was counsel to the Steel Workers union.

Messrs. Charles E. Wilson and Robert McNamara sold their \$2.7 million of General Motors stock and \$1.5 million of Ford stock, respectively, when they entered the Pentagon for different Administrations.

There was an unfortunate exception made in the case of John A. McCone, when he was confirmed in 1962 as director of the Central Intelligence Agency despite his ownership of \$1 million of Standard Oil of California stock, and unstated large amounts of shipbuilding stocks.

The same mistake shouldn't be made again, especially in the sensitive Pen-

tagon post, at a time when there is growing concern about what General Eisenhower aptly named the "military-industrial complex."

AS THE OWNER of one of the leading companies in precision electronics and director of General Dynamics, U. S. Steel and other companies, Packard is the very prototype of the industrialist-half of the complex that owes much of its success to the vast U. S. military budget.

That part of the U. S. industrial machine closely tied to defense spending has an enormous stake in seeing a continuance of big military budgets even after peace is concluded in the Vietnamese war. So the question must be raised as to Packard's ability to view impartially not only questions that may relate to his own company, but to the whole philosophy of defense spending.

Many analysts of U. S. foreign and nuclear arms policy fear that, unless resisted, the combined efforts of military and industrial strategists will lead to a new nuclear arms race that will make some of the recent Vietnam budgets look like peanuts.

HOW WILL A Deputy Defense Secretary who owns \$300 million (in trust) of the Hewlett-Packard electronics business react to these problems? It could well be, of course, that Packard would lean over backwards to be wholly uninfluenced by ties to the company and industry.

But the public shouldn't have to trust to luck or to the extra sensibilities of a man in high office. Packard should either devise a way of selling his stock that will not do serious injury to other stockholders, or turn down Mr. Nixon's offer.

Is this rough on Packard, who genuinely would like to be of public service? Probably so. He can blame Mr. Nixon, who shouldn't have asked him in the first place.

M - 493,020

DEC 25 1969



**RICHARD HELMS**  
Nixon will keep him on

## Controls Quiet Down The CIA

By Chalmers M. Roberts  
Times-Post Service

Washington

After the heady days of Allen Dulles and the strong-willed leadership period of John McCone, the United States Central Intelligence Agency has settled down to a quiet way of going under the direction of Richard Helms.

Talk of the CIA as an "invisible government" has waned. Aside from the continuing major operation in Laos, the agency is involved, as far as an outsider can tell, in nothing to match the deranging-do of the past when it overturned the government in Guatemala, helped oust the Premier in Iran, tried but failed to oust Sukarno in Indonesia and concocted the disaster at the Bay of Pigs.

Officials in other agencies say the CIA now is firmly under control. One official in a position to know commented that Helms is a "very cooperative, responsible guy who gets full marks for inter-agency relationships."

**NIXON**

President-elect Richard M. Nixon has announced that he will keep Helms at the head of CIA. A spokesman for Nixon adds that the President-elect felt that Helms was a nonpartisan career man who had demonstrated ability to handle the office. A check, he added, convinced Nixon that he has done a fine job.

After the Bay of Pigs there was a great hue and cry about the CIA being out of control. The late Robert F. Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor looked into the problem and Taylor, now a presidential adviser, is represented as currently believing the agency now is fully under presidential control.

Control, however, as one official put it, involves a problem: "busy people."

**BOARD**

Aside from the President's own ways of enforcing control, there is a three-man board charged with the job of overseeing CIA activities. It is composed of Charles E. Bohlen, deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Paul H. Nitze, the deputy Secretary of Defense; and Walt W. Rostow, the White House assistant for National Security Affairs.

How good a job this trio does is impossible to determine but others are satisfied.

A key criticism in the Bay of Pigs investigation was that the CIA's intelligence-gathering functions were entwined with the operational efforts, and that the intelligence was used to prove the operation would be a success.

**CONFIDENCE**

Now, it is contended, that umbilical cord has been cut. As a result officials outside CIA say, there is a new confidence in the CIA's intelligence work.

The CIA has two parts: (1) Black operations, the cloak and dagger stuff, and (2) intelligence gatherings and collation. Heading the first is Thomas H. Karamessines, with the title of deputy director, plans; heading the second is William J. Smith, as deputy director, intelligence. Both, like Helms, are long-time professionals in the business.

The agency's budget, well hidden in the congressional appropriations, is highly secret. (The conventional guess is \$500 million a year.) Some say the figure has gone up since the reconnaissance satellites (spies-in-the-sky) have begun to produce stacks of pictures from all over the world which requires a vast number of interpreters. The cost of the satellites themselves, however, is in the Pentagon budget.



# The CIA: A Time of Quiet Pursuits

By Chalmers M. Roberts  
 Washington Post Staff Writer

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## Problem Involved

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## Expenses Go Up

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The CIA is said to have one current money problem growing out of the public outcry at the discovery that it was funneling money into student organizations that had been used in the cold war struggle with the Soviet Union.

A review committee called for private or Congressional subsidies for such activities (and perhaps also for such radio operations as Radio Free Europe) but Secretary of State Dean Rusk has yet to approve the report or forward it. Presumably the clandestine subsidies are continuing. The problem will be in Nixon's lap next year, it now appears certain.

Helms came to the top via the black side of CIA and he had what is described as a modest relationship with Nixon, then the Vice President, in the initial preparations for the Bay of Pigs. During the 1968 campaign Helms on occasion briefed Nixon.

It thus appears that the Nixon-Helms relationship is off to a good start for the new Administration. Beyond that, much will depend on Helms' performance in the coming crises.

DEC 17 1968

M - 238,776

S - 668,941

# Nixon Decides to Keep Helms as CIA Chief

By CHARLES W. BAILEY  
Chief of the Minneapolis Tribune  
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, D.C. — President-elect Richard Nixon, in an action that could



Helms

Agency (CIA).

Helms, a career officer who has headed the government's principal intelligence-gathering and secret operations agency since mid-1966, has been asked to remain "indefinitely," a Nixon spokesman said.

(NIXON MAY Sit Out Effort to Ratify Nuclear Treaty —Page 30.)

The incoming president took a similar—but shorter-term — step in announcing that he would retain J. Edgar Hoover as head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In Hoover's case, however, the reappointment apparently will be for only about a year.

ALTHOUGH NO limit to Hoover's tenure was specified, it was reported that Nixon expects Hoover to retire before the end of 1969. Hoover will be 75 Jan. 1, 1970.

Nixon's action in retaining Helms, who is 55, was considered significant for two reasons:

It represents a decision by Nixon to stay with a career intelligence "professional" as CIA director rather than bringing a new figure in from outside.

Helms is the first career man to hold the top CIA job

and he has won considerable kudos here for keeping the often - controversial agency out of the limelight into which it was thrust by some earlier much-publicized mid-adventures.

Continuation of Helms' supervision presumably will mean a continuation of the CIA's considerable role in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries.

In Vietnam many of the U.S. "pacification" and other nonmilitary programs, as well as some of the more effective secret paramilitary operations, have been conceived, directed, financed and staffed by CIA.

A number of the top U.S. officials in Vietnam have been CIA men, who by and large have spent more time there and gained more sophisticated knowledge of the country than most other American civilian or military personnel.

THE INTELLIGENCE estimates produced for the president by CIA, based on reports from its agents in Vietnam, often have been less optimistic than the forecasts of the military and the State Department.

Helms is known to view his role as CIA director as that of a man who should never advocate policies, but who simply should report facts and judgments to the president.

This view led him into a conflict with some other high officials when CIA estimates of the Vietnam outlook after last year's big Communist offensive were sharply at odds with those expressed by some of President Johnson's key foreign-policy advisers.

NIXON'S DECISION to retain Helms suggests that he agrees with Helms, to whom he has talked several times since election, about the CIA role.

In any event he chose to retain the relatively anonymous intelligence "professional" rather than seek a new director with the flamboyance of Allen Dulles, the public repute of John McCone or the military connections of Adm. William Raborn — to name Helms' ✓

As for the Hoover reappointment, Nixon apparently decided that despite the FBI chief's age, he should keep him on as a symbolical act.

NIXON'S EMPHASIS during his campaign on the problem of crime and his past statements praising Hoover could have made it awkward to remove him, despite the widely held view here that an early change is inevitable.

To keep Hoover on for another year, Nixon will have to sign a formal waiver of the standard requirement that any official over 70 must retire. Mr. Johnson initiated this waiver process for Hoover.

But few here doubted yesterday that Hoover, the only man ever to hold his job, will be retired within a year.

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## The Cuban Crisis Reinterpreted

Readers of the late Robert Kennedy's version of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis came away with an impression of John F. Kennedy as a cool, strong President who used tough diplomacy to win an important victory over the Soviets.

But an article in The National Observer by Peter T. Chew puts a much different light on the incident. Chew quotes two recent books to rebut one of Robert Kennedy's main assertions, and concludes that the Cuban crisis was more a defeat for the United States than for the Soviet Union.

Robert Kennedy states flatly, "On Tuesday morning, Oct. 16, 1962, shortly after 9 o'clock, President Kennedy . . . told me that a U2 had just finished a photographic mission and that the intelligence community had become convinced that Russia was placing missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba . . . The dominant feeling at the meeting was stunned surprise. No one had expected or anticipated that the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba . . . No official within the government had ever suggested to President Kennedy that the Russian buildup in Cuba would include missiles."

But both Arthur Krock's recent "Memoirs" and Mario Lazo's "Dagger in the Heart" state explicitly that John McCone, head of the CIA, had told Kennedy as early as Aug. 10 that missiles were being installed in Cuba, and he repeated the warning several times in the weeks following.

It was during those months that former Sens. Kenneth Keating and Homer Capehart were charging that the Soviets were bringing offensive missiles into Cuba. The Kennedy administration repeatedly replied that the only weapons were "defensive."

If Krock and Lazo are right, Robert Kennedy's recollection was wrong. If the evidence of Soviet offensive missiles was clear as early as Aug. 10, the President could not have been stunned and surprised on Oct. 16. Yet

the administration failed to act until then. Why?

The answer to that question is not known. Lazo thinks that it was because the Kennedy brothers were lulled by repeated Soviet assurances. That, however, is only conjecture.

Also conjecture is Lazo's charge that President Kennedy was a weak and vacillating man under fire, and that Khrushchev tried to take advantage of him.

Another point of debate concerns the concessions that Khrushchev extracted from Kennedy in return for pulling out the missiles. At the time, Kennedy gave the impression that none had been given, but Lazo says that Kennedy agreed (1) not to invade Cuba and (2) to remove our Thor and Jupiter missile bases from Turkey and Italy.

Whatever the final historical verdict on the incident may be, it seems plain that we do not have all the facts now.

What is a fact is that Castro still controls Cuba and uses it as a base to spread Communist subversion throughout Latin America.

VIRGINIA SLIP

30 NOV 1963

## INSIDE WASHINGTON

# Democrats Back Chief of CIA

By ROBERT S. ALLEN and  
JOHN A. GOLDSMITH

WASHINGTON — President-elect Richard M. Nixon is being strongly urged to retain careerman Richard Helms in his present job as head of the ever-controversial Central Intelligence Agency.

Helms, appointed by President Johnson in 1966, has been with CIA since the big spy agency was established in 1947. His retention would go far towards nailing down a precedent for non-political, career directors of Central Intelligence.

Some of the keep Helms sentiment is being relayed to Nixon by Democratic lawmakers. They are stressing the desirability of career continuity in CIA. They contend that the top CIA job has never been treated as a patronage plum.

They are right that, by accident or by design, no President has ever made a purely partisan appointment of a CIA director. Three of the six CIA heads to date have, in fact, been military men, insulated by their profession from partisan politics.

An all but forgotten Naval officer, Rear Adm. Roscoe Hickenkoetter, was the first director of Central Intelligence. He had been the head of a predecessor intelligence agency and was appointed by President Truman in 1947, when Congress established the new CIA.

President Eisenhower appointed his World War chief of staff, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, to succeed Hickenkoetter in 1950. In 1953 Eisenhower appointed Allen W. Dulles as the first civilian director of Central Intelligence, succeeding Smith.

At that time Dulles had an extensive intelligence background. He had been active in the study process which led to the creation of a civilian agency to coordinate all the government's intelligence activities. President Kennedy, as one of his first appointments, announced that he was retaining Dulles.

In 1961, after the ill-fated Bay of Pigs adventure, Democrat Kennedy named a Republican, John A. McCone, to succeed Dulles. McCone had been under secretary of the Air Force and a member of the Atomic Energy Commission in the Eisenhower Administration.


President Johnson named another military man, Adm. William F. Raborn, as McCone's successor in 1965. Helms was named as Raborn's deputy at that time. He was elevated to the top job when Raborn left it a year later.

No mention was made of Helms' politics when he appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee at the time of his appointment in 1965 and, again, in 1966. His career summary made it clear that he had never held a political job.

A reporter in Europe before World War II, Helms became an intelligence officer during the war. He has been in military and civilian intelligence jobs ever since.

He had been serving as CIA's deputy director for plans under McCone when he was selected for the number two spot with Raborn, who had been the expediter of the highly successful Polaris submarine program and let it be known, at the outset, that he would stay in CIA for only a short period.

The transition from the hard-driving, spade-calling McCone to short-timer Raborn was a difficult one for CIA, and the elevation of one of their own was hailed by the agency's careerists.



Allen

Goldsmith

The law which created CIA bars appointment of military men to the top job. That requirement has been interpreted as requiring a civilian deputy

for an officer director, and vice versa. If President Nixon sets a career precedent by retaining Helms, the intelligence community, as presently constituted, would seem to have no lack of career talent.

Even the CIA critics agree that it has assembled an able group of employees at its nearby Langley, Va. headquarters and in overseas posts around the world. On the military side, there is the billion-dollar Defense Intelligence Agency, which coordinates separate Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence services. In addition, there is the super-secret National Security Agency, which specializes in codes, cryptography and other electronic intelligence.

Helms' performance as CIA chief and the performance of the agency under his direction is difficult to assess. No government operation in the world is under as steady a drumfire of criticism as CIA, but the agency gets generally high marks from the insiders who are familiar with the intelligence estimates which it produces.

Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford testified earlier this fall that U. S. intelligence operations have improved "substantially" in recent years. He said he accepts and believes the intelligence community's appraisals of Soviet nuclear strength and thinks there is "a higher degree of agreement" in the intelligence community about such national estimates.

Except for an early misunderstanding with Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Helms has had excellent relations with Congress and the House and Senate committees which ride herd on CIA activities. Generally, Helms has, as he promised in 1966, kept CIA out of foreign policy making.

CIA operations came under fire most recently after the recent invasion of Czechoslovakia by troops from Russia and other nations of the Warsaw pact. Critics contended that CIA's warnings of such a move were deficient.

Congressional military experts, who looked carefully into these complaints, say CIA correctly charted the pre-invasion moves of the Warsaw pact armies and reported the possibility of a move into Czechoslovakia. Missing was the definite word that the Kremlin had decided to invade, and some doubted whether CIA could be expected to get that tightly-held information.

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

# A Birthday Salute to the Philharmonic

BY MAGGIE SAVOY  
Times Society Editor

The first night of the symphony season in Los Angeles has always been a gala affair.

But this year there was something extra-special to celebrate: The Golden Anniversary Season of an orchestra which has taken its place among America's best.

Symphony supporters, who met in the Eldorado Room of the Dorothy Chandler Pavillion before opening night concert, toasted the symphony's birthday party at a buffet decorated with a huge gold "50."

But the orchestra itself, and all the first nighters, yelled "Surprise!" when, after the Beethoven Fifth (which closed the concert) and musical director Zubin Mehta was

taking his bows, all of a sudden doors opened and a 7-foot birthday cake popped into view.

And the brass choir and percussion of the Young Musicians Foundation Debut orchestra struck up the strains of "Happy Birthday to You."

The cake-and-coffee party for the 104-piece orchestra brought memories of its founding—in 1919 by William Andrews Clark Jr.—and recollections of some of the players who have since become nationally known.

Five members have become conductors, including Alfred Wallenstein (who was in the first stand of cellos in 1919, and returned in 1943 as music director of the Philharmonic to be the first native American to be a music director of a major American orchestra); William Stolf, a violinist back in 1919, who became music director of Columbia Studios; Henry Lewis, first Negro permanently engaged by a large-scale orchestra in America, now music director of the New Jersey Symphony Orchestra in Newark; Robert LaMarchina, now music director of the Honolulu Symphony; and William Kraft, who will conduct youth concerts this season.

Ferde Grofe ("Grand Canyon Suite") was a violist in the 1919 orchestra; and Leopold Godowsky Jr. became co-inventor of the Kodachrome process of color photography.

Memories were conversation in the pre-concert buffet in the Eldorado Room, too. Among the guests of honor were Mr. and Mrs. Joseph B.

Koepfli, whose mother was A. Bryant, who was on the first Board of Trustees of the Southern California Symphony Assn. in 1934.


Others there included the Gregor Piatigorskys, just back from Paris, the Henry Salvatoris with the William French Smiths, the John McCones, Richmond Wolfords, Edward Carters, Dr. and Mrs. Simon Ramo, the George Vernon Russells, the Frederick G. Larkins Jr., composer Bronislaw Kaper, the Alexander Saundersons, Mr. and Mrs. Norman Chandler, who have just returned from Spain, and the Kellogg Spears.

Today Mr. Koepfli carries on the family involvement, as chairman of the board of the Southern California Symphony-Hollywood Bowl Assn.

Mrs. George Behrendt, who is vice president of the board and chairman of the Anniversary Year activities, is a daughter-in-law of the Sam Behrendts, early-day patron and patroness. And John Connell, there with Mrs. Connell, is a nephew of Mrs. Michael J. Connell, who was first vice president of the original association.

## In Attendance

Also among the celebrators were Mr. and Mrs. Z. Wayne Griffin, with their daughter and son-in-law the Thomas Techentins, and the Robert D. Volks. Mrs. Griffin, who is Elinor Remick Warren, the composer, is the daughter of the James G. Warrens, also early-day patrons. And John Hotchkis, there with Mrs. Hotchkis. He is a grandnephew of Mrs. E.




HALF A CENTURY—Centerpiece notes orchestra's 50th anniversary.

Continued



PRE-CURTAIN CELEBRATION—Mr. and Mrs. John McCone, left, and Mr. and Mrs. Alexander Saunderson, meet before first concert of the Philharmonic's 50th season in the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion.



SURPRISE! — Birthday cake, presented by Mrs. George Behrendt to musical director Zubin Mehta and symphony, came as surprise at close of opening night of the Los Angeles Philharmonic's 50th season.



# The 13 Days Of Crisis

By Robert F. Kennedy

ON TUESDAY MORNING, Oct. 16, 1962, shortly after 9 o'clock, President Kennedy called and asked me to come to the White House. He said only that we were facing great trouble. Shortly afterward, in his office, he told me that a U-2 had just finished a photographic mission and that the intelligence community had become convinced that Russia was placing missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba.

That was the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis—a confrontation between the two giant atomic nations, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which brought the world to the abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of mankind. From that moment in President Kennedy's office until Sunday morning, Oct. 28, that was my life—and for Americans and Russians, for the whole world, it was their life, as well.

At 11:45 that same morning, in the Cabinet Room, a formal presentation was made by the Central Intelligence Agency to a number of high officials of the Government. Photographs were shown to us. Experts arrived with their charts and their pointers and told us that if we looked carefully, we could see there was a missile base being constructed in a field near San Cristobal, Cuba.

I, for one, had to take their word for it. I examined the pictures carefully and what I saw appeared to be no more than the clearing of a field for a farm or the basement of a house. I was relieved to hear later that this was the same reaction of virtually everyone at the meeting, including President Kennedy. Even a few days later, when more work had taken place on the site, he remarked that it looked like a football field.

The dominant feeling at the meeting was stunned surprise. No one had ex-

*'That kind of pressure does strange things to a human being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men. For some it brings out characteristics and strengths that perhaps even they never knew they had, and for others the pressure is too overwhelming.'*

pected or anticipated that the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in Cuba.

## Meeting With Dobrynin

I THOUGHT BACK to my meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in my office some weeks before. He came to tell me that the Russians were prepared to sign an atmospheric test ban treaty if we could make certain agreements on underground testing.

I told him we were deeply concerned within the Administration about the amount of military equipment being sent to Cuba. There was some evidence that, in addition to the surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites that were being erected, the Russians, under the guise of a fishing village, were constructing a large naval shipyard and a base for submarines. This was all being watched carefully—through agents within Cuba who were reporting the military buildup in a limited but frequently important way, through the questioning of refugees who were screened and processed as they arrived in Florida and through U-2 flights.

Ambassador Dobrynin told me I should not be concerned, for he was instructed by Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev to assure President Kennedy that there would be no ground-to-ground missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba. Further, he said, I could assure the President that this

military

cance, and that Khrushchev would do nothing to disrupt the relationship of our two countries during this period prior to the election. Chairman Khrushchev, he said, liked President Kennedy and did not wish to embarrass him.

I told him we were watching the buildup carefully and that he should know it would be of the gravest consequence if the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba. That would never happen, he assured me, and left.

I reported the conversation to President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, relayed my own skepticism and suggested that it might be advisable to issue a statement making it unequivocally clear that the United States would not tolerate the introduction of offensive surface-to-surface missiles, or offensive weapons of any kind, into Cuba.

That same afternoon, Sept. 4, from a

*This is the first of three installments from a manuscript dictated by the late Sen. Kennedy in the fall of 1967 on the basis of his personal diaries and recollections of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Former Presidential Counsel Theodore C. Sorensen, who "made a number of small corrections" in the manuscript "for the sake of clarity, structure and grammar," says that the Senator intended to add "a discussion of the basic ethical question involved: What, if any, circumstances or justification gives this government or any government the moral right to bring its people and possibly all people under the shadow of nuclear destruction?"*

draft prepared by Nicholas Katzenbach, the Deputy Attorney General, and myself, the President issued exactly this kind of warning and pointed out the serious consequences that would result from such a step.

## Moscow's Public Stance

A WEEK LATER, on Sept. 11, Moscow disclaimed publicly any intention of taking such action and stated that there was no need for nuclear missiles to be transferred to any country outside the Soviet Union, including Cuba.

During this same period of time, an important official in the Soviet Embassy, returning from Moscow, brought me a personal message from Khrushchev to President Kennedy, stating that he wanted the President to be assured that under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

# His Finest Hour—Or a Botched-Up Period?

Each Presidential administration does its best to manage the news and the history of its deeds and misdeeds while in power. Since Dallas, hundreds of books and untold magazine articles about John F. Kennedy have poured off the presses with the result, observed Andy Logan recently in *American Heritage*, that the late President's "fine-liberal-fellow image had expanded uncountable times, been transformed and purified, burst all mortal bounds, and soared toward the realm of the supernatural."

Now we have the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy's recollections of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 in the November issue of *McCall's*. The recollections seek to perpetuate the thesis, already expressed by Sorensen, Schlesinger, and Salinger in their books and articles, that the crisis was, indeed, the late President's finest hour, more than making up for the disaster that was the Bay of Pigs.

From Robert Kennedy's article emerges the picture of a courageous President who moved swiftly and surely to deal with the mortal threat of nuclear-tipped Soviet missiles emplaced 90 miles off America's shores, thus saving the world from nuclear holocaust. The title of the article, which is scheduled to be published in January as a book by W. W. Norton of New York City, is "Thirteen Days: The Story About How the World Almost Ended."

## Two Opposing Views

Two recently published books by respected authors cast grave doubts about this picture. They are *Memoirs* by Arthur Krock of the New York Times, and *Dagger in the Heart* by Mario Lazo, an international lawyer who once represented U.S. Government interests in Cuba. From passages in both works (and this is confirmed perhaps unwittingly by Robert Kennedy's recollections) there emerges the clear inference that the late President and his brother relied more upon the assurances of the Soviets that offensive missiles were not being put into Cuba than they did to the warnings of none other than John A. McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that the missiles were being prepared. Both Mr. Krock and Mr. Lazo state that Mr. McCone first expressed his view to President Kennedy in August—10 weeks before the President, on Oct. 22, 1962, went on television to inform the world that many American cities now sat within the range of Soviet missiles off its shores.

During that 10-week period, it will be recalled, President Kennedy and the U.S. State Department denied time and time again that Soviet missiles were going into Cuba. Now hear what Robert Kennedy has to say in his article.

"On Tuesday morning, Oct. 16, 1962, shortly after 9 o'clock, President Kennedy called and asked me to the White House. He said only that we were facing great trouble. Shortly afterward, in his office, he told me that a U-2 had just finished a photographic mission and that the intelligence community had become convinced that Russia was placing missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba. . . . The dominant feeling at the meeting was stunned surprise. No one had expected or anticipated that the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba. . . ."

"No official within the Government had ever suggested to President Kennedy that the Russian build-up in Cuba would include missiles. . . ." (Italics added.)

Says Mr. Krock in his *Memoirs*:

"Aug. 10. After examining secret intelligence reports he had received, McCone dictated a memorandum for President Kennedy, expressing the belief that installations for the launching of offensive missiles were being constructed on the island. His subordinates who prepared the 'national estimates' papers of the [Central Intelligence] Agency recommended that he omit a statement of this belief until it was completely documented. He ordered that it remain in the paper."

Again on Aug. 17, says Mr. Krock, Mr. McCone stated his case in a high-level meeting attended by Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara, both of whom disagreed with him. Mr. McCone issued similar warnings on Aug. 22 and 23.

## Mr. McCone's Daily Cables

Then, incredibly, in the midst of what he believed to be a gathering crisis, Mr. McCone departed a few days later for his wedding in Seattle, Wash., and on Aug. 30 for his honeymoon on the French Riviera. But he continued to receive intelligence reports, and on the basis of these he sent back almost daily cables to Washington recommending that the "national estimates staff" of CIA "make a firm statement of opinion that the SAM-sites [surface-to-air missiles] discovered in Cuba were being developed for emplacements of surface-to-surface missiles with a 1,200-mile range and more, and that these missile parts and IL-28s [Soviet

bombers] were already being assembled on the island by the Russian 'technicians.' He also told his staff to reiterate his recommendation, which McNamara had successfully opposed some weeks earlier, that low-level observation flights over Cuba be made to help verification of what the regular U-2 flights were photographing."

Mr. McCone's deputy, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, overruled him, and did not include his recommendations in the national estimates. "Carter's explanation is that, as *charge d'affaires*, and in possession of all the intelligence reports textually, which at that point McCone was not, it was his responsibility whether or not to include these statements," says Mr. Krock.

Mr. Lazo's account goes into much greater detail than does Mr. Krock's, noting that "in brushing aside the CIA warnings, the Kennedy Administration relied to some extent on assurances it was receiving from the Kremlin that the Russians meant no harm. On Sept. 4, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, had called on Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy with a message from Khrushchev. The chairman wanted the message passed along by his (the President's) brother and no one else. It was a promise that the Soviets would create no trouble for the United States during the election campaign. . . ."

Robert Kennedy discusses this and other meetings with the Soviets during this period, conceding: "We had been deceived by Khrushchev, but we had also fooled ourselves."

Mr. McCone returned from his honeymoon, says Mr. Lazo, flabbergasted to discover that "western Cuba had not been flown over for a full month, and he reacted immediately, recommending that the entire island be photographed at once, especially western Cuba. This recommendation was made on Oct. 4." Ten days were lost, however, before Mr. McCone's orders were carried out, the delay caused by disagreements in the top-secret "Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance," which determined the U-2 flight schedules, and by Mr. McNamara, who "insisted that the U-2 squadron be placed under the jurisdiction of the Air Force, under his control." This was done—over CIA's stern objections.

The U-2 flight of Oct. 14 confirmed that the Russians were preparing offensive missile sites. "McCone's warning could no longer be ignored," writes Mr. Lazo. ". . . The Kennedy Administration finally realized that the Kremlin had lied. The missile crisis was on."

Central to Mr. Kennedy was a weak and vacillating man under fire—and that this very weakness tempted the Soviets to try him—is the advantages this country had gained from the Cuban crisis, that at the time of the Cuban crisis this country was overwhelmingly more powerful than the USSR, that the Russians were in no position to "show" missiles" on the United States. Mr. Kennedy's earlier pledge that he would never abandon Cuba's people to communism. Khrushchev knew this.

Referring to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists of February 1963, Mr. Lazo contends that at the time of the Cuban crisis, "the United States had almost 200 (ICBMs) and there were eight Polaris submarines at sea. Al-Italy, Turkey, and Great Britain. And though the Communists never disclose their military statistics, it is known that the USSR was still very weak. Its incipient ICBM system was a 'soft' system, not buried deep in the ground and protected by steel and concrete as was the United States.

"The Soviets had no second-strike capability, since the United States had virtually all the Soviet launching pads plotted. Khrushchev knew that the United States was capable of blackening all important Russian military installations and centers of population in two or three hours, while his own nuclear potential posed no remotely comparable threat to America."

#### An Appraisal at Vienna

Why, then, did Russia attempt such a bold stroke?

Because, contends Mr. Lazo, the wily Khrushchev took Mr. Kennedy's measure at their Vienna conference in June 1961 and sized him up as a weak man, a theory that James Reston of the New York Times was to express in an article in the New York Times Magazine two years after the Cuban crisis, with these words:

"Khrushchev had studied the events of the Bay of Pigs; he would have understood if Kennedy had left Castro alone or destroyed him; but when Kennedy was rash enough to strike at Cuba but not bold enough to finish the job, Khrushchev decided he was dealing with an inexperienced young leader who could be intimidated and blackmailed. The Communist decision to put offensive missiles in Cuba was the final gamble of this assumption."

Mr. Reston, in a later article, expressed the belief that President Kennedy had stepped up the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam in order to make American power "credible" to Russia, adding: "That, I think, is where we began to get off the track."

At the conclusion of his article, Robert Kennedy says of the Cuban crisis: "If it was a triumph, it was a triumph for the next generation and not for any particular government or people."

But was it? After losing face when his bluff was called, Khrushchev rallied and the advantages this country had gained were allowed to get away from us, says Mr. Lazo. Among the many concessions made by this country was a pledge to Castro that we would never invade his country, a pledge that negated Mr. Kennedy's earlier pledge that he would never abandon Cuba's people to communism.

On-site inspection was never carried out, and we must, to this day, take Russia's word for it that the missiles were all re-moved. As Mr. Kennedy concedes in his article, this country agreed to dismantle its Thor and Jupiter missile bases in Italy, Turkey, and Great Britain. And since those perilous days of October 1962, Fidel Castro has talked repeatedly of other secret concessions made by the United States at that time.

Soviet submarines are now based in deep-water Cuban ports, and Soviet technicians still occupy the island 90 miles from Florida, their electronic gear monitoring our military activities.

Mr. Lazo derived the title of his book from the following quotation by Sen. J. William Fulbright, who said, in a memorandum to President Kennedy on March 30, 1961: "The Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh; but it is not a dagger in the heart."

Mr. Lazo does not, obviously, agree with Mr. Fulbright. For crisis-numb Americans, his book serves as a chilling reminder that the Cuban threat is still with us, if all but forgotten by many Americans.

—PETER T. CHOW

[*Memoirs*. By Arthur Krock. Funk & Wagnalls; New York City. 508 pages. \$10.]

[*Dagger in the Heart*. By Mario Lazo. Funk & Wagnalls; New York City. 428 pages. \$5.95.]

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

# Kennedy Memoir Details 1962 Crisis

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 20—

"It looks really mean, doesn't it? But then, really there was no other choice. If they get this mean on this one in our part of the world, what will they do on the next?"

That was what Robert F. Kennedy remembered his brother, the President, as having said as they both waited, extremely tense, to see whether the Soviet Union would choose to pull its offensive missiles out of Cuba as President Kennedy had demanded or would risk a world war with the United States.

"I just don't think there was any choice, and not only that, if you hadn't acted, you would have been impeached," Mr. Kennedy—who was Attorney General at the time of the 1962 crisis—said he told the worried President.

President Kennedy thought for a moment, according to his brother, and said, "That's what I think—I would have been impeached."

The agony, the doubts and the quiet triumph of those critical days were told by Robert Kennedy in a lengthy article written last year and scheduled to be published posthumously tomorrow by McCall's magazine under the title "Thirteen Days."

The publication is taking place on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the speech in which President Kennedy informed the nation and the world that Soviet offensive missiles had been detected in Cuba and warned Moscow that the United States was prepared to go to war to make sure that the missiles were removed.

Robert Kennedy's account adds little to what already has been published by others about the details of the crisis, but it provides some intimate glimpses of his brother's Administration under the pressure of a possible world war.

The New York Senator wrote the article for publication in The New York Times Magazine to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the crisis last October. But he informed The Times last fall that he had decided

against publication because he did not want it alleged that he was trying to use the article out of political motives.

Following the Senator's assassination last June, his estate decided to offer the 25,000-word manuscript for sale. It was purchased by the McCall Corporation for an advance of \$1-million, probably the most ever paid for a manuscript of that length.

W. W. Norton & Co. has purchased the book rights from the McCall Corporation for an amount in excess of \$250,000.

Mr. Kennedy gave details of the crisis from the time he was informed on Oct. 16, 1962, that missile sites had been discovered by a U-2 reconnaissance plane flying over Cuba until the denouement on Oct. 28, when the then Soviet Premier, Nikita S. Khrushchev, agreed to withdraw the missiles.

The confrontation between the two great powers, Mr. Kennedy wrote, "brought the world to the abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of mankind."

The crisis actually had two distinct phases. The first was from Oct. 16 to Oct. 21, when President Kennedy and his advisers worked in extreme secrecy to devise their course of action in light of the discovery of the missiles. The second was from Oct. 22 until Oct. 28, when the entire world wondered whether the crisis could be resolved short of war.

The President decided against an immediate military strike at the island's missile bases—an action, Robert Kennedy wrote, that was advocated by the military leaders including the then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, now the American Independent party's candidate for Vice President.

Instead, the President adopted as a first step, a plan for a quarantine of Cuba that was supported by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, and by his brother.

## U.S. Ready for War

The blockade of the island, aimed at giving Mr. Khrushchev time to withdraw the missiles without Soviet humiliation, was seen as a means of showing United States determination to force the missiles out, while stopping short of actually initiating military action. However, in the event the Russians tried to run the blockade, the United States was prepared to go to war, Mr. Kennedy's article asserts.

The blockade was scheduled to go into effect on Wednesday morning, Oct. 24, and Senator Kennedy said that the United States was prepared to go to war if the Russians did not withdraw the missiles.

The President and his advisers awaited news of whether the Russians would accept this measure, "the danger and concern that we all felt hung like a cloud over us all and particularly over the President."

A few minutes after 10 a.m. an intelligence report stated that two Soviet ships, the Gagarin and the Komiles, were accompanied by a Soviet submarine, as they neared the 500-mile blockade barrier. They were due to be intercepted in the next hour if they tried to enter the forbidden area. This raised the real possibility of a conflict, Senator Kennedy's article asserts.

The aircraft carrier Essex was to signal the submarine by sonar to surface and identify itself. If the Soviet craft refused, said Secretary McNamara, depth charges with small explosive would be used until it surfaced, the Senator's article says.

## 'Time of Gravest Concern'

"I think these few minutes were the time of gravest concern for the President," the Senator wrote. "Was the world on the brink of a holocaust? Was it our error? A mistake? Was there something further that should have been done? Or not done?"

"His hand went up to his face and covered his mouth. He opened and closed his fist. His face seemed drawn, his eyes pained, almost gray. We stared at each other across the table. For a few fleeting seconds, it was almost as though no one else was there and he was no longer the President."

"Inexplicably, I thought of when he was ill and almost died; when he lost his child; when we learned that our oldest brother had been killed; of personal times of strain and hurt," the article continues. "The voices droned on but I didn't seem to hear anything until I heard the President say: 'Isn't there some way we can avoid having our first exchange with a Russian submarine—almost anything but that.'"

Mr. McNamara's reply, Senator Kennedy wrote, was:

"No, there's too much danger to our ships. There is no alternative. Our commanders have been instructed to avoid hostilities if at all possible, but this is what we must be prepared for, and this is what we must expect."

## McNamara Remains Firm

President Kennedy then said: "We must expect that they will close down Berlin, make preparations for that."

Senator Kennedy recalled that "I felt we were on the edge of a precipice with no way off."

The tension was broken, the Senator declared, when a messenger brought a note to John A. McCone, then director of the Central Intelligence, disclosing that some of the Soviet ships approaching the quarantine line had stopped dead in the water, an indication that Moscow did not want a confrontation.

Robert Kennedy recalled that his brother had recently read Barbara Tuchman's book, "The Guns of August," which told how the major powers of Europe were drawn into World War I largely out of miscalculation.

The President vowed, Senator Kennedy wrote, that if some future historian were to write a book on the critical events of that October, it would be understood that "we made every effort to find peace and every effort to give our adversary room to move."

Throughout the second week of the crisis, President Kennedy exchanged letters with Premier Khrushchev. The correspondence has not been published in full, but Senator Kennedy did excerpt some of the letters, including an emotional one sent by Mr. Khrushchev on the night of Friday, Oct. 26, that indicated to the Americans that he wanted to negotiate a solution.

Similar excerpts from Premier Khrushchev's letter were published by Elie Abel in his book "The Missile Crisis" (J. B. Lippincott, 1966), which covered the whole Cuban affair in detail.

Mr. Khrushchev called for a statesmanlike approach and asserted that if the United States would give a pledge not to invade Cuba, the problem of the missiles would disappear.

The letter, as printed in Mr. Abel's book, concluded:

"If you have not lost your self-control, and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more we pull, the tighter the knot will be tied. And a moment may come when the knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and it will be necessary to cut that knot; and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

"Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us untie that knot. We are ready for this."

Continued

MANCHESTER, N.H.  
UNION LEADER  
D - 56,042  
NEW HAMPSHIRE NEWS  
S - 48,544

OCT 19 1968

## Weeping Bob

Our readers will recall the revolting sight of former Defense Secretary McNamara blubbering at his farewell ceremony when President Johnson commended him, incorrectly, for his accomplishments as secretary of defense.

It was not surprising, therefore, to note in a recent account of the commissioning ceremony of the aircraft carrier, John F. Kennedy, that again McNamara became so filled up with emotion he gave up and sat down without finishing his speech.

There is nothing the matter with emotion, but for a man in charge of the defense of our nation to be so out of control of his emotions and himself that he cannot respond to the praise of the President and then cannot finish his speech at the commissioning of the aircraft carrier — is, indeed, not only a very revolting spectacle but a terrible condemnation of the leadership of our nation which has been so stupid as to put such a weak personality in charge of our nation's defenses.

In a discussion of foreign policy back in January 1968, McNamara is quoted as saying in regard to the defense budget, "The task of creative statesmanship for the West will be to move Moscow further in constructive directions while at the same time working to break down the wall which insulates Peking from outside influence."

Just how successful McNamara was can be shown by the Russians' recent invasion of Czechoslovakia and the present hate campaign constantly kept up by Communist China against the United States.

The damage that this type of wishful thinking can do to the United States is, of course, immeasurable.

For instance, it has now been revealed in the autobiography of Arthur Krock, long-time head of the New York Times Washington Bureau and close friend of the Kennedy family, that 10 weeks before President Kennedy told the nation of the Cuban missile crisis, CIA Chief McCone had told the President that there were Russian offensive missiles being established in Cuba. But Secretary McNamara told the President that in his estimation the Russians would never do anything like this to the United States!

Ten precious, almost fateful, weeks went by until the President finally said to McCone, "You were right all the while," and took action.

The Russians could very well have fired the missiles during that time, and McNamara would have died along with the rest of us.

Estimating what an enemy WILL do to us, instead of what it CAN do to us, is a fatal mistake for any nation to make. It was not the least of "Blubbering Bob's" errors.

## *Ex-Aides Wish Ike Happy 78th Birthday*

Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, still recuperating from his seventh heart attack, will receive a Western Union night letter today from 200 of his Administration members, wishing him a happy 78th birthday.

"May this be one of the great days for you, with continued progress and renewal of strength," the message reads.

"Our deep pride in past association with you is matched by our present determination to bring about a ringing GOP victory on Nov. 5—a victory that will assure the changes our country needs so badly."

The greeters, who signed the message "with admiration and affection," include 13 Cabinet officers, 26 ambassadors and other officials.

Physicians at Walter Reed Army Medical Center plan to issue a bulletin today on the former President's condition. Daily bulletins on his condition after his most recent attack were suspended Sept. 3. Yesterday the hospital said he was "doing very well."

A small, quiet birthday party is scheduled in his suite with his wife, Mamie; his son, John; his daughter-in-law, Barbara, and perhaps his grandchildren present.

President Johnson has designated this week as "Salute to Eisenhower Week."

National Presbyterian Church, which the five-star general attended while he was in the White House, announced that its Chapel of the Presidents is 85 per cent complete. One of the six stained glass windows depicts Gen. Eisenhower signing a bill that added the words "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance.

Two former Central Intelligence Agency directors are among the signers, Allen W. Dulles and John McCone. (While McCone served Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as head of the CIA, he was Gen. Eisenhower's chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.)



25 September 1968

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

## CLAYTON FRITCHIEY

## Nixon's Vision of the White House

Washington—There is nothing synthetic about Richard Nixon's confidence. He is already dreaming the impossible dreams of a man who has already been elected. Usually these fantasies do not seize a candidate until he has won, but they are unmistakable.

Nearly all new Presidents make the same resolutions: (1) They are going to delegate authority and not be swamped by detail, (2) they are going to have a super cabinet, (3) yes-men will be abolished, (4) all major parties and factions will be represented in the government, (5) the boss will listen and let his advisers do the talking.

Our President, Nixon says, "should not delude himself into thinking that he can do everything himself." His time should not be "drained away in trivia." Easier said than done. Lyndon Johnson said the same thing, but he found he could not depend on others to turn out all the White House lights, and Franklin Roosevelt found he had to make the martinis himself if he wanted them just right.

Presidents vow they will not waste time on gladiating but there's a price for it. FDR was the first President who had nerve enough to skip the DAR Convention; but the ladies are still voting against him because of it. Presidents swear they are going to swear off the gridiron and White House correspondents dinners, but they seldom do.


"I want," says Nixon, "a government drawn from the broadest possible base—an administration made up of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents." Only Democratic Presidents have ever gone in for this kind of bipartisanship, and the results have not been sensational.

After President Kennedy completed his cabinet some wondered which party had won the election. He appointed Republican Robert McNamara head of Defense, and Republican Douglas Dillon head of Treasury. He retained Republican Allen Dulles as director of CIA until he was replaced by Republican John McCone. He named Republican William Foster to head the disarmament agency and Republican McGeorge Bundy to be his chief White House foreign affairs adviser.

The fact that most of these top appointees enthusiastically urged both Kennedy and Johnson to plunge ever deeper into Vietnam has prompted some critics to think that Kennedy and Johnson might have done just as well with a Democratic cabinet, and hang bipartisanship.

Nixon says he is going to surround himself with "a cabinet made up of the ablest men in America." Warren Harding, who also felt a little inadequate, made the same promise, and when he came to he found himself in the midst of the Tea Pot Dome debacle. A super cabinet also was going to make up for Gen. Eisenhower's lack of political experience. But John Foster Dulles "unleashed" Chiang Kai-shek, Treasury Secretary Humphrey ran up a record deficit, and Charley Wilson at Defense thought what was good for General Motors was best for the nation.

"A President," declares Nixon, "must listen." Rubbish. What's the use of struggling all your life to become President if you still have to spend all your time listening? Listening is for the hired hands.



"I don't want a government of yes-men," says the GOP nominee. Of course not. No President does. There was the time, for instance, when LBJ called his advisers together and is supposed to have said, "I don't want any yes-men around here. Whenever you disagree with me, I hope you'll feel free to speak up. After all, you can always get another job." It's a story that could just as well be told about almost any President.

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SEP 24 1968

## Three Perilous Months In 1962

✓ BY A CONSENSUS amounting to an acclamation, President John Kennedy's finest hour was the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Now one of the nation's most distinguished reporters, Arthur Krock of *The New York Times*, cast considerable doubt on the late President's performance in the situation for which he was most applauded.

✓ Krock's new book, *Memoires: 60 Years On The Firing Line*, was published yesterday. The friend and critic of 11 Presidents, who learned many White House secrets in his long and illustrious reporting career, says flatly that Kennedy did nothing for almost three months after CIA Chief John A. McCone reported the offensive nature of the Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

✓ Krock talked with participants in the high-level policy discussions which finally forced President Kennedy to make his memorable address to the nation on Oct. 22, 1962 and to issue an ultimatum to the Soviet Union to dismantle and withdraw missiles capable of striking the American heartland.

★ ★ ★

McCONE'S first memorandum to Kennedy, Krock reports, was dated Aug. 10, 1962. Through the remainder of August and all through September, McCone continued to press for action by the President, over the opposition of Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Both held to the prevailing view that the Cuban installations were only for "defensive," surface-to-air missiles and that, in Krock's summary of their opinion, "the Kremlin would never take the risk of installing offensive weaponry."

In mid-September, McCone ordered a second "national estimates" paper stating that Soviet IL-28 medium-range offensive missiles were being assembled on the Cuban sites by Russian "technicians." The paper was also to include a recommendation that the President authorize low-level observation flights over Cuba to verify what McCone had concluded from U-2 aerial photos and other intelligence sources.

This recommendation was not included

in the paper sent to the President by Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, deputy chief of the CIA, who later explained that it was his responsibility to determine what the paper should include, since he was in possession of texts of all intelligence reports, which McCone (at that time honeymooning abroad) was not.

✓ In Early October, returning to his desk, McCone continued to plead for low-level confirmation of U-2 high-altitude pictures. This was not done, it now seems incredible to hear, until Oct. 16-19. The flights proved conclusively that McCone's deduction had been right from the time of his first warnings.

★ ★ ★

KROCK SAYS the President remarked to McCone: "You were right all along." To which McNamara appended a cryptic face-saver: "... but for the wrong reasons," with an agreeing nod from Rusk.

In the advance excerpts we have from Krock's book, it is not clear what the "wrong reasons" were. But what is clear — if Krock, a meticulous reporter, has his facts straight — is that America was in mortal peril while political appointees rejected impressive intelligence data in the naive notion that Russia would never do such a thing.

This out-of-hand dismissal of Soviet intentions is no less frightening today than it would have been had Krock reported in that fearful fall of 1962. American intelligence can be wrong; that's one thing. But to dismiss reports on the insubstantial grounds that they do not square with some rather wishful thinking about what the Soviet Union would and would not do — this is quite another.

★ ★ ★

THE TERRIBLE thought arises that, but for the persistence of McCone, the Soviet Union might have achieved a hideous advantage in the nuclear standoff, with major American cities within range of Cuba.

There may be another version which contradicts this. But, it should be added, Krock has rarely been successfully challenged on his facts in his long service, from which he is now retired.

23 September 1968

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

# '62 Cuba Stories Stir '68 Fears

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Sept. 22 (NEWS Bureau) — A replay of Cuban missile crisis decisions in 1962 — with more controversy promised next month — threw the Washington intelligence community into an uproar today.

The intelligence experts were already disturbed over the announcement that the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy's version of the critical hours preceding the U.S.-Russian confrontation over installation of missiles in Cuba would be published. They noted the announcement, by McCall's magazine, said information in the 25,000-word Kennedy account of the crisis would include data from Central Intelligence Agency reports.

Reviews and news stories published today concerning a new book by Arthur Krock, retired columnist and bureau chief of The New York Times in Washington, revived fears that the missile crisis controversy would burst into the current presidential campaigns.

Krock included in his memoirs a detailed account of CIA efforts to warn President Kennedy of the Cuban missile threat 10 weeks before key White House decisions were made.

It is expected in intelligent circles here that the forthcoming magazine article by Sen. Kennedy, to be published Oct. 25, will present a somewhat different version of the events leading to the decisions.

In any event, the intelligence experts, principally those in the CIA, are caught in the middle of a potential row over information which was available to the top levels of government. CIA spokesmen today declined any comment.

## Rusk, McNamara Balked

In his account, Krock wrote that former CIA Director John McCone warned President Kennedy on Aug. 10, 1962, that Russian technicians were building medium-range ballistic missile installations in Cuba. McCone re-

peated his warnings persistently until finally, in mid-October, low-level flights produced photographic confirmation of his fears.

The Krock book said that McCone's recommendation for the reconnaissance flights was opposed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara, former secretary of defense.

Theodore Sorenson, special counsel to President Kennedy, who announced the sale of Sen. Kennedy's recollections on the crisis, said that he, McNamara and Fred Dutton, former under-secretary of state, had read the Kennedy manuscript and decided

no review for security purposes was necessary.

It was learned today that McCone's warnings were the result of his own analysis and opinion and that there had been disagreement within the CIA over the importance of the missile installations during August of 1962.

## McCone Disputed

The Office of National Estimates in the CIA, then headed by Sherman Kent, since retired, did not accept the McCone theories. Similarly, McCone was unable to convince the National Intelligence Board, which included representatives of the CIA, the State and Defense departments, that the sites being prepared in Cuba were intended for offensive missiles.

McCone was so intensely concerned over the potential threat that he took time off from his honeymoon in September 1962 to send personal memos back to CIA headquarters, urging further efforts to verify construction of the missile bases.

The experts here were puzzled over the urgency and speed involved in the publication of the Kennedy manuscript in McCall's 10 days before the Nov. 5 election — and barely a month after the Krock book's publication.

# in D.C.

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22 September 1968

# DELAY BY KENNEDY ON CUBA REPORTED

Krock Book Tells of C.I.A.  
Warnings on Missiles

By FELIX BELAIR Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 21—

President Kennedy delayed action in the Cuban missile crisis for 10 weeks after the Central Intelligence Agency reported on the offensive character of the Soviet installations, according to a report by Arthur Krock in a book to be published Monday. The episode is one of many on which the former Washington bureau chief of The New York Times reports in intimate detail. The book, "Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line," contains notes made by Mr. Krock on conversations with participants in high policy discussions. It will be published by Funk and Wagnalls.

The book is crammed with secrets of White House politics that Mr. Krock learned as a confidant, friend and critic of 11 Presidents and their official families.

Mr. Krock is forthright in his estimates of the men who directed the nation's destinies during his long career as reporter, editor and commentator. He views the Administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower as "one of the most notable in our history" and that of Lyndon B. Johnson as "probably the most disastrous."

## Warning From McCone

Mr. Krock's notes on the Cuban missile crisis show that the Central Intelligence Director, John A. McCone, first warned President Kennedy in a memorandum on Aug. 10, 1962, that the installations were intended for offensive missiles of 1,200-mile range. President Kennedy did not address the nation on what he had done about the matter until Oct. 22.

Through the remainder of August and September, according to Mr. Krock's notes, Mr. McCone continued to press for action by the president over the opposition of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Robert J. McNamara, then the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Krock says the two Cabinet members clung to the prevailing view that the Cuban installations were only for surface to air missiles and that "the Kremlin would never take the risk of installing offensive weaponry."

By mid-September, the book says, while Mr. McCone was honeymooning abroad, he instructed his C.I.A. staff to prepare for the President a second "national estimates" paper stating that Soviet IL-28 offensive missiles were then being assembled on the Cuban sites by Russian "technicians."

This paper was also to include a renewed recommendation, forestalled by Secretary McNamara weeks earlier, that the President authorize low-level observation flights over Cuba to verify what Mr. McCone had concluded from U-2 aerial photos and other intelligence sources.

The McCone recommendations were not included in the paper sent to the President by Lieut. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, deputy chief of C.I.A. The book says that General Carter explained later that it was his responsibility to determine what the paper should include since he was in possession of texts of all intelligence reports and Mr. McCone was not.

## McCone Proved Right

On returning to his desk in early October, Mr. McCone continued to press for the low-level flights. The flights, finally undertaken Oct. 16 to 19, "proved conclusively the soundness of McCone's deduction that first was the source of his warnings and then of his firm estimate," the Krock notes state. The notes add:

"In a discussion of the Cuban problem this week the President remarked to McCone, 'You were right all along.'"

"But for the wrong reasons," said Secretary of Defense McNamara with a nod of assent from Secretary of State Rusk."

Mr. Krock describes as "one of history's cruelest ironies and one of the irreparable blunders" of President Kennedy his abandonment of the position he took as a freshman Senator from Massachusetts that the United States must never commit its armed forces to a combat role in a ground war on the Asian mainland.

An aide memoire dated Oct. 17, 1961, covered a luncheon conversation with President Kennedy on Vietnam before he authorized an increase from 8,000 to 16,000 in the number of United States military advisers in South Vietnam's combat area. The memorandum read in part:

"The President still believes, he said, in what he told the Senate several years ago—that United States troops should not be involved [in combat] on the Asia mainland, especially in a country with the difficult terrain of Laos and inhabited by people who don't care how the East-West dispute as to freedom and self-determination was resolved."

Moreover, said the President, the United States can't interfere in civil disturbances created by guerrillas. It was hard to prove that this wasn't largely the situation in Vietnam.

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READER'S DIGEST  
September 1968

# The Cuban Missile Crisis: Who Won?

"We were eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow blinked," the legend has it. If the United States really triumphed, where are the fruits of victory? And why is "the other fellow" Soviet Russia—still firmly ensconced in an island stronghold only 90 miles from Miami?

Condensed from "DAGGER IN THE HEART: AMERICAN POLICY FAILURES IN CUBA" by MARIO LAZO

THE prevailing belief, especially in the United States, is that the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was a clear-cut triumph for the West. It is so widely accepted that relatively few dare challenge its accuracy. But, as seen in the perspective of nearly 12 years, was it really a victory? Or was it a bad and inglorious defeat for the entire Western Hemisphere? In the interest of military and political security today, the question demands an unequivocal answer.

During the months preceding the crisis, official Washington was convinced that a Soviet Union pledged to "peaceful co-existence" would not plant offensive nuclear power on

America's doorstep. Even when the flow of Soviet arms into Cuba, under way since the summer of 1960, expanded suddenly and ominously in late July and August 1962, President John F. Kennedy and his closest civilian advisers refused to be alarmed.

On September 4, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, transmitted a message from Khrushchev to President Kennedy, assuring the latter that Moscow would not create any trouble during the mid-term election campaign then getting under way. The same day, the President released a statement to the effect that there was no proof that ground-to-

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## THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: WHO WON?

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ground missiles or other significant offensive matériel had been sent to Cuba from any Soviet-bloc country.

"Were it otherwise," he added, "the gravest issues would arise." The Dobrynin message was only one of repeated such assurances given privately and publicly by the Soviets.

Alarming evidence, nevertheless, was piling up. Nighttime truck convoys were proceeding westward from Mariel, a deep-water port 35 miles west of Havana, carrying 60-foot tubular objects on trailers. A Cuban refugee newly arrived in the United States accurately described construction work at Remedios, in central Cuba, on permanent installation of nuclear warhead storage bunkers. In early September, anti-Castro groups published newspaper advertisements reporting the influx of Soviet troops and construction of missile pads in their homeland. Sharp warnings of the ominous buildup were sounded by Sen. Kenneth B. Keating, of New York, in

Dr. Mario Lazo, a leading Cuban international lawyer, obtained degrees from Cornell and Havana universities. During World War I, enjoying dual U.S.-Cuban citizenship, he served as Army Captain with the American Expeditionary Forces in France. Then, for 35 years, he headed one of the foremost law firms in Havana, representing American and other corporations, the U.S. government and an impressive Cuban clientele. Arrested during the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 and threatened with execution, he subsequently escaped to the United States. His book is the product of more than five years of intensive investigation. This article is condensed from three of the book's chapters.

ten speeches between August 31 and October 12.

By the end of September, U.S. intelligence knew that 85 Soviet ships had unloaded cargo at Mariel and other ports, that 15 sites for SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) had been prepared, that about 5000 military technicians were on the island. But, as State Department intelligence chief Roger Hilsman has stated, "All through late September and early October, there was a determination to move slowly and deliberately."

Systematic Duplicity. U-2 reconnaissance flights were made over Cuba on August 29, September 5, 17, 26 and 29. All except the first two flights were restricted to the part of Cuba lying east of Havana; with SAMs being speedily deployed west of Havana, it was feared that a U-2 over that area might be shot down. On October 4, however, an increasingly alarmed John A. McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, insisted that the entire island be photographed at once, especially the portion west of Havana. McCone, unimpressed by Moscow's denials, had told the President on August 22 that the only interpretation he could put on the military buildup was that the Russians were preparing to introduce offensive missiles.

This mission, conducted on October 14, finally washed out White House illusions. Yet on that very day, Presidential aide McGeorge Bundy flatly denied on television

16 July 1968

## Rockefeller Names 300 in Fund Drive

Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller today announced the names of nearly 300 executives, including a son of former President Franklin D. Roosevelt, to serve on a Rockefeller-for-President fund raising group.

Besides John A. Roosevelt, first vice president of Bache & Co., a Wall Street firm, the list includes former Gov. William Scranton of Pennsylvania and Eugene R. Black, former president of the World Bank.

Others in the group were James A. Linen III, president of Time, Inc., Gardner Cowles, chairman of Cowles Communications, publisher of Look Magazine, and J. J. Heinz II, chairman of H. J. Heinz Co.

Rockefeller's brother, David Rockefeller, president of Chase Manhattan Bank, was listed as a group member, along with Thomas S. Gates, defense secretary under former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John A. McCone, a former head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The group will be aided in its activities by a volunteer, full-time staff of 10 businessmen.



June 6, 1968

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 6841

The bill provides authority for protection of persons who are determined by the Secretary of the Treasury as being major presidential and vice-presidential candidates after consultation with an advisory committee consisting of the majority leader of the Senate, the minority leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives and one additional member selected by the members of such committees. It is contemplated that protection will be provided for all major candidates for President until after the selection of nominees at the major political conventions. The major nominees for President and Vice President will then be protected until election of the successor President.

This bill also gives us the opportunity to remedy a serious deficiency in existing law. It provides that, when requested by the Director of the Secret Service, other Federal departments and agencies shall assist the Secret Service in the performance of its statutory protective duties and those additional duties established by this bill.

The protection of the President of the United States and the other persons entitled to protection is a governmentwide responsibility. While primary responsibility rests with the U.S. Secret Service, the personnel and facilities of every agency must be available.

The Government became painfully aware of the need for improving this coordination after the assassination of President Kennedy. The Warren Commission stressed the absolute necessity of continuous assistance to the Secret Service in the exercise of its protective duties.

The personnel and facilities of Federal departments and agencies are made available as requested by the Secret Service. However, no legislative basis exists for the provision of this assistance. This lack of specific statutory authority has been an impediment to the making of more formal arrangements with various departments for continuing and permanent assistance.

This omission has become of such concern to me that I asked my staff to study this problem and give me background information on the need for better governmentwide coordination. Let me give you the results of that study.

Protective functions for our Presidents have grown increasingly difficult through the years so that many agencies must provide assistance to the Secret Service.

We live in a shrinking globe of rapidly expanding travel by those who serve and have served us as Presidents of our country. The job of protecting them has become far more difficult.

The Warren Commission summarized the problem in this language:

Whatever their purpose, Presidential journeys have greatly enlarged and complicated the task of protecting the President. The Secret Service and Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies which cooperate with it, have been confronted in recent years with increasingly difficult problems, created

by the greater exposure of the President during his travels and the greater diversity of the audiences he must face in a world torn by conflicting ideologies. (p. 427) (Emphasis added.)

Clearly, the frequency of Presidential travel will not abate. And turmoil—both abroad and at home—will place maximum demands on protective and security forces.

Moreover, the number of persons to be protected has also increased.

Congress has provided specific statutory authority to the Secret Service to protect the President and his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President at his request.

Congress has extended protection to others next in line of succession to the Presidency, the Vice-President-elect, and a former President for a reasonable period after he leaves office.

Congress has extended the protection to include a former President and his wife during his lifetime, and the widow and minor children of a former President for a period of 4 years after he leaves or dies in office.

Congress has extended the period of protection for Mrs. John F. Kennedy and her children through 1969.

Now this bill extends needed protection to major presidential and vice-presidential candidates during the presidential campaign.

Of course, we want to provide adequate protection to our Presidents and those other persons whose contribution to this Nation has been so substantial. But it has become increasingly clear that the increasing complexities of providing this protection requires the resources of many agencies.

## II

The Warren Commission concluded that there had been inadequate liaison between the Secret Service and other Government agencies in the performance of protective duties.

The Warren Commission conducted the most exhaustive investigation in our history on the problems of Presidential protection. One of its primary missions was to determine any means by which the quality of that protection could be improved.

The Commission left no doubt as to its views. At page 459 of its report, we find this conclusion:

The protection of the President is in a real sense a Government-wide responsibility which must necessarily be assumed by the Department of State, the FBI, the CIA, and the military intelligence agencies as well as the Secret Service . . .

The Commission is convinced of the necessity of better coordination and direction of the activities of all existing agencies of government which are in a position to, and do, furnish information and services related to the security of the President . . .

The Warren Commission felt so strongly about the Government-wide nature of protective duties that it proposed a more formal coordinating mechanism. Thus, the Commission's recommendations included the following:

1. A committee of Cabinet members including the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, or the National Security Council, should be assigned the respon-

sibility of reviewing and overseeing the protective activities of the Secret Service and the other Federal agencies that assist in safeguarding the President. Once given this responsibility, such a committee would insure that the maximum resources of the Federal Government are fully engaged in the task for protecting the President, and would provide guidance in defining the general nature of domestic and foreign dangers to Presidential security.

8. Even with an increase in Secret Service personnel, the protection of the President will continue to require the resources and cooperation of many Federal agencies. The Commission recommends that these agencies, specifically the FBI, continue the practice as it has developed, particularly since the assassination, of assisting the Secret Service upon request by providing personnel or other aid, and that there be a closer association and liaison between the Secret Service and all Federal agencies.

## III

The President's Committee on the Warren Report determined that there must be continuing assistance to the Secret Service in its performance of protective duties.

On September 27, 1964, President Johnson designated the Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon, the Attorney General, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, the Director of the CIA, John McCone, and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, to act as a committee to study the Warren Commission Report and make recommendations concerning Presidential protective functions.

When the Committee reported, it expressed this view:

Because our country is so large and complex, no one organization can, by itself, hope to provide protection for the Presidents. Protection must be a cooperative effort among Federal, State and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

The Committee concurred with the Warren Commission that better liaison between the Secret Service and other departments and agencies was needed. It recommended the negotiation of written agreements formalizing agency responsibilities.

## IV

In the absence of express legislative authority, personnel of other Federal departments and agencies could be held personally liable for acts performed in assisting the Secret Service.

The right of Federal employees other than Secret Service agents to participate in the protection of the President has already been subjected to legal challenge. In *Scherer v. Brennan*, 375 F. 2d 609 (7th Circuit 1967), agents of the alcohol and tobacco tax division of the Internal Revenue Service were sued for damages as a result of their assisting the Secret Service with Presidential protective duties.

Relying on evidence that the Secretary of the Treasury had authorized other agencies of the Treasury Department to assist the Secret Service in carrying out its protective assignments, the Court held in that particular case that the Internal Revenue agents were immune from suit because their actions were within the scope of their official duties.

LOOK  
14 May 1968

# THE SPIES AROUND DE GAULLE

BY JOHN SCALI

Leon Uris first presented the story, slightly disguised, in his best-selling novel, *Topaz*. Some critics argued that the plot was incredible. Now, the noted diplomatic correspondent who served as a go-between during the Cuban missile crisis reveals the facts about one of the most bizarre espionage cases of the century—

A TOP FRENCH INTELLIGENCE CHIEF has defected to the United States because he believes Gen. Charles de Gaulle's government is so riddled with Soviet spies that it represents a grave threat to Western civilization.

He now lives quietly in a Southern city, in a home guarded by two huge dogs. He fears assassination, but hopes that someday the French people will vindicate him for his unprecedented action.

This bizarre case, which forms the backbone of Leon Uris's novel *Topaz*, has spread an atmosphere of increasing bitterness and acrimony around French-American relations. Both sides have kept the backstage dispute secret, fearing that public disclosure might shatter the fragile diplomatic relations between the two governments.

The defector is Philippe Thyroud de Vosjoli, 49, a French Secret Service officer who was attached to the French Embassy in Washington for 12 years. Although he was listed only as an "attaché," he actually was

chief of French intelligence in Washington, the operating head of a French spy ring in Cuba, and his government's top representative on the Atlantic Pact intelligence board.

De Vosjoli resigned all these positions in disgust October 18, 1963. He dispatched a secret seven-page letter to President de Gaulle, charging that nothing was being done to root out Soviet agents in the French Government. These agents had been exposed by a high-ranking Russian intelligence chief who had defected to the West.

De Vosjoli is understood to believe that Soviet agents, operating under the code name "Sapphire," penetrated both De Gaulle's immediate entourage and the French Secret Service, and fed De Gaulle phony information to induce him to adopt anti-American policies. The Soviet defector who disclosed the existence of the ring, and also pinpointed some 200 Soviet agents in Western countries, is a former headquarters chief in

12 MAY 1968

# How to Govern (or avoid it)

By Elizabeth B. Drew

The following article by the Washington editor of the Atlantic Monthly is reprinted with permission from the May Atlantic.

IN 1794, PRESIDENT WASHINGTON had a problem. Rebellious groups in Pennsylvania were threatening the Nation with civil disorder. So he appointed a commission. "The report of the Commissioners," Mr. Washington informed Congress in his sixth annual address later that year, "marks their firmness and abilities, and must unite all virtuous men."

Whether it did or not, or whether the President thought it would or even intended it to, is now lost to history. But the technique of appointing a special presidential commission, of which this was the country's first, to investigate, obfuscate, resolve, defuse, defer, detail or derail a problem has become as much an instrument of the Presidency as the State of the Union Message, the toss of the ball on opening day or the review of troops in wartime.

The fine art of commissionmanship enjoys an unusually flourishing state today. There is no official tally of how many presidential commissions are extant, but a casual inquiry shows that in the past year and a half there have been special presidential commissions on Health Manpower, Health Facilities, Rural Poverty, Food and Fiber, Civil Disorders, Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, Urban Housing, Urban Problems, Income Maintenance, Crime (nationwide), Crime (in the District of Columbia), Criminal Laws, Libraries, the Post Office, the Selective Service, Budget Concepts, Federal Salaries and the CIA.

There are several types of Government commissions: permanent floating ones, such as the American Battle Monuments Commission, or the Canadian-American Boundary Commission, which has been preventing an outbreak of war between the two nations; or so-called regulatory commissions, such as the Federal Communications or Interstate Commerce Commissions; commissions which Congress tells the President to establish, such as the Pornography Commission, also espoused by former Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield, who was so upset about the pornography that came through the mail that he kept a whole room full of it just off his office. There are also the not-so-secret task forces of inside and outside experts which President John-

son has been appointing each year to review Federal activities.

But special presidential commissions are an institution unto themselves, so much so that not long ago a group of highly qualified Washington observers (of the stripe that the press frequently turns to for profound insights) formed a Commission on Commission-Watching. Because of internal problems, the report of the CCW has run into unforeseen delays. A comprehensive summary of its findings has been obtained from friendly sources, however, and it goes as follows:

## The Uses of Commissions

THERE ARE EIGHT reasons, which are not mutually exclusive, for appointing a commission.

1. To obtain the blessing of distinguished men for something you want to do anyway. Thus, if you want to make the Post Office more "businesslike," appoint a commission consisting largely of important businessmen whose concurrence might help persuade Congress to relax its grip on postal operations. A useful by-product might be that the commission would work out some of the difficult problems of making the Post Office more businesslike—which the Post Office itself never could do—but this could also be done through a consulting firm, which the Commission on Postal Operations has hired anyway.

2. To postpone action, yet be justified in insisting that you are at work on the problem. This is one of the most popular uses of commissions. The CCW believes that it largely explains the existence of the Commissions on Civil Disorders, Income Maintenance, the CIA, Health Facilities, among others. A guaranteed annual income has now been proposed or studied by one advisory council, one presidential commission, two Government agencies and three secret White House task forces. There are, however, two other possible reasons for the Income Maintenance

Commission (see Reasons 3 and 8).

In 1963, Health, Education and Welfare Department officials were saying that there was an urgent need to build or remodel urban hospitals and estimated that the cost would be \$6 billion to \$10 billion. In 1966, the Administration asked Congress for a \$5 billion program of guaranteed loans for urban hospitals. Mayors and hospital administrator condemned the plan as inadequate, it wasn't pushed very hard and it got nowhere. Early in 1967, the President promised to appoint a commission to study the problem, described as "pressing" the year before, and seven months later he did. At this writing, the commission has met three times.

3. To act as a lightning rod, drawing political heat away from the White House. When the Selective Service Act was to expire in 1967, despite the fact that there had been a (secret) Pentagon study on the draft, it was useful to set up a presidential commission to deal with this politically sensitive subject. This set the terms of the debate at how the draft should be extended, not whether it should, or why we were in Vietnam; moreover, it permitted the President to pass along recommendations to Congress which were a commission's, not simply his own. The fact that Congress rejected almost all of the commission's recommendations, and brought off the singular achievement of making the draft system worse than it was before, does not negate the effectiveness of the lightning rod device.

4. To conduct an extensive study of something you do need to know more about before you act, in case you do. Commission-watchers report that it is often difficult to distinguish between this and Reason 2 (deferment), but they are generally agreed that the latest crime commissions fall in this category. The National Commission on Urban Problems—Codes, Zoning, Taxation and Development Standards fits here, too, because of the highly technical nature of its assignment. Administration officials report, however, that the Urban Problems Commission is showing disturbing tendencies toward

LONDON SUNDAY TIMES

April 28, 1968

**INSIGHT****THE SOVIET SPY  
CLOSE TO  
DE GAULLE**

# DE GAULLE'S SECRET WAR WITH AMERICA

2  
April 22, 1968

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

East Room of the White House where Kennedy's body lay in state, and early on Sunday afternoon met with the new President in Johnson's high-ceilinged and roomy old vice presidential suite in the Executive Office Building. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, John McCone, the CIA director, and George Ball, the Undersecretary of State, met with Johnson and Lodge. Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, and Bundy all had taken part a few days earlier—before the assassination—in a general political-military review of Vietnam that had been held in Honolulu.

Lodge's report was bleak, although he made no specific requests for Johnson to decide upon. In the wake of Diem's removal, the ambassador said, the new government of South Vietnam was shaky and ineffective, political rivalries were sprouting in and out of it, and the various forces set free by the end of Diem's repression were threatening political chaos. The Viet Cong, already powerful enough, seemed to be redoubling their efforts to take military advantage of what amounted to a divided and leaderless nation. The South Vietnamese Army had managed the coup, but otherwise it was corrupt and inefficient and lacked a real will to fight as well as the leadership to succeed in such battles as it could not avoid.

In short, Lodge, an old friend of Johnson's from their Senate days, whom Johnson once had recommended to Eisenhower for Secretary of Defense, and who was thus close enough to the new President to speak his mind (Lodge is not a man to mince words, anyway), told the emotionally drained Texan that if Vietnam was to be saved, hard decisions would have to be made.

"Unfortunately, Mr. President," Lodge said, "you will have to make them."

The new President, as recalled by one who was present, scarcely hesitated. "I am not going to lose Vietnam," he said. "I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went."

"What kind of political support will you have?" Lodge, the experienced politician, asked his old friend and vice presidential opponent.

"I don't think Congress wants us to let the Communists take over South Vietnam," Johnson said.

So the tragedy of Lyndon Johnson—for it may well be that—was set in motion, barely forty-eight hours after he had taken the oath on the plane at Dallas. The moment, if it was there at all, would pass—that moment when, with Diem gone, there might have been the faint possibility of some initial reconciliation between Saigon and the National Liberation Front, and the history of the 1960s might have been changed. All that would follow—the bombing of the North, the half million young Americans trudging the roads and hills and through the jungles of Vietnam, the huge expenditures, the political divisions at home, the decline abroad, the sapping of a Great Society then unborn, the collapse of the consensus yet to be constructed—had been determined in that hour of political decision.

It was a political decision, made by a political man, in political circumstances that left him no real choice. For the first but not the last time Lyndon Johnson's cherished "options" were foreclosed; and even if he had been a different person of different experience, even if he had not chosen continuity and clung to Kennedy's men, even then he could have said nothing else.

Because he was, after all and above all, a new President; he was virtually unknown; he was not universally trusted, and he was even less understood. Throughout the Kennedy years, the people had been narrowly divided; nothing in American politics then was certain—nothing but that a President who failed to pursue a strong line against "Communists" would be vulnerable to political opponents at home and to ambitious ad-

versaries abroad. Even Kennedy, in 1960, had been forced to abandon his "soft" line on such unimportant matters as Quemoy and Matsu; his willingness to apologize to Khrushchev for the U-2 incident had been a major liability, exploited in pre-convention days by none other than Lyndon B. Johnson.

Adversaries at home and abroad were watching the new man. Both would measure his responses, his politics, his attitudes, probing for any weaknesses. Above all other things that dreary November Sunday, Lyndon Johnson had to be strong, which is to say that, at the minimum, he had to appear to be strong; in his own words, he, no less than the nation he now must lead, had to convince the world "not to tread on us."

It is a necessity any new President feels, and not merely as an ambitious politician. That a nation should be respected for its strength as well as its purpose and its past is essential for its security and its ideals, let alone for international leadership. It may well be argued that the greatest respect of mankind should flow to moral rather than military strength, and it is certainly true that there are times when retreat is more to be admired than attack, and when the frank confession of error is more courageous than persistence in it. It ought even to be true that, in Wilson's phrase, there is such a thing as a nation being too proud to fight—or even too moral.

Unfortunately, it cannot be true because in the world of men that strength which unerringly gains the most respect is armed strength; and if might does not truly make right, who can say that it does not rule most of the affairs of men? Thus, political leaders, no matter how beneficial their purposes, tend always to grid up their good intentions with ample armament. "We arm to parley," Churchill said, and in his inaugural address President Kennedy declared ringingly: "Only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed."

This instinct may be regrettable, but it is based on a sure knowledge of man, a predatory animal who does not in practice often turn the other cheek. Thus, armed strength and the willingness to use it are the first requisites of international power, and if this fact is sometimes blamed on political leaders, the righteous who make the charge should ask themselves which came first, men or politicians?

After the Bay of Pigs and after the Khrushchev confrontation, as an example, John Kennedy was in something near despair because he sensed that Khrushchev thought he was inexperienced and weak; James Reston saw Kennedy before he left Vienna, and Kennedy told him he feared that he could never negotiate or deal with the Soviet leader as an equal until he had shown strength and convinced the world of his steadfastness. It is instructive that it was not until the Cuban crisis over a year later, when he threatened to use nuclear weapons on Moscow, that Kennedy finally achieved that goal.

In the meantime, one of the actions he took in pursuit of it may have been his fateful first escalation of the American commitment in Vietnam during the fall of 1961. In his conference with Lodge in November, 1963, President Johnson, under the same pressing necessity, for much the same reason, had taken the second step that would lead to so great a war that none of the distinguished men in the room with him could possibly have imagined it. "I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went."

A whole lifetime of political and human experience was distilled in that sentence; the deepest meaning of the endless adventure is to be found in the circumstances that impelled it. Still, it is doubtful that anyone that day even Johnson himself thought

about the confidential report he had written in 1961 on his return from Southeast Asia. Nor is there anything to suggest that even in the harsh echoes of Lodge's summary anyone foresaw that terrible decision of which the new President once had written "we must remain the master."

The first significant public statement Johnson made about Vietnam as President came on February 21, 1964. He was so new to office that he actually was keeping an appointment made by President Kennedy when, at Charter Day observances at the University of California at Los Angeles, he said:

"The contest in which South Vietnam is now engaged is first and foremost a contest to be won by the government and the people of that country for themselves. [But] those engaged in external direction and supply [of the war in Vietnam] would do well to be reminded and to remember that this type of aggression is a deeply dangerous game."

It may be that the first of these sentences was the most significant in the long run. At the time, however, both the President and the public were more interested in the second sentence.

There is no doubt that Johnson intended this passage as a warning to the North Vietnamese and perhaps to the Chinese that the armed intervention he had been willing to think about in May, 1961, was still a possibility in his own mind. Just to dispel any doubt, Pierre Salinger, the White House Press Secretary, saw to it that White House reporters traveling with the President understood how important Johnson considered the statement.

Those who not only disagree with Johnson's policy in Vietnam as it has developed, but also feel that he duped them during the campaign and later betrayed their hopes, may be right on the facts, but it is a little too much to allow them to have it both ways. In fact, the protests of domestic doves following the Los Angeles speech were so great that Secretary Rusk called a news conference, and denied any implication that the United States was planning to escalate the war. Even so, he carefully repeated that external support of the Viet Cong was a "serious business," but insisted: "Whatever happens in the north, there is a large problem in South Vietnam to be dealt with. . . . No miracle in the north is going to suddenly transform or eliminate the problem in South Vietnam."

Johnson himself let the impression get around that he did not understand how the press could have interpreted the UCLA speech as a threat to escalate. I spent an hour with him in his office four days after the speech and asked specifically for the Presidents' own interpretation, and here are the notes taken on the response:

"Asked him [LBJ] for his version of meaning of passage in UCLA speech. Never got it in so many words but did get long lecture on Vietnam. LBJ started by saying if Gen. Eisenhower had tried to invade Normandy the way we have tried to run the Vietnamese war, the Nazis would be in Paris today. Describes our situation in Vietnam as 'new' because Lodge now has new general, new chief of mission, new CIA man, complete authority from LBJ. McN [McNamara] to look into new Lodge request, for more pay for the [Vietnamese] troops. So in position to get something done. The policy there is to train Vietnamese troops to win their own war. Notes we already pulled out 1,000 men no longer needed. Says more can be pulled out as more Vietnamese get training. Praised Khanh [the latest general to have taken over in Saigon, Nguyen Khanh] as young, vigorous. Used analogy of somebody coming into my yard, burning my trees, killing my mother. Wouldn't that be a "deeply dangerous game?" But no suggestion in itself of expanding the war or enlarging American commitment. Implied criticism of

12 APR 1968

## National Group Set Up

By RICHARD L. MADDEN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 11 — A national committee to draft Governor Rockefeller for the Republican Presidential nomination began operations today with the hope that it could muster widespread support within the next four weeks.

"If we can't do it in four weeks, we'd better go out of business," Senator Thruston B. Morton of Kentucky said in announcing the Rockefeller for President organization at a news conference in a Capitol conference room.

The chairman of the group will be J. Irwin Miller, chairman of the Cummins Engine Company of Columbus, Ind.

"We are confident that a true draft will develop," Mr. Miller said. "We are confident that Governor Rockefeller will respond to the draft and become a candidate. We are confident that he will win. He is the best man. We all need him."

Mr. Miller said, however, that he could not predict when Mr. Rockefeller would become a candidate. "He's pleased with the organization," Mr. Miller said, but did not elaborate.

Thirty-two names were on the list of the organizing committee, including six Republican members of Congress, four Republican Governors, five former Republican National Chairmen, women Republican leaders and a group business executives.

"This is a skeleton," Mr. Morton said of the organization. "We're going to put meat on it (with additional members)."

Several leading New York Republicans who have been boosting Mr. Rockefeller, including Senator Jacob K. Javits, were not on the original committee list. This apparently reflected an attempt to give the organization a non-New York and national flavor.

Mr. Miller said the committee had opened a New York City headquarters at 1335 Avenue of the Americas and soon would open other offices here, plus regional and state headquarters. In addition, offices will be opened on more than 1,500 college campuses, he said.

Mr. Morton said he and other committee members would begin working immediately to line up pro-Rockefeller delegates in states where national convention slates are chosen by local party conventions. He said he did not know yet whether a Rockefeller write-in campaign would be waged in the May 28 Oregon primary.

### Other Names Listed

In addition to Senators Morton and Brooke, the Rockefeller for President organizing committee announced today by Mr. Miller consists of the following:

Senator James B. Pearson, Kansas.  
Representative John R. Dellenback, Oregon.  
Representative Paul Findley, Illinois.  
Representative Charles E. Goodell, Jamestown, N. Y.  
Gov. John H. Chafee, Rhode Island.  
Gov. Harold E. Levander, Minnesota.  
Gov. Tom McCall, Oregon.  
Gov. Winthrop Rockefeller, Arkansas, brother of the New York Governor.  
Leonard W. Hall, Oyster Bay, L. I., former Republican National Chairman, who headed a Rom-

ney-for-President organization earlier this year.

Former Representative William E. Miller, Lockport, N. Y., former National Chairman and Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, in 1964.

Senator Hugh Scott, Pennsylvania, former Republican National Chairman.

Meade Alcorn Jr., Suffield, Conn., former National Chairman.

Miss Bertha S. Adkins, Salisbury, Md., former Assistant National Chairman.

Mrs. David G. Fernald, Upper Montclair, N. J., former co-chairman of Young Republicans.

Mrs. Catharine Gibson, Monroe, Mich., former president of the National Federation of Republican Women.

Mrs. Clare Williams Shank, St. Petersburg, Fla., former Assistant National Chairman.

Eugene R. Black, Brooklyn, former president of the World Bank, who was listed as committee treasurer.

W. Harold Brenton, Des Moines, Iowa, chairman of Brenton Banks, Inc.

Douglas Dillon, Far Hills, N. J., former Secretary of the Treasury.

Thomas S. Gates, Philadelphia, former Secretary of Defense.

Henry J. Heinz 2d, Pittsburgh, chairman of H. J. Heinz Company.

Robert S. Ingersoll, Chicago, chairman of Borg-Warner Corporation.

Ralph Lazarus, Cincinnati, chairman of Federated Department Stores.

Stanley Marcus, Dallas, president of Neiman-Marcus.

Joseph A. Martino, Manhasset, L. I., honorary chairman of National Lead Company.

John McCone, Los Angeles, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and former Director of Central Intelligence.

Robert Oelman, Dayton, chairman of National Cash Register Company.

Walter N. Thayer, Rye, N. Y., president of Whitney Communications Corporation.

John Hay Whitney, Manhasset, L. I., former Ambassador to Britain and president of the former New York Herald Tribune.



# SECRET EVIDENCE ON THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

BY DAVID WISE

In the unnatural quiet of the security room of the National Archives in Washington, beneath a sad row of naked light bulbs, the records of the Warren Commission investigation of the murder of President Kennedy rest in a long double line of green metal shelves. It is not a pleasant sight. One asks: Is *this* the end of Camelot?

The thousands of pages of documents amassed by the commission are stored in gray cardboard boxes alongside the physical exhibits, including Lee Harvey Oswald's 6.5-mm. Mannlicher-Carcano rifle. The windowless security area is protected by a heavy steel door wired to an alarm system. The entire room is, in effect, a vault; only three persons know how to open the black combination lock on the door.

Only members of the Archives staff who have been cleared for security may enter this room. No photographs may be taken inside it.

The great bulk of the documents in the room, about 80 percent, were published by the Warren Commission in 1964 or were made public later. But segregated from these, in one compartment of the security room, are 25 boxes containing documents

that no one outside of the Government or the Warren Commission has read.

By estimate of the National Archives, 10 feet, or approximately 25,000 pages, of Warren Commission files remain closed in these boxes. Many of the closed documents are classified, some bearing the red-ink stamp: TOP SECRET.

Here are some sample titles of secret documents:

- ☐ A report by CIA director Richard M. Helms on "Soviet Brainwashing Techniques." ✓
- ☐ An FBI report of an interview with Yuri Nosenko, a top Soviet KGB agent who defected to the United States 10 weeks after the assassination of President Kennedy.
- ☐ A CIA report on Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico, dated October 10, 1963, six weeks before the assassination.
- ☐ A memo to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover from Richard Helms, titled, "Lee Harvey Oswald's Access to Classified Information About the U-2."
- ☐ A memo from Helms to J. Lee Rankin, general counsel of the Warren Commission, concerning "Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping."

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Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.

JAN 28 1968

E-177,626

S-218,356

*Pueblo team—*

# Experienced in big crises

BY PETER LISAGOR

WASHINGTON (CDN)

A member of President Johnson's council of war in the "Pueblo affair" looked around the table at his colleagues, and mused to himself, "there are an awful lot of hashmarks here."

THE REFERENCE was to the many veterans of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis who are advising Johnson in his diplomatic and military maneuvering to obtain the release of the American ship and 83 crew members seized by the North Koreans.

The President's so-called "planning team," with few exceptions, served the late President John F. Kennedy, when, through a series of actions not unlike those being taken now, the United States forced the Russians to remove offensive missiles from the Caribbean island.

Retiring Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk were key participants of what was known in 1962 as "Excom," short for executive committee, a compact version of the National Security Council, which consists of the President's top advisers.

WALT W. ROSTOW, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, was a deputy to McGeorge Bundy, now president of the Ford Foundation, in 1962. Together with Paul Nitze, Rostow wrote a Post-Cuba critique of Excom's deliberations.

Both Rostow and Nitze, who is deputy defense secretary now and was an assistant secretary under Kennedy, are members of LBJ's planning team today.

Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms, another LBJ adviser in the Pueblo incident, was a top CIA official in 1962, under Director John McCone, and had a hand in the Cuban crisis. ✓

CLARK M. CLIFFORD, nominee for secretary of defense, involved in the Cuban affair as head of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was Army chief of staff in 1962. Both Clifford and Wheeler belong to the Pueblo planning team.

JAN 28 1968

# Kidney Punches in Washington

BY PERRY BRUCE GRIFFITH

TO MOVE A NATION by Roger Hilsman (Doubleday and Co.: \$6.95):

• This book took a lot of guts to write—the way it's written. Here is raw, top echelon, kidney punching politics — the way it works—in Washington and in other world capitals.

This isn't Boss Vare politics—a load of coal dumped in an empty bin for a favor. This is the Big Apple.

The book covers the Kennedy years. If anything, Hilsman, who was pretty much in the inner-club, has let his worship of J.F.K. and his family, personal and official, go off the rails.

He takes on a fair share of the people who run this country. For example, while generally going easy on Dean Rusk, he still keeps him on the hook from cover to cover. McNamara, admired for his highly documented and organized way of doing things, is pictured as doing too many things that should be done by those in uniform, and yet, with sort of sympathetic compassion. John McCone, called "an Irish Catholic Republican... an alley fighter who

will stop at nothing" by one of Hilsman's columnist friends, comes through as a man of high moral purpose and principle but completely ambitious. This is not the feather pillow league.

The book is extremely well written, with military and legal case history format (Hilsman is a West Pointer who left

*Griffith is a retired Air Force major general.*

uniform to go into the State Department after World War II. He is a professor at Columbia). But it is the sheer dynamism of men coping with the sometimes almost impossible burdens thrust upon them that gets through in the writing.

The book drags only where the writer attempts to build a historical framework of how we got into Southeast Asia in the first place. And if the reader can manage to organize jaw-breaking polysyllabic proper names and places, he can get through this.

Some of the quotes are

classics: "Members of a cabinet are the President's natural enemies," Vice President Dawes. President Kennedy's favorite quotation from Dante was, "The hottest corner of hell is reserved for neutrals in time of moral crisis." "Nothing does more harm in a state than that cunning men pass for wise." In the showdown on the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev had told the Russian people, "there was a smell of burning in the air," and that the West might be a paper tiger but it had nuclear teeth, a phrase that caused Kennedy to twit Schlesinger about how good his rival speech writers were in the Kremlin.

Having been involved in some of the crises described; the Congo, India and Pakistan, this all serves to recall how things always seem to get themselves sorted out even though very bleak.

One of the gems of character description running through the book is Hilsman's continual referral to Averell Harriman and his effort-

less, yet effective, way of handling things, regardless of whether in Tibet or the Kremlin.

This all reminded me of the first time I had lunch with Ambassador Harriman in the secretary of state's dining room. There were possibly 10 or 12 of us present, and my counterpart in State remarked, "Keep your eye on the governor. If he gets bored or the conversation flags, he'll just turn the volume down on his hearing aid. He won't be asleep."


This book is replete with current history, profile and anecdote. This is the way things work: by committee, luncheon, at a cocktail party. It's a lot different than how most of us think it is.

President Truman, when contemplating turning the White House over to Gen. Eisenhower, said, "He'll sit there and he'll say, Do this! Do that! And nothing will happen. Poor Ike — it won't be a bit like the army."

Which he jolly well soon found out, I should suspect.

## Rudel Goes West

It grieves hungry Los Angeles opera lovers that the nation's second largest city has no opera. For a Thanksgiving banquet, the Music Center Opera Association (headed by John A. McCone, former head of the CIA) imported the New York City Opera for twenty performances of eight varied operas, including Handel's "Julius Caesar," "La Traviata," "The Magic Flute" and Alberto Ginastera's new twelve-tone "Don Rodrigo." In the 3,100-seat Dorothy B. Chandler Pavilion, operatic Los Angeles was gorging itself last week as gluttonously on the avant-garde as the traditional, causing a surprised Julius Rudel, general director of the company, to schedule an unexpected performance of "Don Rodrigo" in place of the Dec. 4 "Butterfly." "They're really with it out here," says Rudel. The engagement is winning not only popular success but apocalyptic reviews from the Los Angeles critics. And Dorothy (Buff) Chandler says, "I've never felt so much a part of a performance. I'm really a Buff now!" The \$125,000 that it cost to transport the company of 200 and 50,000 cubic feet of property seemed reasonable enough to start serious discussions about a permanent link between the New York City Opera and opera-starved Los Angeles.



# The Kiss and Tell Memoirs

MEG GREENFIELD

FROM 1961 to 1963, Roger Hilsman was director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and for ten months he was the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Hilsman's memoir of three years, *To Move a Nation*, came out a few months ago, it got mixed reviews. That is to say, the reviewers liked it and Mr. Hilsman's former colleagues in government did not. Both were reacting to the same aspect of Mr. Hilsman's book: its extensive disclosure of information that the government had considered confidential.

In any way, *To Move a Nation* captures a trend to political indiscretion that has become ever more pronounced in the memoirs of the Kennedy years—a trend that has raised a number of questions we all find somewhat uncomfortable to discuss. How, for instance, are we to judge the merit of a book that is based largely on material to which we have no access? And what—to cite the point we most studiously avoid—are the proprieties and improprieties of all this secret-baring?

A COUPLE of years ago, when these questions began to appear, there was some argument about them—especially about the early installments of Arthur Schlesinger's *A Thousand Men*. However, as luck would have it, we soon bogged down in a debate about secrecy, and privacy, and his-

tory, and the CIA, and the Manchester book, and whether or not the White House nanny broke the faith—and it was all very passionate but quite inconclusive. What did emerge was the fact that many people did not think of secrecy and openness as neutral conditions, which could be either helpful or harmful to our larger democratic purposes. Rather, they regarded secrecy as being in itself and at all times inimical to those purposes—a view that overlooks, among many other things, our attitude toward the ballot box and the sentiments we were expressing not so very long ago when Adlai Stevenson was publicly attacked for the private counsel he gave during the Cuban missile crisis. At that time, it was the consensus that a democracy could hardly function so long as advisers to the President faced the possibility that bits and pieces of their confidential conversations would be disclosed and used against them.

Maybe the case was overstated then; we are rarely calm on this subject. But certainly any accounting of the price we may pay for piercing too many veils must include this chance that public officials, who after all cannot respond in kind, will be unjustly treated, and that there will be a subsequent erosion of what confidence and frankness exist inside government. The principle—and the risk—apply to our foreign relations as well. Apparently many govern-

ments do not consider the substance of their private talks with us fit subject matter for the next season's best-sellers. Like Pierre Salinger in *With Kennedy*, for instance, former Ambassador to Kenya William Attwood, in a memoir called *The Reds and the Blacks*, was relatively restrained concerning people at their desks in Washington. However, Mr. Attwood freely reproduced the details of his discussions with members of Jomo Kenyatta's government, in consequence of which our present ambassador has scarcely been able to get the time of day in Nairobi for the year that he has been there, although he went so far as publicly to pledge that he would not betray the confidences of the Kenyatta government in a book or otherwise.

Just as these twin considerations of possible damage to individuals and to official relationships have been treated differently by the memoirists, so there are differences too in their approach to a final consideration, that of divulging classified material. On the whole, in the three principal memoirs the movement has been onward and upward. In *Kennedy*, Theodore C. Sorensen is more allusive than direct when he is talking about material that has not been declassified, and he tends to quote advisers without identifying them. Usually we can guess who they are, however, and if not, we can always go look them up in Mr. Schlesinger, whose own more copious

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ELIZABETH, N.J.  
JOURNAL

E-59,172

## Remedies Must Be Massive

Measures of the immensity of the problems confronting the civil disorder study commissions set up by President Johnson and Gov. Hughes are contained in the final report of the McCone Commission, which has been overseeing remedial activities in the Watts area of Los Angeles. While progress in improving conditions for Negro residents there is termed encouraging, it is still "far from satisfying."

Tension remains high two years after what was the nation's worst outbreak of racial disorders until fury struck Detroit last month—and this is so despite use of a sizable portion of nearly \$63 million in federal antipoverty funds for Los Angeles County.

John A. McCone, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, headed the Watts commission. At its own suggestion, it now is being replaced by a statewide governor's advisory committee on race problems.

Discouragement flows from the findings that results are only indifferent in attempts at betterment in education and employment, root causes of Negro dissatisfaction. The complaints heard most frequently by members of Gov. Hughes' commission on a recent Newark tour concerned the quality of education and the lack of job opportunities.

Despite placement of thousands of Watts residents in jobs and development of work-training programs

by federal, state and local agencies, the unemployment rate, disturbingly, has not been reduced substantially. The reasons given for this situation in Watts would apply elsewhere.

For one thing, job training is of no benefit to persons too illiterate to take such courses. Then there is the abnormally large number of fatherless families. Lack of adequate public transportation in Watts is another factor militating against any dramatic upturn in employment.

In the light of the experience in trying to cut down on joblessness among Watts residents, Gov. Hughes' action in opening up 1,500 state jobs to the unskilled takes on extra significance. Lowering of the barriers of unnecessary formal requirements makes it possible to put disadvantaged persons to work.

One of the McCone Commission's early recommendations was for a massive assault on illiteracy. Directing advice to commissions created in the aftermath of this summer's racial strife, it says:

"Unless and until we in our city and in our state and throughout the United States solve the fundamental problem of raising the level of scholastic achievement of disadvantaged children, we cannot hope to solve all the problems of our disadvantaged minorities."

Too little late for Watts is a clear warning regarding the rehabilitative efforts in all other areas where racial deprivation exists.



SEP 4 1967

## Hearing It Like It Is

*"You should have seen the party my white folks gave last night," said one Negro maid to another. "They had Dean Rusk, Bobby Kennedy, Rocky..."*  
*"Oh? What did they talk about?"*  
*"Us."*

—An old Harlem joke

In this fourth riotous summer, Washington talked about little else but the Negro—and the search for a way out of the crisis in the ghettos. Yet it remained an imperfect hunt, longer on diagnoses than on cures. "I feel very deeply that unless we answer this problem it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country," ex-CIA chief John McCone, who headed a California commission inquiry into the 1965 Watts riot, told the Senate Judiciary Committee. But neither McCone nor anyone else had any magical cures to offer. "The temptation," he said, "is to say this is hopeless. But I think we have to stay at the job until we find the answer."

To some, the most beguiling answer was the easiest one: putting such apostles of violence as H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael behind bars. The so-called "anti-riot" bill pending before the Judiciary Committee is aimed at doing pre-

cisely that, though even such a conservative as McCone gently warned the senators against making it an "alternative to permanent programs." And the Federal government, under mounting pressure to move against SNCC's Black Guards, did succeed in jailing Brown for three days in Manhattan on an infrequently used U.S. gun law (after 'Rap was caught toting a 60-shot-a-minute carbine on a round-trip jet hop between New York and New Orleans). Brown finally won a bail reduction from \$25,000 to \$15,000, at a court hearing packed by rowdy followers whose whoops ("Black power! Black power!") twice drove the presiding judge into disgusted retreat in his chambers. "If Lyndon Johnson thinks I'm going to pay \$25,000 to get out of jail," Brown crowed afterward from the courthouse steps, "he's crazy—he wouldn't pay that much for Lady Bird. If he's worried about my rifle, wait till I get my atom bomb."

Yet Brown remained less a cause than a carpetbagger in a wave of violence that began years before he ascended from the Alabama boondocks to the SNCC chairmanship last spring. Brown "did not cause unemployment in the country," the Urban League's Whitney M. Young Jr. told a Washington meeting of the newly formed Urban Coalition, an

assemblage of 800 of the nation's business, labor, municipal, clerical and civil-rights power elite. The coalition quite agreed; it called for a crash public-private effort to find 1 million jobs for the unemployed (with the government as employer of last resort) and to build at least 1 million housing units a year for low-income families. A tall order? Perhaps—but, said Ford Motor's Henry Ford II, the U.S. was confronted with "the greatest internal crisis since the Civil War—a crisis which demands no less than a massive national response."

**Priorities:** And still the question remained whether the nation had either the resources or the will to undertake any such response. The high cost of Vietnam made for an ever-deepening pinch on the cash available for the ghettos; both Whitney Young (at the Urban League's national convention in Portland, Ore.) and New York's Mayor John V. Lindsay (at the Urban Coalition meeting) got big hands for suggesting that the cities ought to have higher priority than the war. And riot-torn Newark's Mayor Hugh Addonizio, for one, doubted whether middle-class whites really cared enough to make the required sacrifices. "Affluent Americans," he told President Johnson's riot-study commission, "are gripped more by the need to

buy a vacation home, a sports car for their college-bound son and a second color-TV set than they are with sharing their affluence with the poor."

In all this crisis colloquy, there was a current of abstraction; white Americans, by long habit, tend regularly to talk about Negroes, not with them. Not until last week, three weeks deep into its investigation of the riots, did the Judiciary Committee get around to hearing an authentic ghetto Negro: Rufus (Catfish) Mayfield, 21, a child of the Washington slums and lately the head of a government-financed neighborhood cleanup crew. Mayfield's street-wise soliloquy was plainly unfamiliar to the senators; it also was, or ought to have been, edifying:

■ On violence: "I'm not for no riot... I don't want nobody burning my mother's house and I have to sit out in some park waiting for somebody to fund me to get another home. I can't dig that."

■ On "outside agitators": "I used to watch a lot of cowboy and Indian flicks, and I noticed that the chief lived to be 80 or 90 years old, and the actual braves didn't live to nothing, approximately 35 or something like that. Then I evaluated, because the chief always sits up on the hill and waves his stick, and them stupid Indians go running there, and they don't last too long, but the chief is still waving

... This is about these outside agitators."

■ On government programs: "Congress and all these type people come up with these dynamite programs, right, you know, in the springtime. They say, 'Here comes another hot summer, let's get these programs back.' [Then] they say, 'Well, it's wintertime, and I don't think Negroes like to riot in the winter, so we take the programs back.' ... It's like a pacifier in a baby's mouth. You know, a baby's not too cool with thinking—he thinks some grub is coming down. What you really need is that meal."

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ANDERSON, S.C.  
MAIL

E-10,130

## Jobs Are Not The Whole Answer

As ~~one-time director of Central Intelligence~~, John A. McCone knew the dangers that beset this nation the world over. It was his duty to learn them and to counteract them where he could.

It may come as a shock to most Americans, as it did to us, to learn that he finds the greatest danger to the nation today not from enemies outside, but from those inside the country.

Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, McCone said that racial strife could destroy the nation. He is an authority on the problem, because he is head of the National Advisory Committee, which studied the strife that wrecked Watts, the Los Angeles sector, two years ago. He had come, in part, to file a report of this committee with Congress.

Summarizing the committee's progress report, McCone pointed to some improvements which themselves may point to ways to solve the problem that worries him and most thoughtful Americans. To start with, the Watts business community has found employment for 17,900 since the riots. Others are being given vocational training. While this does not answer the whole problem, it is a start.

As one long-range cure, McCone urged that a Head Start program be inaugurated in Watts for children of 3

to 4 and that the number of students in regular classes in the schools be divided into smaller classes. This would eliminate the serious lag in reading and other skills in some schools. Given the education and the skills required, the thousands of jobs the private sector has already developed will become a flood and at least the economic causes of the riots will subside.

More than education and training, however, seems to be needed.

One cannot overlook the looting, the sniping and other illegal activities, and find a pat answer that will cover the entire range of the disorders.

Certainly it is in part economic.

But there also needs to be a program of moral improvement at the same time.

People not only need to be trained for jobs, but they ought, at the same time to be taught that looting is morally wrong.

You can't associate the high rate of illegitimacy in this nation with poor economic conditions.

Immoral persons will remain immoral until they are shown that immorality is a wrong way of life. Economic improvement may even tend to weaken the moral fiber of the nation, unless the two phases — economic and spiritual — are advanced simultaneously.

## Oil and the Mideast Crisis

by VICTOR PERLO

THE ARABS have branded the American and British oil companies and governments as responsible for the Israeli invasion and occupation of their lands. Is this justified, or have the Arabs merely picked on an innocent scapegoat for their own failures?

Last year nearly 600,000,000 metric tons of oil were pumped out of the Middle East and North Africa, equal to 43 per cent of the output of the capitalist world. The share of the Middle East\* in world output rises because it contains most of the capitalist world reserves, and production per well is huge. This year US companies planned to reinvest \$1,136 million of their profits in further Middle Eastern expansion, up 36 per cent from their 1966 investment there.

Western Europe already gets 84 per cent of its oil from the Middle East; Japan over 90 per cent. Only 3 per cent of the US supply comes from the area, but US companies control most of the oil, and 65 per cent of the oil used by the US armed forces in Vietnam comes from the Persian Gulf.

US companies today produce abroad goods worth over \$100 billion yearly, an amount exceeding the national income of any capitalist country outside the United States. Profits from foreign investments even exceed profits derived from the vast military budget. And one-third of all the profits on direct foreign investments remitted to the United States in 1965 came from Middle Eastern oil.

The Big Five US oil companies (Standard of New Jersey, Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, and Standard of California) occupy five of the seven top places among US industrial corporations, including first place in the amount of their invested capital. Their assets totaled \$36 billion, and their admitted profits (far under the actual total) were \$3.1 billion in 1966. Approximately half of their crude oil, the decisive source of profits, came from the Middle East. Oil company figures, as reported to the US Department of Commerce, admitted 1965 after-tax profits on Middle Eastern investments equal to 76 per cent of the claimed value of the investments at the beginning of the year (*Survey of Current Business*, September 1966).

\* Throughout this article, this term includes North Africa.

VICTOR PERLO, noted economist and writer on world affairs, frequently appears in NWR. His major economic writings include *Empire of High Finance*, *American Imperialism*, and *USA and USSR: The Economic Race*.

STAT  
EAST: PERLO  
In American Oil Company, giants, is the largest producer in the area wrote ecstatically of its affairs: "Its crude twice as large as those contained in the closely guarded books were made public, that it has the highest profit margin of poration in the world" (March 16, 1966).

Oil royalty and tax payments to the governments are now in the 80 to 85 cents per barrel bargaining, partly through the O Exporting Countries (OPEC), the main price increases. In deals with Japanese, Italians, companies, Middle Eastern countries have. Aside from taxes, the actual cost of production according to John Warder, Chairman of sortium, is 14 cents per barrel in Iran, 8 and 6 cents in Kuwait. For comparison gallon gasoline, this Kuwait cost amounts per gallon.

The average selling prices of Standard were in the range of \$8 to \$9 per barrel incurred in refining, transportation, and of crude oil requires the heaviest investment done in the Middle East also. By an equitable Eastern countries would be entitled to a final value. But the real situation, as shown

For every dollar's worth of products derived oil, the Middle Eastern governments get about workers less than one cent.

THE TEN cents is received, usually, by interest in their subjects' welfare or development. The people who work the oil. The great natural wealth of the Middle East the wherewithal for a splendid program of cultural development and rising living standards of US and British oil companies, contributed the fierce poverty and backwardness of the nation from now it may be too late, as nuclear

The oil companies clearly associate their maintaining backward social conditions, and their direct and indirect political activity to coordination of oil company and US government their foreign properties began after World Oil (N.J.) Chairman A. C. Bedford said: now is an aggressive foreign policy on the part

CUMBERLAND, MD.

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

E-21,751

S-33,460

AUG 30 1957

## Nation Gets Sober Warning On Strife

A chilling warning has been delivered on the ultimate cost to the nation of failure to resolve its racial agony—and soon.

"I feel very deeply," John A. McCone told the Senate Judiciary Committee, "that unless we find an answer to this problem it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country."

This is one of the strongest statements yet heard on the possible consequences of mounting racial strife. What gives it special weight is the source.

McCone is not given to hyperbole. A conservative Republican businessman, he has served three administrations in the Defense Department, as head of the Atomic Energy Commission and, most recently, as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. If anything, sober understatement during a long and impressive career of service.

He would be the last to cry, "Wolf!"

For the past two years, McCone has headed a California commission investigating the Watts riots in Los Angeles, and it was in this capacity that he appeared at the committee's hearings on the House-passed antiriot bill—a measure he found "reasonable" in itself, but "it would be a mistake for Congress to pass this bill and think it is going to stop riots."

The short-range answer, he suggested, is in jobs and the long-range in education, but the ultimate solution is not going to come quickly or easily. But find it we must, resisting the temptation to resign ourselves to belief that the situation is hopeless.

Somber words, but useful. From such a source, they serve to underscore the indispensable basis for the search for a solution—realization, if any can still doubt, that today and right here at home we are confronted with perhaps the gravest challenge of our national experience.

FREDERICK, MD.

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

M-12,642

AUG 30 1967

## Greatest Danger

As one-time director of Central Intelligence, John A. McCone knew the dangers that beset this nation the world over. It was his duty to learn them and to counteract them where he could. It may come as a shock to most Americans, as it did to us, to learn that he finds the greatest danger to the nation today not from enemies outside, but from those inside the country.

Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, McCone said that racial strife could destroy the nation. He is an authority on the problem, because he is head of the National Advisory Committee, which studied the strife that wrecked Watts, the Los Angeles sector, two years ago. He had come, in part, to file a report of this committee with Congress.

"I feel very deeply that unless we answer this problem it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country," McCone testified. "It leaves me with a deep worry about how this problem can be solved. The temptation is to say this is hopeless, but I think we

have to stay at the job until we find the answer."

Summarizing the committee's progress report, McCone pointed to some improvements which themselves may point to ways to solve the problem that worries him and most thoughtful Americans. To start with, the business community has found employment for 17,900 Negroes since the riots. Others are being given vocational training. While this does not answer the whole problem, it is relieving the pressures.

As a long-range cure, McCone urged that a Head Start program be inaugurated in Watts for children of 3 to 4 and that the number of students in regular classes in the schools be divided into smaller classes. This would eliminate the serious lag in reading and other skills in ghetto schools. This is basic. Given the education and the skills required, the thousands of jobs the private sector has already developed will become a flood and the economic causes of the riots will subside. Only then may sound progress be made.

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BISMARCK, N.D.  
TRIBUNE

E-17,713

## Find Solution, or Else

A chilling warning has been delivered on the ultimate cost to the nation of failure to resolve its racial agony--and soon.

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The short-range answer, he suggested, is in jobs and the long-range

in education, but the ultimate solution is not going to come quickly or easily. But find it we must, resisting the temptation to resign ourselves to belief that the situation is hopeless.

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Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

EXPRESS

M - 76,998

EXPRESS-NEWS

S - 102,470

AUG 2 5 1967

Front Page  
Edit Page  
Other PageSEATTLE, WASHINGTON  
POST-INTELLIGENCER

M-204,777

S-252,941

AUG 2 9 1967

# Crisis Warning From John McCone

John A. McCone, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responsible businessman, top Republican and one of the nation's most prestigious public figures, has delivered a solemn warning to Congress about the implication of racial rioting in the United States. As head of a California commission that investigated the Watts riot in Los Angeles, moreover, he speaks on his subject with fresh insight into this grave social development.

"I feel very deeply that unless we answer this problem," McCone declared, addressing the Senate Judiciary Committee, "it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country. It leaves me with a deep worry about how this problem can be solved. The temptation is to say this is hopeless, but I think we have to stay on the job until we get the answer."

He noted that in Watts much had been done to lessen social pressures since the catastrophe of two years ago, but that a potentially dangerous situation remained there nevertheless. No one needs to be informed that similar dangers exist elsewhere in the nation's large urban areas. But as McCone only too trenchantly implies, a sense of urgency is needed regarding these problems, a sense of determination to solve them.

**THE DEEP-ROOTED** social causes of such riots as occurred in Watts, Detroit, Newark and elsewhere must be unearthed, in fact, before they present the nation with the disaster that McCone has envisaged.

## Constructive Riot Prevention

Rap Brown rankles the frazzled nerves of every sane American with his reckless cry of "get some guns." He is the kind of person Whitney Young, director of the Urban League, has called the "Pied Pipers of Destruction."

Brown, Stokely Carmichael and others who are riding the backs of militant racists and deluded do-gooders will force Americans to take sides—openly. In time, these people will defeat themselves. It is the unhappy task of governments—at various levels—to prevent these men from being as great a threat as they are a national nuisance.

Young has asked reasonable Negroes to turn their backs on these "Pied Pipers." John McCone, former chief of the C. I. A. and lately an investigator of the Watts riots, has said it is imperative that positive approaches be made to the troubles.

Several things have to be done. One, legal authority must be reaffirmed by well-trained and well-advised police power. Second-string police characters should not be given the chance to propel themselves into greater importance than the facts warrant. Two, constructive attitudes and the concern of individuals of all races should be made known to overcome what Whitney calls the "silence and indifference (that) allows bigots to speak for them."

Finally, riot-prone people are going to have to translate public programs (enhanced if need be) into individual initiative and responsibility. Their needs have to be met (by such simple things as adequate bus service in Watts, for example, to allow people to get to work) but opportunity also has to be recognized.



From: [redacted]  
Page: [redacted]

BRIDGEPORT, CONN.  
TELEGRAM

M-12,751

**AUG 26 1967**

### The Greatest Danger

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From: [redacted]  
Page: [redacted]

FALL RIVER, MASS.  
HERALD-NEWS

E-40,197

**AUG 21 1967**

## Racial Strife

John A. McCone, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, is a level-headed man, not given to exaggeration. This week McCone who was chairman of the official commission that investigated the Watts riots in Los Angeles told the Senate Judiciary Committee that racial strife could destroy this nation. His statement should not be brushed aside as so much hyperbole. It should be taken seriously at its face value.

According to McCone, unless we find an answer to the problem of integrating the Negro population fully with the rest of the country, the problem "is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country." Certainly no solution has been found up to date, and McCone

said flatly that the outbreaks in New Haven were especially distressing because New Haven had served as a model city in his commission's study and "a great deal had been done" for Negroes there.

The disparity between any possible power the Negro minority could muster and that of the rest of the nation is so overwhelming that McCone's remark that the racial problem could destroy our country seems an overstatement at first glance. What he means, however, is not that a black revolution could succeed, but that it could damage the fabric of our democratic society irreparably. and that is only too probable.

A generation from now historians may find that the fact that the Vietnam war is keeping the government from concentrating on the racial problem here is one of the major tragedies of our time.

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Page Page Page

GREENVILLE, OHIO  
ADVOCATE

E-10,282

## Our Greatest Challenge

A chilling warning has been delivered on the ultimate cost to the nation of failure to resolve its racial agony — and soon.

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ALBANY, N.Y.  
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7  
TIMES-UNION

M - 71,635

S - 122,607

AUG 2 5 1967

## The National Scene:

# Crisis Warning

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I think we have to stay on the job until we get the answer."

He noted that in Watts much had been done to lessen social pressures since the catastrophe of two years ago, but that a potentially dangerous situation remained there nevertheless.

No one needs to be informed that similar dangers exist elsewhere in the nation's large urban areas. But as McCone only too trenchantly implies, a sense of urgency is needed regarding these problems, a sense of determination to solve them.

The deep-rooted social causes of such riots as occurred in Watts, Detroit, Newark and elsewhere must be unearthed, in fact, before they present the nation with the disaster that McCone has envisaged.

PALO ALTO, CALIF.  
TIMESE - 40,695  
10/28/67**EDITORIALS****Dr. McCone prescribes a riot cure**

Studied opinions about what causes riots and how to prevent them are flying this summer. Among them, John McCone's stands out.

In part it is profoundly impressive because of who McCone is: an industrialist, former AEC chairman and CIA director, a Republican, head of the just-dismissed California commission that probed the Watts riots.

Beyond that, McCone didn't strain his personal feelings out of his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee. And he outlined action that is simple in concept but very difficult in execution.

"Unless we find an answer to this problem," he said, "it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country." Those are not words carelessly uttered.

He added, with a touch of despair: "I'm concerned over riots occurring in cities where a great deal has been done. The temptation is to say this is hopeless so why do it. But we have to find a solution . . ."

McCone urged a three-part program: (1) jobs and job training, (2) education and (3) leadership, determination and responsibility on the part of the whole society, including Negroes.

"The short-range solution is jobs and

the long-range solution is education," he said. "But the Negro must help himself. We are in a competitive society and equality means he has to compete. Unless he does, unless he is motivated . . . then no amount of money will be successful."

California has made a fair start on jobs, though McCone only this week pointed out duplication in county, state and federal job training programs — and Gov. Reagan vowed to try to correct it, preferably through coordinators from private industry.

To uplift ghetto schools will, it appears, require massive federal help. Otherwise even states that might handle it themselves would be hobbled by the influx of poorly schooled children from laggard states.

As for challenge and response from the whole society, how to inspire it is the hardest problem of all. Newark Mayor Hugh Addonizio has just asserted that it is a myth "that middle class America has an interest in saving cities." There's truth in his words, yet he fails to say that these people, many of them suburbanites, are paying the bulk of the U.S. tax bills. Their responsiveness would grow if the cities showed why they should be saved and all city people showed a firmer intent to help save themselves.

WORCESTER, MASS.

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

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S-107,539

AUG 24 1967

## McCone's Startling Testimony

✓ John McCone, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, is not a man given to careless remarks. So when he says that racial strife in the cities could "destroy our country," his words have to be regarded seriously.

McCone headed the commission that investigated the Watts riot in 1965. He has had a first-hand look at the appalling conditions that blight the lives of millions of city Negroes. Last year he was quoted as saying that at least \$100 billion would be required to straighten out the slums.

But this week, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, McCone had lost confidence that money can solve the problem. The New Haven rioting he found particularly puzzling, because New Haven has done a great deal to improve slum conditions.

"The temptation is to say this is hopeless, but I think we have to stay at the job until we find the answer," McCone said at one point.

McCone's pessimism is exaggerated. The country is not going to be "destroyed" by racial strife. The problem is not "hopeless."

But it will not be solved until the nation is determined to solve it.

That will require active work and planning from the grass roots all the way up to Washington. Federal funds will certainly be needed — probably in huge amounts — but federal funds alone will not do the trick.

The American people have some hard personal decisions to make. As Newark's Mayor Addonizio put it bluntly, middle-class suburbanites are more interested in getting that second television set than in facing the task of eliminating poverty in the slums. And millions of slum-dwellers seem per-

sueded that nothing they can do, or are willing to do, is even worth trying.

Worcester, for example, does not have one-tenth of the problem that most cities have. But right here in our city, 25 per cent of the families eke out an existence on less than \$3,000 a year — a condition of permanent poverty. Hundreds of Negroes and Puerto Ricans — and whites — right here in Worcester live in wretched conditions and have no hope of getting anything much better, even if they could afford to pay the rents.

In city after city across the land, millions are caught up in what seems to be a permanent urban depression. They live in substandard housing, their children are bitten by rats, their schools are third-rate, their rubbish and garbage is not collected properly, their medical needs are poorly met, they have no nearby parks and playgrounds worthy of the name, and they are the chronic victims of loan sharks and petty criminals.

Their lives are a world removed from those fortunate people who live only a few miles away in suburban surroundings.

In the old days, immigrants crammed in the hearts of the cities at least had hope. They felt that they could work their way up to something better.

But many slum dwellers today do not show much hope or initiative or enthusiasm. Technological, computerized America does not seem any longer the same land of opportunity for the unskilled and unschooled.

But it must once again be made the land of opportunity. It must once again become the land of hope. Otherwise, our cities will slide deeper into the pit of violence, crime and anarchy.

In the long run, that would be the most expensive course of all to follow.

Front Page	Ed Page	Other Page
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NEWARK, N.J.  
STAR-LEDGER

M-248,096

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AUG 2 4 1967

### Preventing riots

John A. McCone, former Central Intelligence Agency director, has come forth with perhaps the most intelligent comment to date on the bill now pending in Congress to prosecute agitators who cross state lines.

McCone, who also directed an in-depth study of the 1965 Watts riots, told the Senate Judiciary Committee: "I think it would be a mistake for the Congress of the United States to pass this bill and think there would be no more riots."

He said he had "no objection" to passage of the measure, while making it clear that it would not accomplish its objective, the prevention of rioting. Congress ought to take McCone's advice, get off the futility treadmill and concentrate on bills that hold more promise for positive results.

## WATTS UNIT FINDS TENSION IS HIGH

Says in Last Report Negro  
Gains Are Not Enough

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Aug. 23 —

The McCone Commission, which has been studying the 1965 Watts riot, said in its final report today that "tensions are still high" in the Negro district and that it was "encouraged but far from satisfied" by steps taken to improve conditions.

The eight-member citizens commission, appointed by former Gov. Edmund G. Brown, has been headed by John A. McCone, industrialist and former Director of Central Intelli-

gence. He testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee yesterday on the national problem of racial disturbances.

The five-day Watts outburst, which caused 34 deaths, was the first of the nationwide wave of riots still plaguing the country. The McCone report said that while "tensions are still high and rumors of trouble and violence and impending outbreaks of destruction are daily occurrences, local law enforcement leaders appear to be prepared with immediate and powerful forces to suppress and quell any eruption of violence."

### \$62.8-Million in Aid

The report noted that Watts had been the principal target of some \$62,827,000 in Federal antipoverty appropriations for Los Angeles, among numerous other Federal, state and local assistance measures.

The core population of Watts is about 30,000, out of 400,000

Negroes in Central Los Angeles. The report noted that the latter number was increasing by about 30,000 migrants a year, so that problems were increasing even as solutions were being pressed.

The two basic problems, the commission concluded, remain employment and education. In education, it said, "improvements, meritorious as they are, do not go to the very heart of the problem" because of substandard home conditions.

In employment, the report said, although "a very substantial infrastructure for training has been created, it is quite apparent that the unemployment rate among Negroes has not been substantially reduced."

Gov. Ronald Reagan is dissolving the McCone Commission, at its own suggestion, and creating a statewide advisory committee to pursue its recommendations.



## McCone Rips Curbs On Cops in Rioting

When race riots break out they should be "suppressed and law and order restored immediately and positively, with no restrictions on law enforcement agencies," the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency said yesterday.

Former CIA chief John A. McCone, who spoke at Kennedy Airport before boarding an air-

plane, realize that they suffer seriously from these riots."

He said he does not believe that the various riots throughout the country were "directed from any central headquarters."

It has been established that Communists did not start most Negro riots, McCone said. "However, once they were started, the Communists moved in to take advantage."

The riot leaders, he said, are now "pretty well indoctrinated in the techniques" of keeping riots alive.



John A. McCone  
Wants order restored

liner for London, said that riots which have been met with unshackled law enforcement attempts have not escalated.

### Calls Others "Tragic"

Riots which were not handled in that manner, he said, have tended in tragic consequences.

McCone said most riots "are carried on by a very small minority of the Negro community, most of whom want no part of it and

## DANGEROUS DEFEATISM

A couple of respected Americans in the last couple of days have made kindred public statements which we'd call dangerously defeatist and foolishly unrealistic.

Rep. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) told the American Federation of Teachers convention in Washington Tuesday that Negroes around the country now are angry enough to try to destroy America.

✓ John McCone, former Central Intelligence Agency director, told the Senate Judiciary Committee in Washington Tuesday that unless the race-conflict problem can be solved "it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country."

### **Who's Going to Destroy What?**

These melancholy remarks, well-intentioned though they were, could only, it seems to us, discourage decent Americans of all colors and encourage agitators and troublemakers of the H. Rap Brown tripe—pardon, type.

Further, to talk of Negroes destroying this nation is to overlook a basic—you might say the decisive—statistic on the population of the United States. That statistic: Negroes make up only about 10% of U.S. citizens.

Therefore, any effort by a few Negroes to destroy this country could result in well-nigh total destruction of our Negro population.

This would be a tragic loss to the nation, since the great majority of our Negroes are fine fellows and gals and damn valuable citizens.

AUG 24 1967

## 'We Have to Find an Answer'

JOHN A. McCONE, who has filled numerous top Government assignments, lastly as chairman of the California commission which investigated the Watts riots of 1965, was testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

The committee is holding hearings on a House-passed bill proposing to make it a Federal crime to cross state lines with intent to start a riot.

Mr. McCONE said he saw no "barm" in the bill, but it should not be regarded as a cure-all for the city disorders still breaking out across the country. Of course, the bill is no cure-all — it mainly is a symbol of sweeping public resentment toward the anarchy which produces the riots.

Mr. McCONE, despite special knowledge gleaned from the Watts inquiry, does not know the whole answer. And probably nobody does.

He talked about what has been done in Watts the last two years — 17,000 jobs found for unemployable Negroes, more job training, improved school opportunities, better relations with the police. Each doubtless a factor in the ultimate answer.

The main point he made was that "we have to stay with the job until we have the answer." That is obvious. And the answer won't come overnight.

But meanwhile, some rigorous law enforcement steps are essential or, as Mr. McCONE said, "this problem is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country."

Public opinion generally is incensed by these outbreaks and unless the riots cease, or are controlled, public opinion is apt to withdraw support from the type of steps Mr. McCONE said are evidence of progress in Watts.

Take Rep. Frank M. Clark of Pennsylvania, a Democrat who has voted for most of the "Great Society" programs. Last week, Mr. Clark voted against the latest civil rights bill which passed the House 326 to 93. It was a reversal of form for him, and his action stemmed directly from the epidemic of riots.

In a speech preceding his vote, he asked:

"How long can society go on thumbing its nose at law and order? Have we lost forever the youth of yesterday who had an appreciation for the cop on the beat? Have we reached the stage where the man who wears a blue coat and a badge is no longer respected at all? . . . We certainly cannot have liberty without order."

Since that speech, Mr. Clark's office has been flooded with mail from his constituents — nearly every message endorsing what he said.

AUG 23 1967

# Detroit Guard Called 'Trigger-Happy'



AP Wirephoto

## McCone Discusses Riots Yesterday

Combined News Services

Washington—Lt. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, the Army commander during the Detroit riots, told a House Armed Services subcommittee yesterday that the National Guardsmen there acted like "trigger-happy, nervous soldiers."

In other testimony, John A. McCone, the former Central Intelligence Agency director who headed an investigation of the 1956 Watts riots, warned before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the nation would be destroyed unless racial problems are solved.

Throckmorton said that he ordered the guardsmen to unload their guns. But his deputy said that 90 per cent of the guardsmen disobeyed the order. Throckmorton told a hostile subcommittee that he had no apologies to make for the order. "If I had to do it all over again I would do exactly the same thing," he said.

Despite the order, Throckmorton said, the guardsmen still fired wildly at streetlights and over passing cars. His deputy, Maj. Gen. Charles Stone, said 90 per cent of the guardsmen carried loaded weapons in violation of the order when he conducted an inspection three or four days later. "Why didn't you have them court martialled?" shouted Rep. Porter Hardy, (D-Va.). "You can't court martial 90 per cent of a force," Stone replied.

The subcommittee in investigating whether the guard is properly equipped and trained to cope with city riots. Under the chairmanship of Rep. F. Edward Hebert, (D-La.), most members of the panel felt Throckmorton's orders left guardsmen unable to protect themselves against sniper fire. Throckmorton disagreed. He said the number of snipers was exaggerated and that when sniping occurred the thing to do was to take cover, locate the sniper "and then send in a guard to root him out."

"I was confronted with a bunch of trigger-happy, nervous soldiers in the National Guard," Throckmorton recalled. "I had no intention of having innocent women and children killed." The general said later during the session he did not mean to single out the national guard for criticism. It was his experience, he said, that when even well trained troops are sent into combat "they are inclined to be trigger happy and it takes two or three days for them to settle down."

McCone spoke before the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on a House-passed bill to make it a federal crime to travel across state lines to foment riots. "Unless we find an answer to this problem it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country," McCone said. He said that he thought the antiriot bill was

reasonable, but he warned: "It would be a mistake for Congress to pass this bill and think it is going to stop riots."

McCone said he was appalled at seeing riots in New Haven, Conn., which he described as having made the best efforts of any city at solving its problems. "The short-range solution rests in jobs and the long-range solution in education," he told the committee. "But the Negro must help himself. We are in a competitive society and equality means he has to compete. Unless he does, unless he is motivated . . . then no amount of money will be successful," McCone said.

Newark Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio, whose city was badly damaged by riots this summer, said much the same in testimony before the President's Special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. "Rising expectations are not only a part of ghetto life, but a part of American life," he said. U.S. cities need "a staggering effort . . . a Marshall Plan" in housing, education, employment, crime control, health programs and in "stabilizing the tax rates."

But Addonizio painted a pessimistic picture of the help cities were likely to get. Middle-class America, he said, has little interest in eliminating big city poverty. "Affluent Americans are gripped more by the need to buy a vacation home, a sports car for their college-bound son, and a second color television set than they are with sharing their affluence with the poor," he said.

AUG 23 1967

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

# Racial Strife a Threat To U.S., McCone Says

By DANA BULLEN  
Star Staff Writer

Racial violence threatens to "split our society irretrievably and destroy our country" unless a solution is found, John A. McCone, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has told a Senate committee.

"The temptation is to say this is hopeless," said McCone, head of a special commission that investigated the 1965 Watts rioting in Los Angeles. But, he added, "we have to keep working at it."

Testifying yesterday before the Senate Judiciary Committee, which is considering anti-riot legislation, McCone called for vastly increased efforts by private industry to provide jobs for Negroes and urged expanded educational opportunities for slum residents.

In addition to general recommendations, McCone gave an appraisal of the effectiveness of steps taken in Los Angeles following the riots there two years ago.

## Brutality Charges Drop

The basis for charges of police brutality, if such a basis ever existed, has been sharply cut back, he said, and today only 0.05 percent of arrests made result in complaints about the treatment involved.

On the job front, he said, a new organization has placed close to 18,000 employable Negroes in positions, and has been partially successful in establishing ways to train those considered unemployable.

In such efforts, McCone stressed, it is important that programs be coordinated and that jobs actually be available in private or public situations for graduates of training programs. "There is nothing more devastating than the boy who takes a training course and then doesn't get a job," McCone said.

## Cites Specific Programs

Regarding education, he called for making Head Start programs permanent, much smaller classes and increased attention to remedial programs.

Asked specifically about the worth of anti-riot legislation now being considered by the Judiciary Committee, McCone gave a lukewarm endorsement.

Saying that a law making it a crime to cross state lines or use interstate facilities to incite violence would do "no harm," he said:

"I think it would be a mistake for Congress to pass such a law and think that it's put an end to riots, because it's not going to put an end to riots that way."

Pressed on this point by both Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., and Sen. James O. Eastland, D-Miss., the committee chairman, McCone said:

"I can see no objection . . . but it is not an alternative to the positive actions that must be taken."

## Addonizio Testifies

The President's Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders heard, meanwhile, from Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio of Newark, N.J. He said that middle-class America has little interest in eliminating big-city poverty.

In suburbia, he said, television sets and sports cars come first.

Addonizio said it would take a massive federal program—"a Marshall Plan"—to eliminate the ghettos, but criticized the Office of Economic Opportunity for bypassing the cities and dealing directly with the neighborhoods.

Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey recently called for a "Marshall Plan" to fight slum conditions, but later contended that he merely meant existing proposals put forth by the Johnson administration. There were widespread reports that

his initial speech had angered the President.

Among the "cruellest of myths," Addonizio said, are the myths that America is an urban nation, that middle-class America has an interest in saving cities, and that the achievement of local political power by Negroes will cure poverty.

Addonizio, whose city was badly damaged by race riots this summer, said that "rising expectations are not only a part of ghetto life, but a part of American life."

He said that "affluent Americans are gripped more by the need to buy a vacation home, a sports car for their college-bound son and a second color television set than they are with sharing their affluence with the poor."

AUG 23 1967

# Former CIA Chief Testifies: Riot Bill Is Not A Solution

By Morton Kondracke

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Former Central Intelligence Agency Director John A. McCone said Tuesday that a bill to prosecute agitators who cross state lines "will do no harm," but "it's not going to prevent riots."

McCone testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, hearing witnesses on a House-passed measure to punish persons traveling interstate to provoke riots.

He recommended a three-part program of jobs and job training, education and Negro self-help. He commented:

"Unless we find an answer to this problem (of Negro frustration), it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country."

## Addonizio Comment

Meanwhile, one of the nation's rapidly growing group of riot-veteran mayors, Hugh J. Addonizio of Newark, N.J., said rioting has "acquired a kind of legitimacy among many people who should know better." He said the attitude should be undone.

Addonizio was a witness before the President's Commission on Civil Disorders, headed by Gov. Kerner of Illinois. McCone testified at the panel's closed hearing before appearing at the Senate.

Releasing some of his testimony to reporters, Addonizio said it is among the "cruelest of myths . . . that middle-class America has an interest in saving cities."

## Marshall Plan Plan

He declared the cities need "a staggering effort — yes, a Marshall Plan" to deal with housing, education, employment, crime and other problems. But, he commented:

"Americans support equality for all and the elimination of poverty, but they would vote the cities out of existence if they could."

"Affluent Americans are

gripped more by the need to buy a vacation home, a sports car for their college-bound sons and a second color television set than they are with sharing their affluence with the poor."

He also criticized the federal Office of Economic Opportunity for bypassing city governments and dealing directly with neighborhood groups.

## 'Club To The Powerless'

"The cities were flat on their backs and the OEO came along and instead of helping them it decided we were a bunch of bullies, and it gave a club to the so called powerless to help beat us as we lay on the ground," he said.

Speaking of the violence, Addonizio said:

"Rioting must be understood by all—black and white—to be beyond the boundaries of American life. There are plenty of reasons and plenty of room for real protest in American life, but there must be no room—not an inch—for violence and rioting."

McCone, who directed a massive California study of the 1965 Watts riots, appeared at the Judiciary Committee at the request of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.). Kennedy is striving to expand hearings on the anti-riot bill beyond reports from police officials on alleged conspiracies by agitators.

## Cost Of New Programs

McCone said, "I think it would be a mistake for the Congress of the United States to pass this bill and think there would be no more riots." However, he said, he had "no objection" to the bill's passage.

McCone, who also formerly headed the Atomic Energy Commission, said the cost of job and education programs "will be paid by the government now, although not as

much as some people think."

He said he does not favor "piling program on program," and recommended full-scale review of anti-poverty efforts. Attempts should be made to involve private enterprise in poverty programs, he said.

McCone said rioting the last three nights in New Haven, Conn., and previously in Detroit "leaves me with a very deep worry. Of all the cities which took corrective action to solve its problems, it was New Haven."

He added: "It is tempting to say, 'This is hopeless,' but I feel . . . we have to find a solution. We have to stay working at it because it's too important."

## The Aptitude Handicap

McCone estimated there were 10,000,000 Americans, most of them Negroes, whose mental aptitude was not up to a fifth-grade level.

"This situation will tear down the walls of our society," McCone told the committee.

Among his suggestions was the use of Negro self-help "in this competitive society."

"The Negro must accept responsibility or anything done for him by the government or he said.

AUG 23 1967

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

# McCONE SAYS U. S. COULD BE RUINED BY RACIAL STRIFE

## Fears Irretrievable Split in Society—Addonizio Finds Middle Class Selfish

By JOHN HERBERS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22—

John A. McCone, former Director of Central Intelligence, told the Senate Judiciary Committee today that racial strife could destroy the nation.

Mr. McCone, head of a California commission that investigated the Watts riots in Los Angeles, said that he was perplexed because rioting had broken out in such cities as New Haven, which had served as a model city in the commission's study and where, Mr. McCone said, "a great deal had been done" for Negroes.

"I feel very deeply that unless we answer this problem it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country," he said.

"It leaves me with a deep worry about how this problem can be solved. The temptation is to say this is hopeless, but I think we have to stay at the job until we find the answer."

### Progress Found in Watts

Mr. McCone filed with the committee, and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders a report on progress found in Watts since the riots two years ago.

The report said that the condition of Negroes in Watts had improved somewhat and that pressures that set off the rioting had been lessened. But, according to the report, a potentially dangerous situation still exists.

Both Mr. McCone and Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio of Newark testified before the President's commission in executive session. Mr. Addonizio made public his statement, in which he said it was "the cruelest of myths" that middle class Americans have an interest in saving the Negroes.

"Affluent Americans are gripped more by the need to buy a vacation home, a sport car for their college-bound son and a second color television set than they are with sharing their affluence with the poor," he said.

### The 'Despair' of Mayors

The Mayor also said that it was a myth that "the poor, could eliminate poverty" by achieving political power.

He said, "The image of a local so-called power structure with a vested interest in poverty is so absurd but so widely held that it is the greatest despair in the lives of most Mayors, particularly in the North."

Mr. Addonizio said that public indifference and ignorance were more to blame for the lack of adequate financing of urban programs than the war in Vietnam.

"The President is right," he said. "The country can afford both, but it just isn't convinced it must. It is too concerned with that second television set."

Mr. McCone, after testifying before the commission, which is studying the causes of the riots, appeared before the Judiciary Committee, which is conducting hearings on the House-passed antiriot bill. The bill would make it a crime to cross state lines or to use the facilities of interstate commerce to incite violence.

The gentle, white-haired Mr. McCone, now in private business in Los Angeles, was the first witness in the hearings to please both the conservatives, who want stronger police action, and the liberals, who want more social programs.

He said the legislation under consideration would be helpful in some situations but warned that Congress should not enact it as a panacea. He acknowledged that riots could be suppressed by broad police power.

"What worries me about this," he said, "is the climate that might prevail in the country for several years. That would be tragic."

### The Post-Riot Gains

Summarizing the commission's progress report, Mr. McCone said the relationship between the Los Angeles police and Negroes had improved in the last two years and "we are gratified about what has been done in law enforcement."

The business community, he said, found employment for some 17,900 Negroes since the riots. He said that attempts to coordinate and improve vocational training programs had met "partial success."

"This does not answer the whole problem but it does relieve the pressures," he said. "I don't want to leave this committee with the feeling that there are no grievances or tensions in the community."

Mr. McCone said the combined efforts of the private and public sectors to meet the needs of the community "have alleviated some of the tense feelings that caused the trouble two years ago."

As a long-range cure, he said, the commission had recommended "costly" reforms in education patterned after programs tried in New York. He said there were two basic recommendations:

First, that "permanent Head Start programs" beginning at the age of 3 or 4 be started in ghetto schools; second, that classes in these schools be made much smaller.

The commission, he said, was not sure that this could be done or would have the intended effect of eliminating the quite serious lag in reading and other skills in ghetto schools. But he said the results in New York had been "quite encouraging" and he was persuaded that this was the most important, long-range step that could be taken.

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7



Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

# McCone Calls Anti-Riot Law No Solution

By Jean M. White

Washington Post Staff Writer

John A. McCone told Congress yesterday that it would be a mistake to pass an anti-riot law and "think it is going to put an end to riots" that way.

McCone, who headed the commission to investigate the 1965 Watts riot, said he saw "no harm" in passing such legislation.

"But it is no alternative to permanent programs," he emphasized.


The former director of the Central Intelligence Agency appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee to testify on a House-passed bill that would make it a Federal offense to travel over state lines to incite violence.

McCone came to the Hill after giving private testimony to the President's Commission on Civil Disorders, which held its fourth closed meeting yesterday.

Another witness, Newark Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio, told the President's commission that rioting has acquired "a kind of legitimacy among many people who should know better."

Addonizio called for a "Marshall Plan" of massive Federal help to improve life in the ghettos. But at the same time he lashed out at the Office of Economic Opportunity for by-passing the cities and dealing directly with the poor neighborhoods.

"The cities were flat on their backs and the OEO came along and instead of helping



By Wally McNamee—The Washington Post

**ON RIOTS**—Former CIA director John A. McCone told a Senate Committee that any anti-riot law will not serve as an alternative to permanent programs.

us, as Congress intended, it decided we were a bunch of bullies and it gave a club to the so-called powerless to help beat us as we lay on the ground," the Newark Mayor complained.

Addonizio gave reporters a copy of some of his testimony prepared for his appearance at the closed session of the Presidential committee.

He praised model cities legislation as "one of the few programs which recognizes that city governments need to be strengthened and not abused."

As for big-city problems, the Newark Mayor said these are of little concern to middle-class Americans in their suburbs who worry more about buying a sports car or a color television set than "sharing their affluence with the poor."

At the Senate hearing on the anti-riot bill, McCone soberly warned that unless an answer is found to the racial problem "it is going to split our society irretrievably and destroy our country."

Pressed closely by Sen. James O. Eastland (D-Miss.), committee chairman, McCone finally agreed that he didn't object to an anti-riot bill. But, he added, such legislation wasn't "going to stop the problem."

He pointed out that his commission found no evidence of out-of-state agitators behind

the Watts riots. And, he noted that H. Rap Brown, the Black Power militant, came to Los Angeles a few weeks ago and got the "back of the hand" from residents at the two-year-after festival.

McCone, quoting from an interim report handed over to Gov. Ronald Reagan of California last Saturday, said some progress has been made in Los Angeles in the two years since the Watts riot but much remains to be done.

He summed up these accomplishments and "partial" successes: more than 17,000 jobs found for unemployable Negroes; job training programs coordinated and tailored to job needs in private and public fields; a drop of 13 to 15 per cent in the infant mortality rate in South Central Los Angeles; better police-community relations with "visible" response to complaints of police brutality.

But, McCone added, he didn't want to leave the impression that Watts was in a "satisfactory condition." He emphasized there is still bitterness and frustration.

The rising welfare costs are particularly disturbing, McCone said. He cited figures that welfare costs have gone up 32 per cent in the last two years in Los Angeles County,

where the total cost of welfare is \$400 million a year.

McCone said he was "sick" to see rioting break out in a city like New Haven, Conn., which his commission staff found to have one of the most progressive and concerned city administrations.

"We may be tempted to say: 'Why do it?' ... We have to stay at this job and find an

AUG 1 1967

DORIS FLEESON✓

## *Vested Interests on Commission*

With his advisory commission on civil disorders, President Johnson has moved the problem away from the White House and Congress for the present.

He has not relinquished the leading strings. From the chairman, Gov. Otto Kerner of Illinois, on down the commission members have obvious vested interests in what has been done, how it was done and the potential of present programs. They are in a position to protect themselves and in turn, the President, from a political backlash and a blunt finding that what has been done, however well intentioned, has not in practice worked.

There can be no question that the country is not in a mood to blame itself. This political maneuver then is a reflection of the country and it can be argued that it is all that the people are willing now to do.

It is a tactic that is the President's special skill. He used it to get his spectacular results as Democratic Senate leader and during his first years as President.

It must be judged now in today's terms, when the Vietnam war far from ended and meeting increased public opposition evidenced by opinion polls plus the pending presidential election that already has cast so plain a shadow on the Detroit riots. The costs of the war are

rising, and so is public resistance to more taxes.

The President has not sorted out his priorities: his new proposal only seeks to gain time. The various pressure groups will focus on his commission where they are so well represented. They can mull over his questions a long time, for all of them have long been in the public domain.

Democrats who question the effectiveness of another commission to examine a literally burning issue are uneasily reminded of the Watts riots of 1965 and the McCone commission.

Watts has the awful distinction of pioneering the ghetto riot frenzies. The then Gov. Pat Brown sought advice from many sources, including the White House, and decided on a commission. President Johnson suggested as chairman John McCone, an able industrialist and staunch Republican conservative who had been President Truman in the Pentagon, President Eisenhower as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and President Kennedy as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The McCone report was inclusive, it spotted the basic problems and was generally well received. Yet urban experts are saying today that nothing really has changed in Watts and, Brown lost the election to Ronald Reagan the following year.

Watts was by no means the only issue in California last year but the election turned on the quality of Brown's leadership and Watts was an important factor in it.

Johnson has had rough sailing the past few years. It began with questioning of his style and manners, some of it in as bad taste as he was accused of. It got worse with the steady escalation in Vietnam and he has expended a great deal of his valuable energy fighting it.

Presidents on the defensive do not do well. They have been most effective on the offense, using to the hilt their vast powers, exploiting to the full the immense reservoir of good will toward the presidency that exists in this country.

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 28, 1967

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1966]

## STORY BEHIND THE DODD TV INTERVIEW

(By Drew Pearson)

There's an interesting untold story behind the fact that the Metromedia TV hookup featured a recent taped TV interview between Sen. Tom Dodd (D-Conn.) and William Buckley, former Conservative candidate for Mayor of New York.

The story began Jan. 18, 1964, when Sen. Dodd's staff on his Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee finished a study of crime and violence on television. After monitoring ABC, CBS, NBC and Metromedia they found that the following networks had carried the following number of violent shows in one week: ABC, 45; CBS, 13; NBC, 64 and Metromedia, 111. (The Washington Metromedia outlet is WTTG-TV, Channel 5).

Realizing Dodd's power to influence television, Metromedia had already begun to cultivate the Senator, and almost immediately after this preliminary juvenile delinquency report Florence Lowe, Metromedia representative in Washington, intensified the lobbying play for Sen. Dodd.

On Jan. 9, even while the Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee was making its TV crime study, Mrs. Lowe invited Dodd to the Women's Press Club dinner, where he sat at the same table with Rep. Oren Harris (D-Ark.), then chairman of the potent House Commerce Committee, and Sen. Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine).

## REGAL ENTERTAINMENT

On March 1, Dodd was entertained royally by Metromedia's owner, John Kluge, food broker and big-time advertiser, at his Beverly Hills home, which he purchased from Frank Sinatra.

Then followed other dinners and lunches: April 14, with Mrs. Lowe and Mrs. Kluge at dinner; April 28, with the Kluges at their 2101 Connecticut ave. home in Washington; May 15, with another Metromedia representative, Larry Fraiberg; May 21, dinner with Mrs. Lowe at the National Lawyers Club, and so on.

And when he went to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in August, 1964, Lowe arranged to meet him at the airport and later proposed driving him on up to New London.

All this time Sen. Dodd and his Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee were supposed to be studying TV violence, including the extra high rate of violence on Metromedia. Inside fact, however, was that the study of Metromedia had come to a full stop. Mrs. Lowe had given the Senator a beautiful color TV set, and in gratitude for this and various entertainment the Senator had put Roger Lowe, Mrs. Lowe's son, on the staff of the Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee where he was able to read all reports and know exactly what was happening on the inside. Roger had no knowledge of juvenile problems other than being a school dropout. It was an amazing deal, and it continued for about two years.

## A \$500 CAMPAIGN GIFT

Meanwhile the buttering up of the man in charge of investigating TV violence continued. When Sen. and Mrs. Dodd celebrated their wedding anniversary May 19, they received an assortment of champagne and choice liquors from the Kluges with a card reading: "Congratulations and best wishes. Theo and John."

As Dodd's election campaign approached, Mrs. Lowe wrote Oct. 6, 1964, "I am the self-appointed chairman, board of directors and membership of the 'Florence Lowe, for Dodd Committee.' So far all my candidates have won. You will be no exception. With fondest regard to you and Grace. Sincerely, Florence."

She also sent Dodd a contribution with this note, "Love and kisses, Florence."

Three days later, Oct. 9, Dodd wrote back "Dear Florence: John and Roger check arrive

(sic) and believe me it is mighty welcome." It was for \$500.

By the time December of 1964 rolled around, the Senator from Connecticut felt so grateful for the hospitality extended to him by the Metromedia cohorts that he wanted to do something in return. On Dec. 22 he wrote a glowing letter to President Johnson praising Mrs. Lowe and recommending her for a job.

"I know how interested you are in bringing more and more qualified women into the Federal service," Dodd wrote his friend LBJ. "It is my understanding that a vacancy exists on the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, and I would like to propose to you the name of Mrs. Florence S. Lowe of Washington."

Dodd went on for more than a page in praise of the lady who had managed to maneuver him out of investigating TV violence on her own stations. President Johnson was not particularly impressed. Bill Moyers wrote Dodd a perfunctory acknowledgement Dec. 31.

Fraternalizing and the backscratching continued through 1965 with a regal party given by the Kluges on the Dodds' 31st wedding anniversary in May.

Meanwhile the TV stations with the highest rate of violence remained uninvestigated. So you can understand why grateful Metromedia featured the Dodd-Buckley interview when other stations did not.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1966]

## SECOND NETWORK PROTECTED BY DODD

(By Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson)

The Metromedia TV chain was not the only one Sen. Tom Dodd (D-Conn.) protected from Senate investigation regarding televised violence and its effect on the youth of America. Another network, the National Broadcasting Company, also got immunity.

Sen. Dodd's staff on the Juvenile Delinquency subcommittee spent many hours screening the networks, prepared all sorts of material ready for the Senator to investigate. But when they were all ready to go, investigation of the two most violent TV groups just faded away. Something mysterious happened. Suddenly Sen. Dodd, chairman of the subcommittee, lost interest.

At that time—the autumn of 1961—Dodd's Juvenile Delinquency staff had prepared a damaging case. Chief counsel Paul L. Laskin and staff director Carl L. Perian summarized their progress in a confidential memo to Dodd dated Oct. 25, 1961.

## SCORECARD OF CRIME

"In our hearings thus far," they reported, "we have established that:

"Programs of the crime-detective, action-adventure, Western type increased from 15 per cent of total prime program time (7-11 p.m.) to over 50 per cent since 1955.

The memo also pointed out that "experts from several disciplines have testified as to the cumulative effect of so many children watching so much violence. Their feelings can be summarized by quoting Dr. Wilbur Schramm who testified, 'In view of our findings, the amount of violence on television is just too dangerous to go on.'"

The staff's biggest problem stated Laskin and Perian, was to pin down who was responsible for TV violence.

## WHO IS TO BLAME?

"Through the process of subpoenaing documents relative to program decisions, we are now on the threshold of identifying the persons at not only NBC but ABC and CBS as well, who are responsible for crime and violence on television.

"We can now focus public opinion and attention on the actual three-to-six men who are responsible for major program development . . . A further public exposure of the men at NBC, ABC and CBS could have a permanent effect on the future makeup of networks."

Unknown to the subcommittee staff, NBC had already made a private approach to Dodd. The network had found an attorney in Philadelphia, Tom Meeker, who had once lived in Connecticut and knew the Senator personally.

Meeker buttonholed Dodd in the Capitol building on Sept. 16, 1961. Next day, he scribbled a personal note to the Senator on the stationery of the Mayflower Hotel. The note, intended for Dodd's eyes only, was slipped under the door of his Senate office.

"Dear Tom," wrote Meeker. "Thank you for seeing us yesterday. In my haste to give you the documents, I neglected to give you Mr. Sarnoff's reply to Mr. Kintner, which I enclose a copy of herewith. (Robert Sarnoff is NBC's board chairman; Robert Kintner was then NBC's president, is now a White House aide.)

"Mr. Sarnoff appreciated your willingness to hear his testimony in closed hearings," Meeker's letter continued, "and would prefer to make arrangements for the same subsequent to his return from Africa in about four weeks. In accordance with our chat yesterday, I will call you Monday afternoon."

Sen. Dodd not only obliged with closed hearings, but he completely suppressed any real probe of NBC. The balance of this inside story will follow shortly.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1966]

## U.S. INTELLIGENCE UNDERGOES UPHEAVAL

(By Jack Anderson)

From the apogees of its spy satellites to the perigees of its bombproof basement code rooms, the vast U.S. intelligence industry has been going through a wrenching reorganization.

The Central Intelligence Agency has been rocked by more than 200 reforms. Military intelligence has been consolidated, with a great battering together of brass hats, into a single unit: The Defense Intelligence Agency.

Still, many Senators are not convinced that the reforms have gone far enough, and are demanding greater control over the whole James Bond industry.

The purpose of the reforms, of course, is to improve the quality of intelligence, eliminate rivalries, and prevent another Bay of Pigs—the CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba which became a bloody fiasco.

While some minor rivalries may have been scotched, however, a major rivalry has emerged. Our intelligence apparatus has sprouted two heads, the CIA and the DIA, which often get in one another's way.

## CIA VERSUS DIA

In theory, the CIA is supposed to be the final sieve through which all intelligence should pass before reaching the President. It is upon this information that he keeps abreast of world affairs and makes his policy judgments.



Yet the DIA increasingly is catching the President's eye. Moreover, it is so dominated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that it has a tendency to produce intelligence that supports his views. Its reports generally have reflected his optimistic outlook if the Vietnam war, rather than the pessimistic possibilities.

Those in the Pentagon who disagree with an intelligence analysis, of course, are free to state their views as a footnote. But it takes a bold man to challenge McNamara's attitudes too frequently.

His interest in economy, no secret to his intelligence officers, has led to more comfortable appraisal than conservative military men would make. They prefer to judge the Communist threat by its capability for aggression rather than someone's estimate of its intentions.

The Secretary of Defense, a formidable figure inside the policy-making councils, also has had an intimidating effort on the CIA

# PLANÈTE



*CIAI.OI Whitten, Allen*  
*CIAI.OI McCone, John*

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# TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE  
February 24, 1967 Vol. 89, No. 8

## THE NATION

### THE ADMINISTRATION

#### The Silent Service (See Cover)

*What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.*

—Sun Tzu, 6th Century B.C.

Chinese military theorist

Inside a U.S. ferret satellite flashing around the earth at 17,000 m.p.h., supersensitive instruments intercept and flick back to Virginia a radio message between Moscow and a Soviet submarine in the Pacific. In Laos, an American listens attentively to the words of a cocktail waiter, then slips him a bar of silver. In an office of the U.S. embassy in Bonn, a rotund Sovietologist digests a stack of reports that may originate from any one of a thousand sources—a barber in East Berlin, a whorehouse madam in Vienna, a U.S. electronics salesman in Darmstadt, an Eastern European propaganda broadside. At an airfield on Taiwan, a black U-2 reconnaissance plane with a Nationalist Chinese pilot at the controls soars off the runway, bound for skies 15 miles above Red China on a photographic mission.

Such is the spider-web scope and space-age sophistication of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the nation's deep-secret seeker of foreknowledge in the dim, cold demi-world of international intelligence. CIA is America's chief combatant in what Secretary of State Dean Rusk calls "a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world, a never-ending war, and there's no quarter asked and none given."

**Cacophony of Protest.** So cloaked and gagged is CIA's operation that a majority of Americans cannot recite even its most dramatic feats: its pinpoint reporting about day-by-day developments leading to the explosion of Red China's first nuclear device, its brilliant success in wiretapping Soviet army headquarters in East Berlin,\* its nick-of-time revelation in 1962 that Russian missile bases were abuilding in Cuba. Even more mysterious to most Americans than CIA itself is its director, Richard McGarrah Helms, 53, an intense, con-

trolled, self-effacing professional who holds one of the most delicate and crucial posts in official Washington—and whose name has yet to appear in *Who's Who in America*. Dick Helms has been, in Washington parlance, a "spook" for nearly 25 years. He is a veteran of some of the agency's most labyrinthine operations—from masterminding double

the emotionalism of young Americans who worship honesty. It aroused the outrage of many in the academic community who—mistakenly—regard CIA as an evil manipulator of foreign policy. And the furor showed again how readily Americans, who, while seldom acknowledging the quiet and generally successful performance of their intelligence com-



STUDENTS ARRIVING FOR WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL IN MOSCOW (1957)

Once again, a spotlight on the tightrope of paradoxes.

agents working at the very heart of Kremlin intelligence to supervising covert U.S. operations that kept the Congo out of Communist control.

Yet no amount of expertise in back-alley battling or electronic espionage could have prepared Helms or CIA for the cacophony of protest that arose last week over yet another facet of U.S. intelligence—the agency's undercover funding of American and international students' associations.

The controversy once again spotlighted the shadowy tightrope of paradoxes that the Helmsmen must walk in the interests of a nation that cherishes openness and fair play. The debate pitted the Puritan ethic against the pragmatism of cold-war survival. It matched the conspiratorial methods necessarily

munty, will howl their indignation at the first hint of misjudgment.

"Sinister Specter." The story—and the storm—broke early in the week when *Ramparts*, the sensation-seeking New Left-leaning monthly, took full-page newspaper ads to trumpet an article scheduled for its March issue that would "document" how CIA "infiltrated and subverted the world of American student leaders." The story, according to *Ramparts*, was a "case study in the corruption of youthly idealism," and would prove that "CIA owes the youth of this country an apology." CIA's involvement with the academic community has been a target of *Ramparts* before: an article last April lambasted Michigan State University for providing cover for five CIA agents during a federal project to train South

\* Accomplished by digging and wiring a tunnel from West to East Berlin, which caved in only because East German street laborers inadvertently hit a weak spot while working on a routine job in 1956.

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

## THE ROUND TABLE, THE COMMONWEALTH QUARTERLY

Number 225  
January 1967

## IN DEFENCE OF THE C.I.A.

## TOO MUCH PIOUS HYPOCRISY

FREDERIC W. COLLINS ✓

THE Central Intelligence Agency, the C.I.A., its logotype as renowned as 007, is going through another time of troubles with a certain segment of the American public which thinks it finds some political profit or fulfilment of conscience in flailing at a foe forbidden by its own very nature openly to strike back. The impulse for self-examination and self-criticism and the conduct of public affairs in a goldfish bowl may be among the cardinal American virtues; but like all virtues they can if permitted to run wild begin to become an end in themselves without relevance to practical context.

It simply cannot be argued within the boundaries of common sense that the intelligence functions of a major power, using the word "intelligence" in all its connotations, can be conducted in full view of the public. The C.I.A. must have the protection of secrecy. That this imperative is at odds with some of the cherished principles of an open society is regrettable, but it does not present an insoluble problem. It requires a compromise fundamentally no more disturbing than that by which the United States government, rather than private enterprise, assumes the task of carrying mail.

This compromise in respect of the C.I.A. has been worked out. Its terms are wholly compatible with the principles of representative government. It confers upon a limited number of people, a very limited number, the responsibility of monitoring on behalf of everyone else the activities of the C.I.A. It is possible to trace, and in the course of this article there will be traced, a clear linkage between what the public wishes to permit the C.I.A. to do and the effective terms of the C.I.A.'s licence to operate. This linkage holds the C.I.A. to its functions as an instrument of the Presidency. It permits the C.I.A. to carry out a responsibility essential to today's unique American undertaking as the strongest champion of freedom in a world unique in the scope, intensity, profundity and obstinacy of the conflicts which beset it.

The C.I.A. has made some mistakes, but many of them have been more in the nature of errors in public relations than in objectives and methods. It is a young agency, not yet 20 years old. Having such an agency was a novel experience for the United States, at a time when the country entered upon a period of its history in which it suddenly found itself having one nightmare after another, and could not at once realize they were not nightmares. The means of controlling a secret agency had to be invented, or evolved by trial—and error.

It is my personal conviction, firmly held even if only my own, that the

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Date: SEP 1 1964

# Dems Put RFK on NY Map Today

New York—Attorney General Kennedy becomes the Democratic candidate for the United States Senate from New York today. Convention delegates were expected to make it official despite cries of "carpetbagger" from within their own party.

Barring a last-minute change of heart, Rep. Samuel Stratton (D-Amsterdam) was expected to make a last-ditch fight against Kennedy when the party convention opened in the 71st Regiment Armory. Stratton has been charging that the nomination of a man who lives in Virginia and votes in Massachusetts to run in New York would violate the spirit of the Constitution. After hearing Stratton repeat those charges, the delegates were expected to get down to the business of choosing a candidate to oppose Republican Sen. Kenneth B. Keating—Kennedy. Even before the convention got under way today, it appeared that the attorney general had the support of at least 900 of the 1,122 convention delegates.

Mayor Wagner, who virtually locked up the nomination for Kennedy Aug. 21 when he gave Kennedy his blessing, planned to place Kennedy's name in nomination. Former Gov. W. Averell Harriman was to deliver the principle seconding address, and Nassau County Executive Nickerson to introduce Kennedy for the acceptance speech. After that, the campaign fireworks will start. Kennedy has said he would "fight and fight hard" against Keating. To establish New York residence he has rented a 15-room house in Glen Cove.

Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-Riverhead) was to offer Stratton's name in opposition, but this is more illustrative of a split in the ranks of Suffolk Democrats than of strength for the Amsterdam representative. Suffolk Democratic Chairman Lawrence Delaney supports Kennedy and other Suffolk Democrats said Pike enjoys the reputation of being independent-thinking. Pike

gubernatorial nomination in 1962 but it went to Robert Morgenthau.

Stratton has said he would attempt to derail the Kennedy express in a preconvention meeting today with the State Democratic Committee in the Statler-Hilton. But State Democratic Chairman William H. McKeon has pledged his support to Kennedy, and the odds were good that the bid would not get off the ground.

Kennedy, 38, is the second youngest man in the nation's history to become attorney general. From that position, "Bobby" became known by friends as "the second most important man in government," and by detractors as "Little Brother." Bobby, who managed his brother John's campaign for the Presidency, played an important role in advising the late President on appointments. He was reportedly influential in the choice of John A. McCone as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Soon after graduation from the University of Virginia Law School in 1951, Kennedy joined the Justice Department. In January, 1954, he was one of 15 assistant counsels under chief counsel Roy Cohn. By the end of the year, he was chief counsel—when the Democrats organized the Senate and Sen. John L. McClellan became chairman of the Senate Investigations Committee.

Kennedy became chief counsel of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Labor or Management in 1957 and immediately opened an investigation into the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under David Beck. When the investigation was completed, Beck was sentenced to up to 15 years in prison and his son, David Jr., was fined \$2,000. Later, when Hoffa took over the Teamsters, Kennedy attacked him. The usually calm Hoffa smarted under his questioning and angrily called Kennedy "a ruthless little monster."



AUG 7 1964

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110006-7

1964

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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[From the Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1964]  
VIETNAM OF 1964 RECALLS KOREA OF 1950

(By Marquis Childs)

The really deep trouble in Vietnam lies outside the scope of American sea and air power. The great question is whether the South Vietnamese Army has the will to go on fighting on the ground against Communist guerrillas after 17 years of almost unrelenting warfare.

Before the naval action in the Gulf of Tonkin, evidence was accumulating that war weariness and political dissension in Saigon had raised grave doubts about the future. Hints were coming from the military clique headed by Gen. Nguyen Khanh that the United States would have to take a much larger share of the burden, including even direct participation in combat.

On the recommendation of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, the new Ambassador in Saigon, Washington moved to increase the number of American military advisers from 16,000 to 22,000. They were, it was reported, empowered to fire back if fired on. No one can say whether this will be enough.

At the same time, disturbing rumors have circulated in Saigon about a new coup to replace General Khanh. If the worst should happen, the Johnson administration faces an awesome choice—sending in large numbers of American combat troops or expanding the war with massive bombing in the north. The risks in either course are incalculable. To get out, a third choice, seems impossible in view of what has gone before and in the light of politics in the presidential year.

The beginning of the Korean war 14 years ago comes vividly to mind. The atmosphere then was very much what it is today. Republicans and Democrats were rallying around President Truman and promising him support against Communist aggression. Robert A. Taft, minority leader in the Senate, gave reluctant assent despite his strong isolationist convictions. It was a moment of patriotic fervor in which Mr. Truman, by almost unanimous opinion, emerged as a strong and decisive President.

But that mood quickly altered. As the woefully untrained American troops that were rushed from Japan were pushed back almost off the Korean Peninsula with fearful casualties, it became "Truman's war."

By the 1952 campaign and the disaster resulting from the massive Chinese invasion, this was the chief line of Republican attack. General Eisenhower could say at the University of Illinois that Midwestern farm boys should stay at home and let Asians fight Asians.

Mr. Truman had resisted the demand to bomb the privileged sanctuary across the Yalu River. He had shown marked restraint out of concern that the war would be enlarged to a global scale. He was damned from hell to breakfast for that restraint.

There is one important difference today. In 1950, Mr. Truman went to the United Nations before responding to the North Korean attack. By a piece of luck, the Soviet delegate was absent, so that the Security Council could pass a resolution calling on the U.N. to join in resisting aggression. This time the United States struck first.

Except for the Communist nations, almost every U.N. member approved a joint defense of Korea. Even neutralist India sent an ambulance unit. If a widened conflict develops in Vietnam, this country will find it hard to rally support. It will have the look of a war waged by white men against Asians.

This is, in effect, what President de Gaulle has been saying—that the war, as it is currently being fought, cannot be won. The French tried for nearly 7 years, beginning in 1947, and they sacrificed the cream of St. Cyr, their West Point, in the vain effort. Unhappily, De Gaulle's prescription for end-

ing the war has been based on a formula of neutralization that sounds like surrender.

Three long-term consequences of a greatly enlarged war in Asia, if it comes to that, are unforeseeable. The most important single event of the last 2 to 3 years has been the split between the Soviet Union and China, with reverberations throughout the Communist world. In recent weeks that split has seemed to be irreconcilable. It could be healed by a war between the United States and China. Expert opinion here is that Moscow would stop short with condemnation of American moves.

But that is conjecture. As often in the past, the most baffling and frustrating element in the new crisis is the enigma of Red China. American policy has walled off a nation of 600 or 700 million people and what goes on in the fastness of Peiping is as mysterious as what may be happening on Mars. That may have been inevitable after Korea. But it is today a tragic commentary on the darkness that cloaks the dubious future in Asia.

[From a Milwaukee Journal editorial, Aug. 6, 1964, as reported in the New York Times]

#### APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT

It may be that the North Vietnamese, with the backing of Communist China, were testing the American will. If so, they have their answer.

There is some danger that this country may tend to overreact to North Vietnamese stings because of our political situation. President Johnson has been under attack for what opponents call a "no win" policy in southeast Asia. He has been unwisely urged to escalate the war.

Under such circumstances, a President can be handicapped in making vital decisions. President Johnson will need courage and patience and restraint to keep the Nation from the wider war that he—and all who realize what modern war is—wish to avoid.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1145) to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

#### MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 189) to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, has my time expired?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MORSE. In fairness to the Senator from Alaska, I cannot yield any more time.

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time not to be charged to either side.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold that suggestion?

Mr. McNAMARA. I withhold it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Since the House has passed a joint resolution which I understand is identical to our resolution, by a vote of 414 to 0, with one Member voting present, and the House joint resolution has now been received by the Senate, is it proper to ask unanimous consent to take up the House joint resolution and substitute it for the Senate joint resolution?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is proper to ask unanimous consent to take up the House joint resolution, and to vote on the House joint resolution in lieu of the Senate joint resolution.

Mr. MORSE. Temporarily, I shall have to object. When the time has been exhausted, if the Senator wishes to renew his request, I may not object. I do not wish to sacrifice any more of our time. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, how much time have I remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What happened to my 7 minutes? Every time I inquire as to how much time I have left, the time goes down by 5 minutes. I was not talking on my time. I was responding to a question by the Senator from Wisconsin. I did not yield myself any time to respond to the question. I do not see how I can possibly have used any time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair's statement as to the remaining time is based on what the Parliamentarian advises the Chair.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Perhaps his watch—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All these discussions take a great deal of time.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It depends on whose time it is. The Senator from Arkansas did not yield any time.

Mr. MORSE. This is becoming ridiculous. I ask unanimous consent that the agreement be extended for an additional 10 minutes, with that time made available to the Senator from Arkansas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I voted for this resolution in the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, and I expect to support it when we vote in the Senate today.

In the committee I had the occasion to commend the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, and—of course—the President of the United States, on the action which they took in response to the unprovoked, premeditated, and deliberate attacks made on our naval ships on the 2d of August and again on the night of the 4th of August.

The facts are indisputable. At the time of the first attack by the North Vietnamese PT boats on the U.S.S. *Maddox* on August 2, the U.S.S. *Maddox* was

something in the neighborhood of 25 to 30 miles offshore operating in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. According to the testimony, the commander of the U.S.S. *Maddox* had some information that this attack might develop and he was seeking to avoid any contact with the PT boats, yet they pursued and overtook him, firing torpedoes at his ship and subsequently coming alongside and strafing him with .50-caliber machineguns.

The U.S.S. *Maddox* returned the fire, damaging seriously one of the PT boats. It was shortly after this occasion that we were briefed by the Department of Defense as to just what had transpired. Secretary McNamara told us of plans to continue to operate our naval ships in the international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, and said that now the President had given orders for the ships and men not only to defend themselves but to shoot to destroy. It was shortly after these orders went out that we were called to the White House and told of the second attack by a host of North Vietnamese PT boats against not only the U.S.S. *Maddox*, but the destroyer *C. Turner Joy* which was operating in conjunction with the *Maddox* some 65 miles from the nearest coast.

After all the facts were presented to us no responsible persons could arrive at any other conclusion than that the attacks were deliberate and intended to be provocative. When the President told us of his orders in response to the attack, it was agreed by all those present that our retaliation was appropriate. It was decisive; it was thorough; it was quick, and yet it was restrained and it was measured. The punishment fit the crime.

By such action the President of the United States made it clear that the United States was not going to have its ships, its men, or its flag, shot at or attacked anywhere in the world where we had a legal right to be without quick and decisive response. This action is, figuratively speaking, language which the Communists understand. If they made a miscalculation with respect to whether or not the United States was in truth and in fact, as their propaganda had insisted, a "paper tiger," they no longer suffer from such disillusionment. They now know for a certainty that we will respond totally and completely if necessary, to any unwarranted action they may take against us.

They now understand that we are concerned in southeast Asia through our membership in the SEATO Organization; and that our commitments there are totally concerned with protecting the newly independent countries of southeast Asia and assisting them in achieving freedom and democracy. They now know that we are not going to be bluffed or bullied out of our commitments to our friends and allies in that area of the world.

I, along with others, approved of this action by the President of the United States because I believe it signifies a long needed change in policy. It, in effect, states that there will never again be a haven behind which the Communists can hide after they have made attacks

on us, such as existed in Korea, north of the 38th parallel.

If we should become involved in stepped-up military action in the Asiatic theater, and we of course hope and pray that we do not, but if we do, the Communists must understand that there will be no sanctuary from which their military forces can operate with impunity.

I hope and trust that those who would make these momentous decisions for the Communist world, would understand that the policy has changed.

Mr. President, I shall not delay the Senate longer. I am sure each Senator has his mind already made up. I am certain that a vast majority of Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle stand wholeheartedly behind this action taken by the President of the United States.

I am certain that every Member of the United States Congress who votes for this resolution recognizes that if we do not make such response—as we did in this recent instance against the North Vietnamese—there will be other more serious aggressions against us, and others in the free world. And the time would come when we would be forced out of international waters, and forced to retreat and run from our friends and allies around the face of the globe. This resolution makes it clear that we stand behind the President in a firm resolve to give whatever is required in time, substance, money or lives to the protection of those ideals of freedom which we hold so dear and for which this Nation has so long stood. I feel that each Senator who supports this resolution recognizes that in being true to our heritage we have no other course.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, last night I read in one of the local newspapers a speculative article which undertook to give this subject something of a partisan cast. One of the expressions used was, "The President has done it again." That is an unfortunate speculation, because that was not involved in any of the discussions we have had about the joint resolution.

I attended the briefing at the White House. It lasted for almost an hour and a half. The whole case was laid on the table by the President, by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, by the Secretary of Defense, and by the Secretary of State. Thereafter, there was no limit on the amount of discussion or on the questions that any member of the joint leadership from both the House and Senate might have wished to propound, whether they were addressed to the Secretaries or to the President.

When the meeting was over, we discussed the content of a resolution, with the understanding that the resolution could be modified and simplified, if that were necessary or deemed desirable. That was the whole story.

Before we left the Cabinet room, the President asked every Member who was present whether he would give support to the resolution. Every Member responded. I am rather proud of the fact

that every Republican who responded said that, speaking for himself and, hopefully, for the party, he would support the President in his determination to meet the crisis now before us in the South Pacific.

This is in line with every policy statement that the minority policy committee and the minority party have made with respect to foreign affairs. We have constantly emphasized that all we ask, when a decision is pending or a crisis is upon us, is to be consulted, to have an opportunity to offer alternative proposals and substitutes. When we have had our day in court and the decision has been made, we are prepared to abide by the decision and to demonstrate to the whole wide world that there is no division between the Executive and Congress in repelling aggression aimed at our forces wherever we are under protocol or treaty obligations. We have religiously adhered to that posture and that policy ever since.

The President could have taken this action in his own right as the Commander in Chief. He does not have to ask Congress about the deployment of troops, submarines, bombers, and fighter planes.

What is involved is a demonstration that the executive and legislative branches of the Government stand together in an hour of need and threat, and when there is peril in a section of the world that could easily jeopardize the entire free world.

I wished to make clear how the minority stands, and how it stood in that briefing session, and also when this subject was before the various committees of the Senate and House.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

I wish to affirm what the distinguished minority leader has said. I was present at the briefings. There was not the slightest indication of any kind of partisanship in any sense. Back through the years, when similar resolutions have been under consideration, this has also been true. It was true when there was a Republican administration.

I cannot resist paying a compliment to the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN]. While on certain matters he is a great partisan leader, nevertheless, on all matters affecting the security of this country, matters which are comparable to this kind of situation, I have never seen him be partisan, either on the floor or off the floor of the Senate. He always rises above partisanship in dealing with problems that directly involve our security and reserves his partisanship, as all of us do, for less profound subjects than those which threaten the security of our country. This is, of course, normal and demonstrates the distinction between foreign relations and domestic relations.

I did not see any such article as that to which the Senator from Illinois has referred; but if there was such an article, it was entirely in error, because there was no partisanship, and none is involved in this measure.

Now I wish to say a word or two about the House joint resolution. It passed

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the House by a vote of 414 to 0. I do not believe that in a democracy unanimity is always necessary. Certainly, it is not necessary when we are dealing with matters of substance involving domestic legislation, or even legislation dealing with foreign relations. However, in the expression of an advisory opinion of broad policy, which this resolution is, it is a happy and fortunate circumstance if there can be a high degree of unanimity. So I am much pleased by the House action. I hope the Senate will approach that unanimity, if possible.

I realize that we all have our apprehensions about what may happen in South Vietnam or elsewhere. But fundamentally, under our system, it is the President, as our representative in these activities, who must necessarily have the dominant role, however jealous we may be of our own privileges—and we rightly should be in many areas. But in dealing with the Nation's security or with threatened warfare, we must rely to a great extent on the decisions of the Executive. We always have a reserve power, when we see that the President has made a mistake. We can always later impeach him, if we like, if we believe that he has so far departed from the sense of duty that he has betrayed the interests of our country.

But essentially the joint resolution is an exhibition of solidarity in regard to the will and determination of this country as a whole, as represented in Congress, to support the broad policies that have been well announced and well described in the words of the President, both recently and in past months. We are exhibiting a desire to support those policies. That will have a strong psychological effect upon our adversaries, wherever they may be.

I believe the joint resolution is calculated to prevent the spread of the war, rather than to spread it, as has been alleged by some critics of the resolution. I have considered every possible alternative, both those that have been suggested on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere, and I still have come back to my own conclusion that the action that was taken; the resistance that was made in the Gulf of Tonkin; the joint resolution adopted in committee; and all our actions in this connection, are best designed to contribute to the deterrence of the spread of war.

No one knows, in this uncertain world, whether the war will spread. It could easily spread because of the determination of our adversaries, in spite of anything we might do. But I sincerely believe that this action, taken with such general support by both Houses of Congress, will result in deterring any ambitions or reckless adventuresome spirit on the part of the North Vietnamese or the Communist Chinese. So I ask and hope that Members of this body will support the joint resolution.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in my remarks certain editorials relating to this subject.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New Orleans (La.) Times-Picayune, Aug. 5, 1964]

#### INTENTIONS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN

Whatever the Vietcong attack on the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* may mean about Communist intentions in southeast Asia, the decisive response it sparked both aboard the warship and in the White House underscores the clear American intention to stick by its commitments in that troubled area.

While viewing the incident as serious, U.S. officials were not sure what it portends. It might have been a hapless joy ride undertaken by a trio of thrill-seeking patrol boat jockeys. It might have been a tactical maneuver, a planned one-shot probe to test U.S. reflexes in a sensitive location. It might have been the opening gambit in a drive to insulate coastal supply lines between militarily important Luichow Peninsula of Red China and North Vietnam. Or it might have been a political play to forestall pending division in the Communist ranks by increasing tensions in a vital area of conflict between East and West.

Against this range of possibilities, the U.S. response was at once appropriate and cautious. The *Maddox's* counteraction against the three attacking torpedo boats and President Johnson's shoot to kill order illustrate the importance the United States attaches to continuance of patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. That waterway has significant strategic importance as a line of supply for men and material in support of guerrilla activities in South Vietnam. And it offers the readiest access for assault on supply links into North Vietnam.

Orders to bolster and defend the naval positions there seem to mean that the United States intends to stay right on the job.

[From the Richmond (Va.) Times-Dispatch, Aug. 6, 1964]

#### THE MOMENT OF TRUTH

If the ghost of John Foster Dulles were lurking in the wings of the world stage at this climactic moment, he would smile grimly to see his policy of brinkmanship implemented by the very liberals who denounced his basic premise; namely, that the United States must dare to go the very brink of war in order to halt the expansion of Red imperialism.

President Johnson's statements of the past 2 days revealed the deep reluctance of the United States to risk a major war. But he paraphrased Dulles' contention when he said that "aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed."

It is reassuring to learn that our NATO and SEATO allies, with the tentative exception of France, agree that the instant retaliation ordered by Mr. Johnson was unavoidable. Yet they expressed hope that Red China will realize the futility of provoking a military showdown certain to occur should Peiping decide to overrun southeast Asia.

Whether she will do so depends to a great extent on whether Moscow considers the time propitious to revert to Stalinism, throw in her lot with Red China, and shoot the works in a desperate gamble to destroy Western capitalism and clear the track for a Communist takeover of the globe.

Moscow's temptation to do so cannot be dismissed, but it is highly doubtful that Khrushchev—and Mao, for that matter—would risk counterrevolutions. The peoples of East and West equally dread a nuclear war that would exterminate millions and, in all likelihood, condemn survivors to a painful, lingering death on a nuclear-contaminated planet.

For the time being, Moscow has worded its comments obliquely. Tass, as the Kremlin's mouthpiece, has stated that competent Soviet circles resolutely denounced the U.S. retaliatory attack on North Vietnam as absolutely unjustified. Under the circumstances

some such gesture was to be expected. It is to Moscow's advantage to retain at least a perfunctory alliance with Peiping, if only to keep the West off balance, and Russian nuclear weaponry as a bargaining counter in negotiations over Berlin, Cuba, and her European satellites.

"Truth is the first casualty," in any war, as history has redundantly proved. The North Vietnamese propagandists claim that our report of a second attack on U.S. destroyers was a fabrication. Peiping's New China News Agency denounced Johnson's order to bomb North Vietnam bases as a move to enhance his position in the forthcoming presidential election.

Both claims are palpably false; the first, because the approach of North Vietnam's torpedo boats within range of the *Maddox* and *Joy* proved their intention to invite return fire; the second, because the President's decision to attack North Vietnam naval bases was approved by leaders of both parties and by Senator GOLDWATER, Mr. Johnson's opponent in the November elections.

As the President said yesterday, at Syracuse, in this crisis—"We are one Nation, united and indivisible."

[From the Atlanta (Ga.) Constitution, Aug. 4, 1964]

#### POLITICAL MATURITY AS WELL AS OUR NAVY ARE TESTED IN TROUBLED ASIAN WATERS

The unprovoked North Vietnamese attack on the American destroyer *Maddox* was a test both of our naval preparedness and the maturity of our diplomatic judgment.

Happily, we came through both tests with flying colors.

The *Maddox* herself was undamaged, but she and Navy jets scored hits on two of the PT marauders. The third was stopped cold.

Diplomatically, we forcefully restated our position in southeast Asia, and President Johnson backed it up with orders for a beefed-up Navy force.

But the President, for the time being at least, declined to let the incident trigger carrying the war into North Vietnam.

The difficulties of conducting a wise foreign policy and a presidential election at the same time are well illustrated by the incident. After repeated sniping from the why-not-victory crowd, the President must have been tempted to order direct retaliation on North Vietnam. But because of the delicate involvement of Vietnam in the entire southeast Asia problem, Mr. Johnson exercised restraint.

The time may indeed come when there is no honorable alternative to retaliation on North Vietnam's land bases. We should never fail to make that clear to the Communists.

In the meantime, however, President Johnson and the Navy have made our position plain:

U.S. ships have a right to sail in international waters. They will defend that right with immediate return of fire against any attacking vessel.

North Vietnamese are probing America for any signs of weakness and dissension during this political year. It is to be hoped that none of our homegrown politicians give the Reds any comfort with scatterbrained proposals.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, Aug. 6, 1964]

#### UNITED STATES ANSWER TO AGGRESSION

The U.S. response to what President Johnson called deliberate and unprovoked attacks on American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin was fitting in selectivity, proper in application, and—given the clear, long-standing statement of U.S. intentions—inevitable in delivery.

There is not the slightest doubt that further attempts by the Communists to inter-

fere with U.S. ships in international waters or U.S. planes in free skies will be met with retaliatory blows of equal promptness and severity.

As the President made plain in both his address to the Nation Tuesday night and his talk at Syracuse University on Wednesday, the United States seeks no enlargement of the conflict. But this Nation is united in its belief that, in Mr. Johnson's words, "there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply."

We Americans have also the solemn compulsion to face the fact that the Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated the hostilities—an escalation we must meet. Thus the struggle in southeast Asia inevitably will become deadlier. At least now the cause is clear and we know what we are doing and why we do it.

The motives behind North Vietnam's deliberately aggressive acts are for the moment obscure. It must have been clear to both Hanoi and Peking that shooting at U.S. ships would not frighten the 7th Fleet out of Tonkin Gulf. Nor, it should have been equally clear, would these acts be permitted to go unpunished.

The destruction of Red antiaircraft batteries in Laos 2 months ago after U.S. planes were shot at should have been ample proof of this.

Perhaps the North Vietnamese and Chinese were counting on U.S. retaliation as a lever to force greater Soviet commitment to the Communist side, in the belief that regardless of doctrinal differences the Russians would stand with their fellow Communists in the event of a showdown with the United States.

Perhaps the attacks were part of an overall strategic plan, timed to coincide with stepped-up ground activities in South Vietnam.

Or perhaps the intent was simply to gain a propaganda victory by a quick humiliation of vaunted U.S. seapower.

In any case the North Vietnamese challenge has been answered, and the United States has shown that any further attempt to escalate the conflict will indeed result in what North Vietnam has called grave consequences.

The Communists may believe that domestic U.S. policies precludes our taking effective action in southeast Asia. They are wrong. Senator GOLDWATER's statement Tuesday night and the response in Congress have shown that, as the President noted, "there are no parties—and there is no partisanship—when our peace or the peace of the world is imperiled by aggressors in any part of the world."

The crisis continues, and in the days ahead may intensify. U.S. strength in the area is being increased, a further earnest of our intentions to challenge any aggression. As the quickly mounted, multipronged strikes against the North Vietnamese naval installations proved, the United States has the power as well as the will to destroy selective targets on a controlled basis. Whether that power will be again used is very much up to the Communists.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Aug. 4, 1964]

#### SHOOT TO DESTROY

It is difficult to understand why the North Vietnamese would want to provide a clash with the U.S. 7th Fleet.

In any such encounter the odds would be overwhelmingly against the attackers. They have no naval force which would stand a chance in a sea engagement, and if they were to damage or sink a U.S. ship on the high seas this would amount to an engraved invitation for a counterattack against North Vietnam.

The fact remains, however, that three PT boats did attack the destroyer *Maddox* while the latter was on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, and there seems no doubt that the Communist ships came out of a North Vietnamese base.

In these circumstances, the President's response, it seems to us, has been appropriate. He has instructed the Navy to continue its patrols in the gulf, to add another destroyer to the patrol, to maintain fighter plane cover over the destroyers, and, most significantly, to shoot with a view to destroying any attacking force. This last reflects a major policy change since previous instructions to the *Maddox* had been to defend itself if attacked, but not necessarily to destroy the attacker.

It seems unlikely that Hanoi, in the face of these beefed-up defensive measures, will permit any further attacks on American ships steaming in international waters. If the contrary should prove to be the case, however, the North Vietnamese would be solely responsible for the consequences—and we hope the consequences, if need for retaliation arises, will be severe.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times]

#### WARNING TO HANOI

President Johnson's response to the North Vietnamese attack on the destroyer *Maddox* contained the right mixture of firmness and restraint. No reprisals are being undertaken. But a strong diplomatic protest is being combined with military measures that should discourage Hanoi from further attacks, if any are planned. American naval forces in the Tonkin Gulf area are being strengthened. And they now have orders to destroy any forces that attack them, rather than merely to drive them off.

It must be hoped that this first attack by North Vietnam on the U.S. 7th Fleet was an error. South Vietnam's small naval forces have staged a number of raids on the North Vietnam coast. One theory in Washington is that the American destroyer, as seen on North Vietnamese radar, may have been taken for a similar South Vietnamese ship. Another theory is that the incident may simply have been the trigger-happy response of a North Vietnamese patrol, or its command, to an encounter with an American vessel near coastal waters. There have been other recent indications of North Vietnamese nervousness, following talk in Saigon of extending the war.

But the possibility cannot be excluded that the torpedo boat strike was intended to be the first of a series designed, perhaps, to test Washington's determination to continue aiding Saigon. If that be the case, it is essential that Hanoi realize immediately that it has opened a Pandora's box.

North Vietnam's capability of injuring the 7th Fleet is small. The power of the 7th Fleet to damage North Vietnam is incalculable. Since this must be evident, nothing is more vital than for Hanoi to be left in no doubt about the American intention to remain in the Tonkin Gulf and to continue supporting South Vietnam's military effort. The President's action should convey this message clearly.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post]

#### SOBER RESPONSE

The administration has responded with a reassuring blend of firmness and balance to North Vietnam's attack on the destroyer *Maddox*. President Johnson reaffirmed the shoot-back orders which had led the *Maddox* to return the fire of the three Vietnamese torpedo boats, and he beefed up the 7th Fleet patrol in the international waters off the Vietnamese coast. At the same time he directed that a protest be made through one of the indirect channels available to this country in the absence of formal relations with Hanoi.

This sequence, no less than the calmness with which it was undertaken, should leave no doubt in Hanoi's mind about the intention of the United States to claim and exercise its right to cruise in international waters and to defend itself against any further unprovoked attacks. The President's actions should also leave no doubt that the United States is determined to use its great power wisely, to husband its strength unless and until there is appropriate military and political occasion for its employment, and to avoid being tricked or provoked into imprudence.

Naturally, it will be asked if the American reaction was adequate to the needs of the situation. These needs are, in our view, limited: the protection of American ships and men and the discouragement of further attacks. Premier Khanh of South Vietnam feels the United States must also act so as not to appear a "paper tiger." One can guess that others, perhaps thinking of different ends than morale in South Vietnam, will join him in extending the list of needs which require satisfaction.

There is nothing sacred about the President's restraint, to be sure, but we feel it was tailored well to the specific challenge and that it leaves the United States in a strong position, politically and diplomatically, to take more drastic action later if that should become necessary. In our view, it was sensible to treat the attack as a single incident or uncertain purpose, and not as the deliberate start of a campaign to tease the American Navy or provoke a David-Goliath confrontation with the mighty 7th Fleet. Hanoi's persistent efforts to pry the United States out of the Vietnam conflict argue against the latter view. The Communists must also consider that the advantages which accrue to guerrillas on land are largely lacking to marauders by sea.

The difficulty of reading Hanoi's mind on this score is enhanced by the peculiar half-light of signal and security which shines on, but fails to illuminate, many moves by both sides in Vietnam. Of all the moves so lighted, those connected with proposals to carry the war to the North are the most delicate. Over the weekend the North charged that two islands had been shelled by American and South Vietnamese ships and that a border village had been hit from the air by American planes crossing over from Laos. These accusations were promptly rebutted by American officials, but they contribute to the atmosphere of danger and ambiguity that enshrouds the attack on the *Maddox*.

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, Aug. 4, 1964]

#### ON WARNING

When the news of the North Vietnamese attack on the U.S.S. *Maddox* was flashed back to Washington early Sunday the administration decided to play the affair in low key. That posture was deliberate and studied. At home nerves already are on edge, and in southeast Asia tension is a standard component of the atmosphere. Because the raid on the patrolling destroyer was repulsed without American casualty, there was nothing to be gained from turning it into an emotional production. The news was made public in an announcement exemplary for its restraint, and in subsequent discussion the administration portrayed the attack as an incident of minor consequence.

There is a danger in such caution. It conceivably could encourage a rash enemy, thwarted once, to try again. If the North Vietnamese or any of their allies had found the American reaction deceptive, and had thought of new adventures, the President's fresh instructions to the Navy must make the prospect singularly unattractive. The White House has ordered the patrols in the

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Gulf of Tonkin to be continued with air cover and in doubled strength, and the Navy is directed to destroy any attacking force. In the future there can be no doubt as to the response.

The presence of American warships off the Communist coast is necessary to the defense of South Vietnam. It is a surveillance operation designed to detect any unusual movement of troops or supplies and to prevent any sudden Communist push. It is a perfectly legal patrol, and American ships have as much right to be there as in the high seas off Hampton Roads. No ship in international waters can be expected to endure attack without reprisal, and the Communists have been put on formal notice that American reprisal will be swift and devastating.

[From the Charlotte (N.C.) Observer, Aug. 6, 1964]

MAO FACING WAR-OR-PEACE CHOICE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

For the second time in less than 2 years the United States—and perhaps the world—stands on the brink of major war.

Now, as in October 1962, there is no need to talk of national unity or national determination. These we have in full measure.

All the political leaders who have so recently been engaged in partisan strife, from Senator BARRY GOLDWATER on down, have thrown their support to the President without hesitation in a critical hour. Congress is speedily backing his hand.

Ugly as they are, the Mississippi murders, the northern race riots and the growing bitterness between races and between political factions, all these have been suddenly thrust into the shadows by gunfire and bomb bursts in the Far East.

We wait and watch while the deployment and use of vast destructive powers move toward a showdown, link by link.

The chain began with an incident which, in a tactical sense, would scarcely have rated mention in the annals of World War II. North Vietnamese patrol boats made torpedo attacks on the *Maddox*, a 7th Fleet destroyer on solitary and lonely patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin off North Vietnam. The *Maddox* acquitted itself well, and with the help of naval aircraft, damaged and drove off the attacking craft.

President Johnson responded with the kind of caution which is imperative in world leaders in the nuclear age. He issued a warning and ordered air and surface reinforcements to the scene. It was barely possible that the attack had not been authorized by the government of Ho Chi Minh.

Tuesday a new flash came, and all doubt was blasted away. The *Maddox*, the destroyer *C. Turner Joy* and supporting aircraft had fought off another attack, sinking two enemy boats and damaging two.

In every capital of the world, all lingering questions about timidity or excessive restraint were answered by President Johnson's response. The punishing air attack which he ordered against the coastal installations of North Vietnam constituted but one thing—a heavy punch on the nose of Asian Communists.

But as the President stated, it was a "limited and fitting" response. While force was met with superior counterforce, the options for broadening the conflict now rest in the lap of Mao Tze-tung, the real originator of Communist aggression in southeast Asia.

Given the Chinese sensitivity to loss of face, it will not be an easy blow to absorb. Yet Mao has the instincts of a thousand Chinese warlords before him who knew that canny restraint, or even evasion, was sometimes necessary in the presence of great danger.

We can only hope that Chinese wisdom outweighs Chinese sensitivity in the critical hours and days ahead. For with all bluff gone, the issue is joined and a bloody and

destructive war is almost certain to come with any new Communist aggression.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, Aug. 6, 1964]

U.S. ANSWER TO AGGRESSION

The U.S. response to what President Johnson called deliberate and unprovoked attacks on American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin was fitting in selectivity, proper in application and—given the clear, long-standing statement of U.S. intentions—inevitable in delivery.

There is not the slightest doubt that further attempts by the Communists to interfere with U.S. ships in international waters or U.S. planes in free skies will be met with retaliatory blows of equal promptness and severity.

As the President made plain in both his address to the nation Tuesday night and his talk at Syracuse University on Wednesday, the United States seeks no enlargement of the conflict. But this Nation is united in its belief that, in Mr. Johnson's words, "there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply."

We Americans have also the solemn compulsion to face the fact that the Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated the hostilities—an escalation we must meet. Thus the struggle in southeast Asia inevitably will become deadlier. At least now the cause is clear and we know what we are doing and why we do it.

The motives behind North Vietnam's deliberately aggressive acts are for the moment obscure. It must have been clear to both Hanoi and Peiping that shooting at U.S. ships would not frighten the 7th Fleet out of Tonkin Gulf. Nor, it should have been equally clear, would these acts be permitted to go unpunished.

The destruction of Red anti-aircraft batteries in Laos 2 months ago after U.S. planes were shot at should have been ample proof of this.

Perhaps the North Vietnamese and Chinese were counting on U.S. retaliation as a lever to force a greater Soviet commitment to the Communist side, in the belief that regardless of doctrinal differences the Russians would stand with their fellow Communists in the event of a showdown with the United States.

Perhaps the attacks were part of an overall strategic plan, timed to coincide with stepped-up ground activities in South Vietnam.

Or perhaps the intent was simply to gain a propaganda victory by a quick humiliation of vaunted U.S. seapower.

In any case the North Vietnamese challenge has been answered, and the United States has shown that any further attempt to escalate the conflict will indeed result in what North Vietnam has called "grave consequences."

The Communists may believe that domestic U.S. politics precludes our taking effective action in southwest Asia. They are wrong. Senator GOLDWATER's statement Tuesday night and the response in Congress have shown that, as the President noted, "there are no parties—and there is no partisanship—when our peace or the peace of the world is imperiled by aggressors in any part of the world."

The crisis continues, and in the days ahead may intensify. U.S. strength in the area is being increased, a further earnest of our intentions to challenge any aggression. As the quickly mounted, multipronged strikes against the North Vietnamese naval installations proved, the United States has the power as well as the will to destroy selective targets on a controlled basis. Whether that power will be again used is very much up to the Communists.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, Aug. 6, 1964]

MR. STEVENSON SPEAKS FOR AMERICA

Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson's calm and lucid discussion before the United Nations yesterday of Communist torpedo attacks upon American warships off the coasts of North Vietnam provided the American people with an understanding of the crisis in southeast Asia which, until he spoke, had been sadly lacking.

President Johnson, in his address to the Nation Tuesday night and in his speech yesterday at Syracuse University, had asked unity in support of American firmness. He is more likely to get it now that Mr. Stevenson has stated the facts and explored the Communist motives.

As our spokesman told the U.N. Security Council, the attacks by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats in international waters—the first 30 miles offshore and the second more than 60—were senseless in themselves. But, said Mr. Stevenson, taken as part of a larger pattern, they disclosed a relentless determination by the Communists to subjugate the whole of the area by terror and force.

In this enterprise, he emphasized, the Ho Chi Minh regime in Hanoi could not be considered to be acting alone. It was teamed up with and supported by Communist China in a systematic violation of the Geneva accord of 1954 which was supposed to guarantee the peace of the countries which formerly composed French Indochina.

Mr. Stevenson said that these aggressors must be taught that their criminal methods would not pay. He said that the American reprisal air raids against Communist torpedo boat flotillas, their bases, and their oil depots were limited in intention, designed to correct the mistaken Communist impression that the United States would hold still for any brazen act of piracy.

If Peiping and Hanoi get the message and put into practice the agreements to which they are honorbound under the Geneva accord, the Ambassador said, southeast Asia could look forward to peace. But not until there are visible proofs that the Communists intend to cease their aggressions on land and sea and leave their neighbors in peace would the United States find it possible to withdraw its forces from that part of the world.

Mr. Stevenson repeated what President Johnson had said—that the United States does not want any wider war. He went beyond that to say that the United States does not want war at all, and there would be no war in southeast Asia if the Communists, in violation of their Geneva pledges, were not making it.

The Russian spokesman, who followed Mr. Stevenson, made the usual Soviet effort to befog the issue by calling for an appearance by North Vietnam before the Council. That country is not even a member of the United Nations, and the only purpose would be to fill the air with propaganda.

We have felt all along that the American people will support the policy of this or any other administration as long as they know what it is and what is at stake. Until now, the administration has created most of its difficulties in winning public confidence by its own failure to deal honestly with the people.

When its Pentagon spokesman has declared the existence of a policy of "news management" and has spoken of news as "weaponry" available to the President, adding that is the right of a government "to lie to save itself," it is hardly inviting the confidence of the people.

Mr. Stevenson has put Communist piratical acts and the systematic campaign to conquer South Vietnam and Laos in clear perspective. His unadorned recital of what has happened and is happening in southeast Asia will go a long way toward persuading



the people that they now are informed about Communist objectives and the purpose of American counteraction. The Washington administration should be relieved that its brief was given such effective presentation.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 6, 1964]

#### THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

Everyone hopes the President's decisive move in ordering limited retaliation against North Vietnam will cause the Communists to abandon their forays in the Gulf of Tonkin and perhaps rethink their whole war effort. Yet, decisive though this U.S. reaction was, an aura of indecisiveness still clouds important questions on both sides of the struggle.

While Communist intentions can only be a matter of speculation, it may be that the Reds' own uncertainty about how far to push the war inspired the attacks on the 7th Fleet. At least it seems reasonable to interpret the attacks as a probing action designed to gauge the American response; for a long time no one could be sure how strongly the United States would prosecute the defense of South Vietnam. Now the Communists have part of the answer, though what they will make of it is something else again.

It is possible Communist China and its allies have decided now is the time for a showdown with the United States, but their own past behavior suggests otherwise. They did not push Korea to the bitter end. They did not mount an all-out attack on Taiwan. They did not pursue the harassment of Quemoy and Matsu to the point of major hostilities.

In Vietnam itself, of course, the Red tactic has been guerrilla warfare—incessant probes for weakness, if you like—rather than frontal assaults, and so far there has been relatively little evidence of direct Chinese participation. Since this type of warfare has been increasingly successful for them, it seems likely they will continue to step it up despite their stern rebuff in the Gulf of Tonkin.

That prospect leads us to the remaining areas of uncertainty about the U.S. position. It seems beyond doubt that the Government has decided to stay in Vietnam. It seems further that a decision has been reached to make a stronger stand—advocated, perhaps not so incidentally, by Senator GOLDWATER. Even before this week's naval engagements, it was planned to beef up the American forces in South Vietnam.

But if the war aim is to rid South Vietnam of the Communists once and for all, how it is to be accomplished? It certainly is not being accomplished now. Will it be necessary to intervene in much greater force and finally take over the direction of the war from the Vietnamese generals?

Anything along that line faces serious obstacles. Those generals are jealous of their prerogatives. The political instability in Saigon is so bad that talk is heard of yet another coup. Many of the people are far from dedicated to the fight against communism and indeed an undetermined number in the countryside are evidently sympathetic to the Communist Vietcong guerrillas.

Even if it is possible to extirpate the Communists with a major undertaking, it is difficult to see how future infiltration could be prevented. At any rate, it would seem to require a very large force to seal off the various and fluid borders, and the force might have to remain indefinitely, as in Korea.

Perhaps the Pentagon has effective answers to all these questions, but our Vietnamese involvement to date does not lend much support to that hope. Indeed, the history of that involvement has been marked by indecisiveness and confusion. The United States has drifted deeper and deeper into the war, without even appearing to know how to achieve its aims or always knowing what the aims were.

For some time, however, the course of events has itself narrowed the range of indecision. That is, the failure of small-scale "advisory" action has led to progressively fuller participation and mounting American casualties until now we are at the point of limited action against North Vietnam. Unless the Communists are deterred by that, it seems only too probable that the process will continue until we are committed to doing all that is necessary to get the Communists out.

Whatever actually happens, it is regrettable the United States is once again so enmeshed in so unpromising a venture. Yet we have gone so far that there appears no acceptable alternative. And if the President's order means the Government is at last on the road to firmness and decisiveness, it may be the best hope the circumstances offer.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Daily News, Aug. 6, 1964]

#### BACKLASH IN TONKIN GULF

The North Vietnam Reds on Tuesday mounted their second PT boat attack on U.S. warships in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Thereupon, President Lyndon B. Johnson remembered that he is a Texan, or gave a thought to Senator BARRY GOLDWATER's repeated "Why not victory?" cracks, or both.

Anyway, the President ordered our Far East air and sea forces to backlash fittingly at the North Vietnam Reds.

Our men carried out this assignment yesterday, superbly.

U.S. naval aircraft destroyed or damaged 25 North Vietnamese PT boats, hashed up 5 torpedo bases, and wrecked the big oil storage depot at Vinh, in North Vietnam.

Cost to us: two planes and their pilots, may they rest in peace.

Unless the North Vietnamese take some more pokes at us, this backlash will be our last, according to present plans. The President said we want no wider war, in his dramatic TV-radio address to the Nation late Tuesday night.

The great majority of Americans, we believe, heartily approve all this; and we think Congress should endorse it after adequate debate.

And it is reassuring to see our Far East forces get set for whatever may grow out of the episode.

North Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh is obviously hopping mad over this unexpected snipe dealt by us to his wispy whiskers. He may try to get hunk; Red China may try to help him.

Both of the Communist governments' press and radio mouthpieces are making big talk about how they will soon be coming around to get revenge for yesterday's U.S. air strikes.

In that event, it may be our heaven-sent good fortune to liquidate not only Ho Chi Minh but Mao Tse-tung's Red mob at Peking as well, presumably with an important assist from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan (Formosa).

[From the Providence Journal, Aug. 6, 1964]

#### "WE ARE ONE NATION, UNITED AND INDIVISIBLE"

In the short but calmly strong address in Syracuse, President Johnson restated this country's simple formula for the restoration of peace in southeast Asia. He also made it abundantly clear that in the current crisis, there are no parties and no partisanship dividing the American people.

What Mr. Johnson offered as a formula for peace in southeast Asia is essentially the same formula to which President Eisenhower and the late President Kennedy dedicated their efforts: the governments in that part of the globe ought to follow international agreements already supposed to prevail.

The President urged the governments there to leave each other alone, to settle their

differences peacefully, and to "devote their talents to bettering the life of their peoples by working against poverty and disease and ignorance." "Peace requires that the existing agreements in the area be honored."

"To any who may be tempted to support or to widen the present aggression" by North Vietnam, he said, "I say this. There is no threat to any peaceful power from the United States, but there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply. That is what is meant by the action" taken by the Navy.

Having made plain "to the people of all nations" the reasons for this Nation's course of action in recent days, the President made it equally plain that, for Americans, this is no time for politicking with crisis. Congressional support of the President yesterday dramatized this fact.

"Let no friend needlessly fear and no foe vainly hope that this is a nation divided in this political year," he said. "Our free elections—our full and free debate—are America's strengths, not America's weaknesses \* \* \*. We are one nation, united and indivisible; united and indivisible we shall remain."

There was strength of purpose and calmness of language in the President's brief message. But there also was clarity and eloquence. There will be plenty to debate in the coming campaign, but in the face of savage threat to "our peace and the peace of the world," there is solid national unity.

[From the New York Journal-American, Aug. 6, 1964]

#### ACTION IN THE EAST

President Johnson has acted with appropriate firmness and dispatch in ordering retaliatory action against North Vietnam for its attacks on U.S. naval vessels on the high seas.

There is no doubt the overwhelming sentiment of the Nation is behind him. This was swiftly expressed in terms of bipartisan congressional support and included a special statement from Senator BARRY GOLDWATER.

The salient fact of this grave development in the Far East is this: the Communists have changed the ground rules of the continuing struggle in the Far East—and now cannot unchange them. Nor should the United States, in its show of firmness, seek to unchange them.

Before the attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on American destroyers patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin, the "rules" were clear. They specified that North Vietnam was a supplier of men and arms to Red guerrillas in South Vietnam. They specified that the United States would train and advise the forces of South Vietnam in operations against those guerrillas.

Now the North Vietnamese Government, or perhaps the Peking Government, has apparently decided on a broader confrontation. The manipulators have thus forced the United States to raise its own sights, too. And it is too early to foresee the consequences of this sudden escalation of war in the Far East.

However, now that our sights are thus adjusted, perhaps the issue of quelling Communist imperialism in the area is closer at hand than before. Perhaps now the vast power of the United States will be brought to bear to enforce peace in the Far East.

The aim of the United States in its blows against North Vietnam is not to spread conflict and not to engage in a major war, nor should it be.

The aim is peace—peace instead of unprovoked assault on the high seas, peace instead of armed attempts to overthrow legitimate governments and peace instead of the outlaw behavior of regimes contemptuous of the fate of millions.

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[From the New York Post, Aug. 6, 1964]

# THE U.N. AND VIETNAM

Clearly the United States does not seek a wider war. Let us hope Asia's Communists do not either. The initial Soviet response, as given by Tass, was quite restrained. While deploring U.S. "aggressive actions," the statement avoided committing Moscow to doing anything about them.

At the U.N., the Soviet delegate was equally restrained. His request that a representative of North Vietnam be invited to participate was doubly significant.

It served to suggest that Moscow did not know what its Communist brethren in Asia were up to. It also set up interesting possibilities of dividing Hanoi from Peiping.

Whatever Russia's motives, there is every reason to invite North Vietnam.

"It is a solemn responsibility," said President Johnson Tuesday night when he disclosed an air strike was in progress, "to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States."

That awesome strength makes it all the more baffling that the North Vietnamese should be seeking to provoke us. Direct contact with the representatives of Hanoi may shed some light on this.

North Vietnam may not like our vessels' presence in the Tonkin Gulf. The Communists have always been sensitive about their frontiers—almost to the point of paranoia. But neither does the United States exactly welcome electronically equipped Soviet vessels carrying on continuous surveillance off Cape Kennedy.

But we put up with it. The right of ships to voyage on the high seas is incontestable. The response of the United States was wholly predictable. The question remains: Why did Hanoi do it?

The more basic question, however, is where are we heading in Vietnam? Are we being sucked into a dark tunnel from which there may be no egress?

Ambassador Stevenson eloquently stated our case. But it was a limited brief, largely restricted to justifying our air strikes under the right of self-defense set forth in article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

We owed this explanation to the U.N. But the U.N. should be more than a sounding board.

The smaller nations, those not directly involved in the dispute, and therefore capable of some detachment, should be encouraged to come forward with proposals for mediation, perhaps conciliation.

Several weeks ago U Thant called for a new Geneva conference. If the parties involved in the war could reach an agreement, Thant said, the U.N. could play a role in seeing that the agreement was carried out. "Even at this late hour," he suggested, means might be found to end the war.

Nothing happened. The United States is again perilously close to a major military venture on the Asian mainland. Surely before we venture further, a major effort should be made to open up channels of communication with our adversaries.

"Blessed are the peacemakers," said President Johnson in June, quoting the Bible in a foreign policy speech that coupled firmness with an olive branch.

Provocative as the Communists have been, that still remains true.

## EDITORIAL REACTIONS TO ASIAN CONFLICT

(Following are excerpts from newspaper editorial comments on the situation in Vietnam.)

### EAST

[From the New York News (Independent)]  
*Backlash in Tonkin Gulf*

Unless the North Vietnamese take some more pokes at us, this backlash will be our

last, according to present plans. The President said we want no wider war, in his dramatic TV-radio address to the Nation late Tuesday night. The great majority of Americans, we believe, heartily approve all this; and we think Congress should endorse it; after adequate debate.

And it is reassuring to see our Far East forces get set for whatever may grow out of the episode.

It may be our heaven-sent good fortune to liquidate not only Ho Chi Minh but Mao Tse-tung's Red mob at Peiping as well, presumably with an important assist from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan.

[From the Herald Tribune (Independent Republican)]

### The right response

Whoever planned the torpedo-boat attacks, for whatever purpose, stand warned. If they were probing the intentions of the United States, of Red China, of the Soviet Union, they at least know that the United States will resist aggression, and that it has the capability of doing so.

The controlled impact of the American counterblow has clearly made its impact on the world. From its friends this country has received such congratulations as that of Japan (very directly concerned with the problem of Communist expansion in Asia) and such encouragement as that of Britain in the Security Council. From the Soviet Union has come denunciation—but it is oddly perfunctory.

[From the Journal-American (Independent)]

### Action in the East

President Johnson has acted with appropriate firmness and dispatch in ordering retaliatory action against North Vietnam for its attacks on U.S. naval vessels on the high seas. There is no doubt the overwhelming sentiment of the Nation is behind him.

The salient fact of this grave development in the Far East is this: The Communists have changed the ground rules of the continuing struggle in the Far East—and now cannot unchange them. Nor should the United States, in its show of firmness, seek to unchange them.

Now the North Vietnamese Government, or perhaps the Peiping Government, has apparently decided on a broader confrontation.

[From Newsday (Independent)]

### Mild response

The North Vietnamese and their Chinese preceptors should now realize that we mean what we say: that further aggression will be countered by further, carefully directed force, and that the peace of southeast Asia can be reestablished overnight only if the Communists will cease meddling in the affairs of small nations that want to live at peace.

The purpose of the United States is to demonstrate that we are willing, as the President says, to face with courage and to meet with strength this challenge precisely as we did in Greece and Turkey, Berlin and Korea, Lebanon and Cuba.

On that platform for national defense, and for peace, the whole country can unite, regardless of political differences.

[From the Post (Independent)]

### The U.N. and Vietnam

North Vietnam may not like our vessels' presence in the Tonkin Gulf. The Communists have always been sensitive about their frontiers—almost to the point of paranoia.

But neither does the United States exactly welcome electronically equipped Soviet vessels carrying on continuous surveillance off Cape Kennedy. But we put up with it. The right of ships to voyage on the high seas is incontestable. The response of the United States was wholly predictable.

The question remains, why did Hanoi do it? The more basic question, however, is: Where are we heading in Vietnam? Are we being sucked into a dark tunnel from which there may be no egress?

The smaller nations, those not directly involved in the dispute and therefore capable of some detachment, should be encouraged to come forward with proposals for mediation, perhaps conciliation.

### NEW ENGLAND

[From the Boston Herald]

### Test of U.S. policy

The sudden flareup of hot war in Vietnam provides a vital test of the flexible defense strategy favored by the Kennedy-Johnson administration.

The next move is up to the Reds. If they seek a wider war, they can have it. Because of our flexible strength, because we are able to answer first in a limited and fitting way, the chances of avoiding a major showdown are good. The flexible defense strategy has given us options which may make a life-or-death difference for our generation.

[From the Hartford Courant (Republican)]

### Red China blamed

As in Korea, when this country last stood up against military aggression, we may expect a world that often wonders about our maturity and responsibility to support our sharp but limited retaliation. Let us hope United Nations Security Council understands and does not temporize with a great threat to the peace it is its duty to preserve.

Most likely explanation of what has happened is that this is Red China's response to the American decision to step up its aid to South Vietnam and to all southeast Asia if need be, by way of countering increasingly successful North Vietnamese pressure southward.

### MIDDLE ATLANTIC

[From the Newark Evening News]

### After the storm

Whatever the intention, the attack and the precisely tailored response it has drawn serve to reinforce the conditions that must prevail before a realistic settlement can be attempted. Neither the United States nor any of its allies need, or will, settle for less freedom and more Communist encroachment in Southeast Asia. Negotiation is possible. It is desirable. But it must be more firmly rooted than in 1954 or 1962. Its results must be susceptible to more effective enforcement.

One dividend to be derived from the conflict in the Gulf of Tonkin is that the United States has demonstrated its capability of dealing with a variety of eventualities. However much they may rant and threaten in the dangerous days that lie ahead, our Communist adversaries cannot lose sight of that fact.

[From Philadelphia Bulletin (Independent)]

The rapid concentration of our military might in the southeast Asia area for a major show of force lends great credence to the United States determination. The crisis in Vietnam has by no means ended, and, as Secretary Rusk said, the situation remains very explosive, but it seems to be dwindling, thanks to the clarity and forcefulness of our response.

### SOUTH

[From the Washington Post]

### Gratitude for Johnson

President Johnson has earned the gratitude of the free world as well as of the Nation for his careful and effective handling of the Vietnam crisis. The paramount need was to show the North Vietnamese aggressors their self-defeating folly in ignoring an unequivocal American warning and again attacking the American Navy on the high seas.



To a world sensitive to the uses of power by an American President, the crisis—the first major foreign-policy crisis faced by President Johnson—has found him not wanting in toughness or in nuance.

[From the Star (Independent)]

*"Paper tiger" rebutted*

President Johnson's order to the 7th Fleet to bomb North Vietnamese PT boats and the facilities from which they operate is fully justified. What counteraction, if any, will come from the other side, remains to be seen. If they react forcibly, however it would be logical to expect some enlargement of the war against South Vietnam.

Our response to the PT-boat attacks should disabuse the Communist mind of the "paper tiger" fiction. But if the war in the South is stepped up we should not be content merely to hold our ground. Our purpose, as contrasted to Korea, should be to destroy the enemy and the sources from which his attacks are being mounted.

[From the Atlanta Constitution (Independent Democrat)]

*A test of will*

The Communists apparently have decided to test our resolve, in southeast Asia and even the Congo, during this presidential election year. Quick action by both political parties and approval by GOP Nominee GOLDWATER shows there is no partisanship when the Nation's security is at stake.

We seek an honorable solution without war and welcome U.N. help, but we cannot negotiate the wanton violation of solemn treaty agreements to which we are a party.

[From the Journal (Independent Democrat)]

*We have made it clear*

We have made our move in southeast Asia. We have replied with bombs on North Vietnam bases to deliberate attacks on our naval vessels in international waters. We have made it clear to the Reds in that part of the world that we have been pushed far enough.

Here we have done the sensible thing. It also happens to have been the honorable thing. Somewhere and some time a line had to be drawn. The Nation has been aware of this for a long time. It is a relief that this line finally has been drawn.

[From the Baltimore Sun (Independent Democrat)]

*There was no choice*

It is not an easy thing to lose even a small fraction of the military power available to the Commander in Chief, but in this case there was no choice. In striking back at a time of grave provocation, the United States hoped not to spread the fighting but to pinch it off before it got out of hand.

The key to peace in Asia is hidden in Communist China, in the course it may essay alone, or with the encouragement of Moscow. Whatever the dangers, the United States will face them with the courage possessed only by those who are both free and strong.

[From the Louisville Courier-Journal]

*War can be averted*

The convincing show of the national unity on the war threat in Asia, met with speed, wisdom, and restraint by President Johnson, strengthening the possibility that a major war with Red China can be averted.

It leaves no doubt in Communist minds anywhere that if war is what they want, war is what they will get—a certainty that should bring even Peiping's fanatics to their senses unless they remain irresponsibly addicted to the opiate that only a major war can head the Sino-Soviet rift.

**SOUTHWEST**

[From the Houston Post]

*Goldwater is quoted*

There can be no question of support for the President's action. This support was

aply expressed by Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, with whom the President talked before telling the people what he planned to do.

Emphasizing his support of the President's action, the Republican presidential nominee said, "We cannot allow the American flag to be shot at anywhere on earth if we are to retain our respect and prestige."

Hopefully, the quick and decisive action by the United States will convince the world that we will carry out our commitments to all free people without seeking any wider war. Certainly the prompt support of Senator GOLDWATER should erase any doubts.

**MIDWEST**

[From the Chicago Sun-Times (Independent)]

Whether events in Vietnam develop into full-scale warfare involving the United States now depends on what the Communists do next.

Whatever their motive for the suicidal attacks on American ships in international waters, they and all the world have learned—once again—that the United States does not become weak when divided internally by a presidential election campaign.

[From the Chicago Tribune (Independent Republican)]

*Unity is foreseen*

Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson's calm and lucid discussion before the United Nations yesterday of Communist torpedo attacks upon American warships off the coasts of North Vietnam provided the American people with an understanding of the crisis in southeast Asia which, until he spoke, had been sadly lacking.

President Johnson, in his address to the Nation Tuesday night and in his speech yesterday at Syracuse University, had asked unity in support of American firmness. He is more likely to get it now that Mr. Stevenson has stated the facts and exposed the Communist motives.

[From the Milwaukee Journal (Independent)]

*Appeal for restraint*

It may be that the North Vietnamese, with the backing of Communist China, were testing the American will. If so, they have their answer.

There is some danger that this country may tend to overreact to North Vietnamese stings because of our political situation. President Johnson has been under attack for what opponents call a "no win" policy in southeast Asia. He has been unwisely urged to escalate the war.

Under such circumstances, a President can be handicapped in making vital decisions. President Johnson will need courage and patience and restraint to keep the Nation from the wider war that he—and all who realize what modern war is—wish to avoid.

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Independent Democrat)]

*The guilt is shared*

The two Communist naval attacks on units of the U.S. 7th Fleet, and the swift and devastating U.S. reply, need not and should not bring about an "escalation" of the struggle in Indochina.

This country plans no further belligerent action unless there is another attack; President Johnson and U.S. Ambassador Stevenson have made clear we want "no wider war."

It is true that if the Communists would abide by the Geneva political settlements peace and independence would be assured and military power could be withdrawn.

But the West is not guiltless in this respect, and there is not likely to be an end of the conflict short of a negotiated political settlement guaranteed by the big powers and, perhaps, supervised by the U.N.

[From the Cleveland Plain Dealer (Independent Democrat)]

*Warnings to Reds*

North Vietnam's acts of aggression against U.S. ships in the Tonkin Gulf have been given a fitting response.

President Johnson, speaking yesterday in Syracuse, has solemnly warned there will be "no immunity to reply" from further aggression.

The meaning of the President's words is clear. There is no excuse for Hanoi or Peiping to misunderstand them.

[From the Indianapolis Star (Independent)]

*The proper reaction*

President Johnson's decision to use full military action against Communist aggression in southeastern Asia is the proper reaction to the events of recent hours.

The attacks on U.S. naval craft in the Gulf of Tonkin appear to have been calculated provocations. To react in any way suggestive of fear or hesitation would simply invite more attacks. As long as we are involved in such a conflict, the only thing to do is try to win it.

**MOUNTAIN STATES**

[From the Denver Post (Independent)]

*Nixon's view backed*

We are inclined to agree with Richard Nixon that these attacks were set up by the Chinese Reds to test U.S. reactions during the election campaign.

The Communists probably expected the Nation to be so split that the President would be afraid to react decisively to such attacks. This phenomenon of our political parties' interrupting bitter partisan warfare to close ranks whenever there is an outside threat to the Nation has baffled Europeans and Asians for years. But it is a rock-hard fact of American life.

**PACIFIC**

[From the Los Angeles Times (Independent Republican)]

*Conflict grows deadlier*

Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated the hostilities—an escalation we must meet. Thus the struggle in southeast Asia inevitably will become deadlier. At least now the cause is clear and we know what we are doing and why we do it.

[From the Portland Oregonian (Independent Republican)]

*Old, familiar situation*

If the facts are as represented, the American response was justified, even necessary.

What now, of the Communist response? Red China has a defense treaty with North Vietnam. So has the Soviet Union.

There is the possibility that the PT-boat attacks were designed to trigger the certain American retaliation against North Vietnam to provoke and force China's entrance to the war in southeast Asia. With each side charging aggression, the old, familiar situation which has led to other big wars has been created.

[From the San Francisco Chronicle (Republican)]

*Answer to Peiping*

The answer has been given. In the words of President Johnson, it was an unmistakable "positive" answer, and Peiping now knows that the U.S. forces in Vietnam can and will strike back effectively if attacked.

The principle is incontrovertible, and the measures thus far employed under it were sound and no doubt inevitable. It is the hope of world peace that they were also effective.

[From the Seattle Times (Independent)]

*Affront to U.S. dignity*

No self-respecting nation could have permitted without retaliation the indignity of

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a second armed attack on its vessels in the face of a protest over the first such attack—least of all that nation which bears the principal burden of restraining Communist aggressors in all parts of the world.

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 7, 1964]

## AS THE TENSION CONTINUES

One inevitable consequence of momentous events in southeast Asia the past few days is the necessity for American foreign policy experts to reassess the entire situation in that part of the world.

Although the basic U.S. objective—to preserve freedom and repel Communist aggression—remains the same, there will need to be major revisions in the planning and execution of methods to achieve the goal.

The Communists should have no delusions now about the overwhelming superiority of American naval power in the Far East—but on land it is a different story. For this reason, the great peril is that the Reds will step up their offensive in the jungles of South Vietnam and Laos where American destroyers, aircraft carriers and jet planes can't help much.

Meanwhile, as fresh policy studies proceed, and the U.S. military buildup in the Far East is accelerated in preparation for any eventuality, it is important for Americans to remain united behind President Johnson in this crisis and to be wary of any wishful thinking that the danger has passed. The North Vietnam dragon is nursing humiliating wounds. "Saving face" is very important in that part of the world.

Russia, apparently, is not anxious to encourage North Vietnamese attacks against the United States, as indicated by the relatively mild nature of official Soviet words emanating from Moscow and the United Nations. Red China, of course, is another matter. Peiping is always unpredictable. Mao is always dangerous.

Under existing circumstances it was shocking to have unity in Congress rudely shattered by Senator MORSE, of Oregon, a maverick Member of the President's own party, who charges that the trouble in southeast Asia "is as much the doing of the United States as it is the doing of North Vietnam." Mr. MORSE ignores all the facts in the case—notably the prolonged Communist aggression against Laos and South Vietnam and the unprovoked Red attacks on U.S. warships on the high seas.

In contrast to the ill-advised outburst by Senator MORSE was the prompt support given to President Johnson by Senator GOLDWATER in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation that is so essential in this grave time.

Facing up to all the new implications inherent in the radically altered situation in southeast Asia is a task that requires the best in all of us. This applies especially to those in positions of public responsibility who should dedicate themselves unstintingly to the task of doing whatever may need to be done to win the struggle for peace and freedom.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 7, 1964]

## AS OTHERS SEE THE TONKIN GULF

The Washington Post:

"President Johnson has earned the gratitude of the free world as well as of the Nation for his careful and effective handling of the Vietnam crisis. The paramount need was to show the North Vietnamese aggressors their self-defeating folly in ignoring an unequivocal American warning and again attacking the American Navy on the high seas. This Mr. Johnson did by means of a severe but measured response deftly fitted to the aggression: retaliation against the boats and bases used in the attack \* \* \*.

"Most immediately, the reprisal rendered obsolete the old terms of the debate on whether to carry the guerrilla war in South Vietnam back to the aggressors in the north.

"To a capital and a world sensitive to the uses of power by an American President, the crisis—the first major foreign-policy crisis faced by President Johnson—has found him not wanting in toughness or in nuance. But the crisis has also pointed up the office of the Presidency as the single center of control and responsibility for American power.

"Military measures were only a part of President Johnson's response. He coordinated them with the other constituencies and communities of which he is the leader. He asked and got from Senator GOLDWATER a promise of nonpartisanship. The Senator, like the patriot he is, instantly forsook politics and stood by his side."

Pittsburgh Post Gazette:

"In both his Tuesday announcement of the attack order and in his speech Wednesday at Syracuse University, the President stressed the limited nature of the American response to the gunboat attacks and the desire of the United States to avoid the tragedy of a wider war. Yet no one in Washington has any way of anticipating the thinking of officials in Peiping.

"In view of the serious danger to world peace from the broadened hostilities in southeast Asia, the United States has properly called for an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council to deal with the crisis. Hopefully, through the good offices of that agency and the good sense of responsible officials in various capitals and chancelleries, the ugly Vietnamese war can be kept from triggering an immeasurably more destructive wider conflict.

The Boston Globe:

"President Johnson, speaking at Syracuse University Wednesday, enunciated the proposition that 'aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed.' This striking phrase reiterated a principle that has long lain at the heart of American foreign policy and at the core of every international crisis, however complex it has seemed.

"Peiping, with an unsolved food problem, would like an excuse to move into the 'rice bowl' of Indochina. It might hope by a mass attack to leave the United States only the alternative of giving way or fighting a major—perhaps an all-out—war. Success would give the Chinese an immense advantage in the competition with Russia for the leadership of world communism.

"This country has moved fast to dampen any such hopes."

Christian Science Monitor: "Premier Nguyen Khanh of South Vietnam makes sense.

"He points out that President Johnson warned the Asian Communists against the 'very dangerous game' they have been playing in southeast Asia. And that the Communist answer has now come. It is intensified war—both in South Vietnam and in torpedo boat attacks on an American destroyer off the North Vietnam coast.

"The immediate response from President Johnson was being announced in Washington even as the South Vietnamese Premier spoke in Saigon. It was the obvious response. The Navy was instructed to destroy any such attacker in future.

"The United States is unavoidably going in further. The only questions are when and how far."

The Times, London: "The next step is left to the Communists, and in attempting to assess what it may be there are three guiding thoughts. The Americans, having made their counteraction, have issued no threats or ultimatums. The Communists are not forced against a wall. Secondly, the American reinforcements are enough to warn the Communists that any extension of the war would

be highly costly and dangerous to them, as well as to others. And the third point: the Americans have, very rightly, put the whole matter to the Security Council."

The Guardian, Manchester: "The war will be won or lost in the South; and it would continue there if every military base in the North were pulverized. In fact, any extension of the war is likely to make the Vietcong more determined."

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: "The American revenge came unexpectedly fast and sharply \* \* \* but still the retaliation of Washington did not get out of control. That is important."

Aurore, Paris: "In the Gulf of Tonkin it is Mao who is maneuvering with his docile satellite of North Vietnam and it is Khrushchev who is the target. How will Khrushchev get out of it?"

Vienna Volksblatt: "If Johnson rattles his saber a little it is mainly to show the electorate that he is not the defeatist and friend of Communists that GOLDWATER has made him out to be."

Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo: "The United Nations is urged to act promptly in order to prevent the present conflict from developing into a full-fledged war."

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 7, 1964]

## "BE IT RESOLVED—"

As Commander in Chief, President Johnson could, and did, order retaliatory action against North Vietnam for its unprovoked attacks upon American ships. That was a logical extension of the right of self-defense; speed was of the essence. But the continuing crisis in southeast Asia may call for other, more elaborate measures. It is sound policy to provide congressional indorsement in advance for such steps, both as an expression of the role of the legislature in the American system of government and, at least equally important, as a demonstration of American determination.

This dual role will be performed by the joint resolution to be voted today by both the Senate and House, approving the President's action and empowering him to "take all necessary steps including the use of armed force," to aid America's allies, to repel attacks upon U.S. forces, and prevent further aggression.

Red China has made it very clear that it considers North Vietnam's cause its own. It is very far from clear just what Peiping intends to do about it. But in the light of past history (in Korea, on the Indian border, along the Formosa Strait) it would be folly to brush the Red Chinese menaces aside. It would also be folly to assume that if action does not immediately follow on the threat the latter is empty.

Red China has not always made good its boasts. But it has hit hard in almost every case. It brags now that Indochina presents a far better field of military action for its teeming divisions than the Korean Peninsula, while no body of water separates China from Indochina as was the case with Quemoy, Matsu, and Formosa.

The United States and its allies, then, would do well to regard the threat from Peiping as a time bomb, which will only go off when the Red Chinese want it to. The best method of preventing an explosion is to impress, as strongly as possible, upon Mao Tse-tung and his band, that this country is prepared, physically and morally, to meet any thrust.

The joint resolution gives the President full backing for any preparations that the Armed Forces may require in the danger area. It does so publicly and unequivocally. At the same time, it gives voice to the American will. Indeed, it might be said that the most significant part of the measure is the formal preamble, which in this context is full of meaning: "Now, therefore, be it resolved."

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the great statesman from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING].

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, yesterday, I made my views on the pending resolution known on the floor of the Senate, and they appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. There is no need to add to them, except to reaffirm them. It is a matter of deep regret for me that I cannot, on this major issue, support the resolution drafted by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in response to a message from the President to the Congress requesting such support.

I believe that President Johnson in his more than 8 months in office has shown himself to be a great President. I find myself in warm accord with most of his actions and declarations of policy. I intend to campaign for him after the adjournment of Congress.

Regrettably, I find myself in disagreement with his southeast Asian policy, and have repeatedly voiced my disagreement in the Chamber. The serious events of the past few days, the attack by North Vietnamese vessels on American warships and our reprisal, strikes me as the inevitable and foreseeable concomitant and consequence of U.S. unilateral military aggressive policy in southeast Asia.

I consider the action of the North Vietnamese in attacking our vessels as utterly stupid and outrageous, and our prompt retaliation justifiable and proper. But this is precisely the kind of episode that our unilateral and aggressive policy in southeast Asia would inevitably bring forth. That incident has in turn brought about the President's message and the responding resolution by Congress.

If this resolution merely affirmed its approval of the President's declared policy and action to respond to attacks on our fleet when in international waters, as he has responded, that would be one thing. I would gladly approve of such a resolution, as I approve of his action. But this resolution now before us goes far beyond that. It not only endorses all our Government has done to date in southeast Asia, but also gives the President a blank check, not merely to do whatever he likes in South Vietnam, but, to quote the text of the resolution:

To take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

That is, in effect, a pre-dated declaration of war, if and when the Executive chooses, and war not merely in South Vietnam but in all southeast Asia.

Is that what the Congress intends?

That is what the Congress is doing.

We now are about to authorize the President if he sees fit to move our Armed Forces—that is, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps—not only into South Vietnam, but also into North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and of course the authorization includes all the rest of the SEATO nations.

That means sending our American boys into combat in a war in which we

have no business, which is not our war, into which we have been misguidedly drawn, which is steadily being escalated. This resolution is a further authorization for escalation unlimited.

I am opposed to sacrificing a single American boy in this venture. We have lost far too many already.

I have repeatedly expressed my view which I now reiterate. That we should have been waging peace with the same energy and fervor with which we have been waging war.

I have asked, and ask again now, that instead of multiplying our Armed Forces and the resulting casualties, we request a cease-fire and seek, instead of hostile military action, a peacekeeping United Nations police force. I should be happy to see Americans as a part of that peacekeeping police force.

This procedure, as I have pointed out, has been successfully used on the Israel-Egypt border, and in the Congo. Why not try it in South Vietnam?

My time being short, I can only call attention to my earlier statement on this resolution and repeat that I cannot in good conscience support the pending resolution, which opens the door to unlimited unilateral war by our country in an area and for a cause which pose no threat to our national security, and in which no more American lives should be sacrificed.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, how much time remains to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon has 8 minutes remaining.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I shall not use all of that time. I wish only to correct a misapprehension that I was not able to cover in my speech earlier, but I wish to add one further point which I overlooked.

I was commenting on a Washington Post editorial which cited the Cuban resolution as being comparable to the pending resolution.

Last night, I pointed out that they are quite different resolutions.

I ask Senators to turn to page 17845 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of August 6, where I inserted the Cuban resolution. It will be recalled that in discussion of the Cuban resolution the point was made, both in committee and on the floor of the Senate, that the resolution differed from the Middle East resolution and the Formosa resolution, in that it made no reference whatever to authorizing any power to the President of the United States. It was because of that that we were able to get support for the resolution. At the time of the Cuban resolution if there had been an attempt to give war making authority to the President, the resolution would not have received the votes it did. Some Senators announced that they would not support the resolution with such a clause in it. If we examine the resolution, we see that all it does is to set out the opinion of Congress as to what American foreign policy should be, vis-a-vis Cuba.

That is quite a different thing from giving the President any authority for a predated declaration of war in respect to Cuba, as this resolution does in respect to Asiatic problems.

I believe that history will record that we have made a great mistake in subverting and circumventing the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8, thereof by means of this resolution.

As I argued earlier today at some length, we are in effect giving the President of the United States warmaking powers in the absence of a declaration of war.

I believe that to be a historic mistake. I believe that within the next century, future generations will look with dismay and great disappointment upon a Congress which is now about to make such a historic mistake.

Our constitutional rights are no better than the preservation of our procedural guarantees under the Constitution.

We are seeking by indirection to circumvent article I, section 8 of the Constitution. Senators know as well as I do that we cannot obtain a test before the U.S. Supreme Court of that attempt to grant warmaking powers to a President by a resolution because under this set of facts we cannot hail the President of the United States before the Supreme Court for a determination of such a question as to the unconstitutionality of the pending resolution.

I am sorry, but I believe that Congress is not protecting the procedural, constitutional rights of the American people, under article I, section 8 of the Constitution.

If the President of the United States, after Pearl Harbor, could exercise his inherent power in defense of this country, as every President has the right to do and then come before the Congress and ask for a declaration of war as Roosevelt did, then the pending regulation is not necessary. The President can come to Congress and ask for a declaration of war, as was done against Japan at that time. The President of the United States can now do likewise, if the time ever comes when the President must ask for a declaration of war against a country in Asia or anywhere else.

For the reasons I have set forth, I shall vote against the resolution.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is necessarily absent today but has asked that he be recorded in favor of the resolution supporting the President's policies in Vietnam. The Senator would state, if he were here, that the United States was the victim of unnecessary provocation and that the United States was compelled to respond and, he would add, that it is essential for the country to unite behind the President at this time of crisis.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of House Joint Resolution 1145, as a substitute for the Senate joint resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate a joint resolution coming over from the House, which will be stated by title.

The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1145) was read twice by its title.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the House joint resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution is open to amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to a third reading, and was read the third time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call may be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the House joint resolution.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution having been read the third time, the question is, Shall the joint resolution pass?

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON] and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON] and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] are absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON] the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE], the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] would each vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] is necessarily absent and, if present and voting, would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 83, nays 2, as follows:

[No. 520 Leg.]

YEAS—88

Alken	Bennett	Byrd, Va.
Allott	Bible	Byrd, W. Va.
Bartlett	Boggs	Carlson
Bayh	Brewster	Case
Beall	Burdick	Church

Cooper	Jordan, N.C.	Pastore
Cotton	Jordan, Idaho	Pearson
Curtis	Keating	Pell
Dirksen	Kuchel	Prouty
Dodd	Lausche	Proxmire
Dominick	Long, Mo.	Randolph
Douglas	Long, La.	Ribicoff
Eastland	Magnuson	Robertson
Ellender	Mansfield	Russell
Ervin	McCarthy	Saling
Fong	McClellan	Saltonstall
Fulbright	McGee	Simpson
Goldwater	McGovern	Smathers
Gore	McIntyre	Smith
Hart	McNamara	Sparkman
Hartke	Mechem	Stennis
Hayden	Metcalf	Thurmond
Hickenlooper	Miller	Tower
Hill	Monroney	Walters
Holland	Morton	Williams, N.J.
Hruska	Moss	Williams, Del.
Humphrey	Mundt	Young, N. Dak.
Inouye	Muskie	Young, Ohio
Jackson	Nelson	
Javits	Neuberger	

NAYS—2

Gruening Morse

NOT VOTING—10

Anderson	Johnston	Talmadge
Cannon	Kennedy	Yarborough
Clark	Scott	
Edmondson	Symington	

So the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1145) was passed as follows:

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

The preamble was agreed to.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senate Joint Resolution 189 be indefinitely postponed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## LEASING OF REAL PROPERTY BY POSTMASTER GENERAL

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House on H.R. 9653.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 9653) to extend the authority of the Postmaster General to enter into leases of real property for periods not exceeding 30 years, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. McNAMARA. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Michigan.

The motion was agreed to.

## TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

By unanimous consent, the following routine business was transacted:

### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 1057) to promote the cause of criminal justice by providing for the representation of defendants who are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in criminal cases in the courts of the United States.

### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

#### AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE ACT

A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Federal Crop Insurance Act, as amended (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

#### REPORT ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations), transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on military construction, Air National Guard (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

#### DISPOSAL OF CHROMIUM METAL, ACID GRADE FLUORSPAR, AND SILICON CARBIDE FROM THE SUPPLEMENTAL STOCKPILE

A letter from the Administrator, General Services Administration, Washington, D.C., transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the disposal of chromium metal, acid grade fluorspar, and silicon carbide from the supplemental stockpile (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Armed Services.

#### REPORT OF DIRECTORS OF FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES, INC.

A letter from the Commissioner, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., transmitting, pursu-

ant to law, a report of that corporation, for the fiscal year 1963 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

**SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF ALIENS—  
WITHDRAWAL OF NAME**

A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, withdrawing the name of David Yang from a report relating to aliens whose deportation has been suspended, transmitted to the Senate on July 1, 1964; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

**REPORTS OF COMMITTEES**

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. BAYH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment:

S. 1045. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Genevieve Olsen (Rept. No. 1332);

S. 2458. A bill for the relief of Lloyd K. Hirota (Rept. No. 1333);

S. 2750. A bill for the relief of Fred E. Starr (Rept. No. 1344);

H.R. 1451. An act for the relief of Frank Mramor (Rept. No. 1337); and

H.R. 6883. An act for the relief of the estate of Eileen G. Foster (Rept. No. 1338).

By Mr. BAYH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment:

S. 2133. A bill for the relief of Maj Raymond G. Clark, Jr. (Rept. No. 1336); and

S. 2672. A bill for the relief of Robert L. Wolverton (Rept. No. 1335).

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment:

S. 2271. A bill for the relief of Shu Hsien Chang (Rept. No. 1341); and

S. 2790. A bill for the relief of Charles Chung Chi Lee and Julia Lee (Rept. No. 1342).

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment:

S. 2678. A bill for the relief of Dr. Victor M. Ubieta (Rept. No. 1343).

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with amendments:

S. 2759. A bill for the relief of Kim Sook Hee and Kim Lou (Rept. No. 1344).

By Mr. STENNIS, from the Committee on Appropriations, with amendments:

H.R. 11369. An act making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1339).

By Mr. BIBLE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

S. 2944. A bill for the relief of the Greater Southeast Community Hospital Foundation, Inc. (Rept. No. 1345);

H.R. 9975. An act to exempt from taxation certain property of the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States in the District of Columbia (Rept. No. 1346); and

H.R. 10215. An act relating to sick leave benefits for officers and members of the Metropolitan Police force of the District of Columbia, the United States Park Police force, and the White House Police force (Rept. No. 1347).

By Mr. MCINTYRE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

H.R. 6128. An act to amend section 15 of the Life Insurance Act to permit any stock life insurance company in the District of Columbia to maintain its record of stockholders at its principal place of business in the District of Columbia or at the office of its designated stock transfer agent in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1348).

**DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1965—REPORT OF  
A COMMITTEE (S. REPT. NO. 1331)**

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on Appropriations, I send forward a favorable report on H.R. 11202, which is the annual appropriation bill for the Department of Agriculture and related agencies. We recommend that the bill be passed with various amendments which we recommend.

Mr. President, I also send forward an extensive report for printing. May I say to the majority leader that the very voluminous report of hearings on the bill has been printed and is available. The Committee will be ready to take up the bill on the floor of the Senate at such time as the majority leader may indicate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SALINGER in the chair). The report will be received and the bill will be placed on the calendar.

**REPORT ENTITLED "INTERSTATE  
TRAFFIC IN MAIL-ORDER FIRE-  
ARMS"—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE—INDIVIDUAL VIEWS (S.  
REPT. NO. 1340)**

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, from the Committee on the Judiciary I submit a report entitled "Interstate Traffic in Mail Order Firearms" pursuant to Senate Resolution 274, 88th Congress, 2d session, together with the individual views of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART].

I ask unanimous consent that the report, together with the individual views, be printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the report will be received and printed, as requested by the Senator from Connecticut.

**BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION  
INTRODUCED**

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. KEATING:

S. 3089. A bill for the relief of Dr. Haroutun M. Babigian; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEATING (by request):

S. 3090. A bill for the relief of Dr. Orhan Kutlu; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEATING:

S. 3091. A bill for the relief of Shabir Ahmad Kahn; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BAYH:

S. 3092. A bill to amend chapter 37 of title 38, United States Code, in order to make the widows of certain peacetime veterans eligible for loans under such chapter; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. LONG of Missouri (for himself and Mr. SALINGER):

S. 3093. A bill to provide for the erection of a monument on Alcatraz Island to commemorate the founding of the United

Nations in San Francisco, Calif., in 1945, and to serve as a symbol of peace; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(See the remarks of Mr. LONG of Missouri when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. JACKSON:

S. 3094. A bill for the relief of Jen Cheng Shao; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey:

S. 3095. A bill for the relief of Stevan Akocs, his wife, Rozalija Akocs, and their children, Carlos Akocs and Jorge Akocs; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CHURCH:

S.J. Res. 190. Joint resolution providing for a study and report to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury concerning the silver policy of the United States; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

(See the remarks of Mr. CHURCH when he introduced the above joint resolution, which appear under a separate heading.)

**MONUMENT TO COMMEMORATE  
THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS ON ALCATRAZ ISLAND,  
CALIF.**

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, on Monday of this week I had the privilege and honor of filing with the Congress the final report of the Commission on the Disposition of Alcatraz Island. The Commission, established by Public Law 88-138 as amended by Public Law 88-226, made several recommendations in its report as to how best Alcatraz Island might be utilized.

Today, I have the privilege of introducing on behalf of myself and the Senator from California [Mr. SALINGER] legislation in this august body to implement the recommendations of the Commission. Representative JEFFREY COHELAN, of California, is introducing similar legislation in the House of Representatives today.

The primary purpose of this bill is to provide for the erection of a monument on Alcatraz Island to commemorate the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco, Calif., in 1945, and to serve as a symbol of peace.

To achieve this noble objective, this bill would establish a commission to be known as the United Nations Monument Commission. The Commission's function would be to develop and execute suitable plans for the erection of the monument. Moreover, the international architectural competition, designed to select the most suitable monument for erection on the island, will be under the general supervision of the Commission, as will be the demolition and removal of the present structures on the island and the building of the monument.

Although all costs incurred in the demolition and building aspects on the island are to be borne by the San Francisco Chapter of the American Association for the United Nations, rather than the Federal Government, the proposed legislation provides for the Commission, in consultation and cooperation with the Secretary of Interior, to oversee activities on Alcatraz. The National Park Service is charged with administering, protecting, and developing the monument after it is built.